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Chevron's Domain
THOMAS W. MERRILL* AND KRISTIN

E.

HICKMAN**

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Counsel, Inc.' dramatically expanded the circumstances in which

courts must defer to agency interpretations of statutes. The idea that deference
on questions of law is sometimes required was not new. Prior to Chevron,
however, courts were said to have such a duty only when Congress expressly
delegates authority to an agency "to define a statutory term or prescribe a
method of executing a statutory provision." 2 Outside this narrow context,

whether courts would defer to an agency's legal interpretation depended upon
multiple factors that courts evaluated in light of the circumstances of each case.

In other words, deference was not mandatory, but was grounded in the exercise
of judicial discretion.3
Chevron expanded the sphere of mandatory deference through one simple
shift in doctrine: It posited that courts have a duty to defer to reasonable agency

interpretations not only when Congress expressly delegates interpretative authority to an agency, but also when Congress is silent or leaves ambiguity in a
statute that an agency is charged with administering.4 The Court in Chevron
blandly referred to such gaps and ambiguities as "implied" delegations of
interpretative authority and treated these implied delegations as equivalent to

* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A., Grinnell College, 1971; B.A.,
Oxford University, 1973; J.D., University of Chicago, 1977. E-mail: t-merrill@northwestern.edu.
** Member of the Bar, Illinois. B.S., Trinity University, 1991; J.D., Northwestern University, 1999.
E-mail: jdkristin@yahoo.com. The authors would like to thank Robert Anthony, Carl Auerbach,
William Buzbee, Steven Croley, Mayer Freed, John Harrison, Andrew Kull, Gary Lawson, Ron Levin,
Elizabeth Magill, Henry Smith, Jim Speta, Peter Strauss, and participants at a faculty workshop at
Emory Law School for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452
U.S. 247, 253 (1981); see Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 274-75 (1982); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers,
453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 (1979); Batterton v. Francis, 432
U.S. 416, 424-26 (1977). See generally 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.8 (2d
ed. 1979). Even when reviewing express exercises of delegated authority, of course, the Court would
invalidate administrative interpretations contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Addison
v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944) (invalidating legislative regulation defining "area
of production" in terms of number of employees).
3. See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 972-75
(1992) (describing pre-Chevron practice); see also Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 562-67 (1985) (listing factors relied upon by courts in
pre-Chevron era).
4. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) (noting that Chevron rests on
the "presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an
agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired
the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows").
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express delegations.5 Chevron's equation of gaps and ambiguities with express
delegations turned the doctrine of mandatory deference, formerly an isolated
pocket of administrative law doctrine, into a ubiquitous formula governing
court-agency relations. With this one small doctrinal shift, the Court effected a
fundamental transformation in the relationship between courts and agencies
under administrative law.
Much has been written about the Chevron doctrine. Scholars and judges alike
have debated the wisdom of the Chevron transformation; 6 have considered what
real-world effect the doctrine has had on the distribution of power in the
administrative state; 7 and have explored different interpretations of Chevron's
famous "two-step" procedure, which first asks whether the statute has a gap or
ambiguity, and if the answer is yes, asks second whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable.8 This Article makes no effort to add to these bodies of
literature. Instead, we accept for present purposes the Chevron revolution as an

5. The Court wrote:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (citations omitted).
6. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEx. L. REv. 113
(1998); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452 (1989); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation
and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992); Merrill, supra note 3, at 993-1003;
Jonathan T. Molot, The JudicialPerspective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modem Doctrines
of Deference with the Judiciary's Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2000); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Chevron and Its Aftermath: JudicialReview ofAgency Interpretationsof Statutory Provisions,41 VAND.
L. REv. 301 (1988); Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989
DuKE L.J. 511; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REv. 83 (1994); Laurence H. Silberman,
Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821 (1990); Kenneth W. Starr,
Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
AdministrationAfter Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).
7. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 65 (1994); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay, Judicial Partisanshipand Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Orin S.
Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An
EmpiricalStudy of FederalAdministrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984; Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E.
Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44
DuKE L.J. 1051 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 313 (1996); Gary S. Lawson, Comment, Reconceptualizing
Chevron and Discretion:A Comment on Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1377 (1997); Rbnald
M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENr L. REv. 1253 (1997);
Thomas W. Merrill, Essay, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351
(1994).
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established fact and ask: To what sorts of statutes and what sorts of agency
interpretations should the mandatory deference doctrine of Chevron apply? In
other words, what exactly is Chevron's domain?
Throughout most of the post-Chevron period, the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals have paid little attention to the problem of defining the scope
of the Chevron doctrine. The most the Supreme Court has had to say on the
subject is that Chevron applies whenever an agency is "charged with administering" a federal statute. 9 Little effort has been made to spell out what Congress
must do to charge an agency with a statute's administration, or what sorts of
agency interpretations qualify for Chevron deference once an agency has been
so charged. Academic commentators, with a few important exceptions,' ° have
also had little to say on the subject.
Yet, as the Chevron doctrine has solidified, and as government lawyers have
relentlessly pushed for Chevron deference in new contexts, disputes have
inevitably erupted over what kinds of statutes and what kinds of agency action
trigger this strong deference. It was only a matter of time before these disputes
reached the Supreme Court. In the last two Terms, the Court has been confronted on no less than four separate occasions with questions about Chevron's
domain." Additional cases presenting such issues are on the docket this Term.12
Although the recent decisions have clarified some issues regarding when Chevron does and does not apply, the most important of these decisions, Christensen
v. Harris County, 13 reveals deep divisions among the Justices about the basic
principles that govern the scope of the Chevron doctrine. The time is therefore
propitious for taking stock of when Chevron deference properly starts and stops
within the scheme of administrative review.
In Part I, we review recurring questions that have arisen about the scope of
the Chevron doctrine. We start with the Supreme Court's recent decisions, and

9. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739; see Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407,
417 (1992); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; see also Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9
(1997) (denying Chevron deference to agency interpretation of the Administrative Procedure Act
because the APA is not a statute the agency is "charged with administering").
10. The principal exception here is an article by Robert Anthony, which grew out of his work as
reporter for the Administrative Conference of the United States. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency
InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990); see also Duffy, supra
note 6, at 199-203 (discussing scope of Chevron doctrine if understood as an exercise of legislative
rulemaking authority); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2093-104 (suggesting that Chevron's scope is limited
by competing canons of construction and separation of powers principles).
11. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (discussed infra notes 59-82 and
accompanying text); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (discussed infra
notes 50-58 and accompanying text); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (discussed infra
notes 37-49 and accompanying text); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999)
(discussed infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text).
12. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct.
675 (2001); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001); United States v Mead Corp., 185
F.3d 1304 (Fed Cit. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000) (discussed infra note 352 and
accompanying text).
13. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
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then outline other questions that have divided the courts of appeals or have been
expressly reserved by the Supreme Court. In all, we identify fourteen questions
about the scope of the Chevron doctrine that remain unresolved.
We next address two background principles that are key in developing a
coherent approach to Chevron's domain. The first principle, which is the subject
of Part II, concerns an issue that divided the Justices in Christensen:Is there one
deference doctrine or two? As a matter of both precedent and policy, we argue
that there are two deference doctrines: the two-step deference regime associated
with Chevron, and the multi-factoral approach to deference embodied in the
Court's venerable decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.1 4 The recognition of two
deference doctrines rescues courts from a stark choice between Chevron deference or no deference at all; Skidmore deference offers an intermediate option in
which courts can assess the views of the agency under a more nuanced,
context-sensitive rubric. The existence of this third option, we argue, counsels
in favor of construing the scope of the Chevron doctrine relatively narrowly.
The second background principle, which is the subject of Part III, concerns
the source of law that underlies the strong deference doctrine advanced by
Chevron. Three candidates have been put forward in the legal literature: (1) the
Constitution, in the form of the doctrine of separation of powers; (2) the courts,
in the form of a common-law norm of self-governance; and (3) the Congress, in
the form of a presumption about congressional intent.' 5 The Supreme Court in
recent years has endorsed the notion that Chevron rests on implied congressional intent.1 6 For various reasons, including the need to reconcile the practice
of mandatory deference with the language of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), we agree. Chevron should be regarded as a legislatively mandated
deference doctrine. Skidmore, in contrast, rests on a judicially developed norm,
and hence can be called a common-law deference doctrine. The conclusion that
Chevron rests on an implied delegation from Congress also has important
implications for Chevron's domain: It means that Congress has ultimate authority over the scope of the Chevron doctrine, and that the courts should attend
carefully to the signals Congress sends about its interpretative wishes.
In Part IV, we build on these background principles by identifying three
operating principles that courts should use in resolving questions about Chevron's domain. Together, these principles comprise what might be called "step
zero" in the Chevron doctrine: the inquiry that must be made in deciding
whether courts should turn to the Chevron framework at all, as opposed to the
Skidmore framework or deciding the interpretational issue de novo.
The first operating principle concerns the type of power Congress must
bestow upon an agency in order impliedly to delegate interpretational authority

14. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
15. See infra n6tes 166-214 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 520 U.S. at 132; HaggarApparel, 526 U.S. at 392-93; Smiley v.
Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996).
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to it-that is, to charge an agency with a statute's administration. Here, we
adopt the position, evidently embraced in Christensen, that Congress impliedly delegates the power to interpret only when it grants the agency
power to take action that binds the public with the force of law. Thus,
Congress must give the agency the power to implement the statute either
through the promulgation of legislative rules or the rendering of binding
adjudications. If an agency has neither power-for example, if it performs
only funding or investigatory or prosecutorial functions-it is not eligible
for Chevron deference.
The second operating principle concerns the types of agency interpretations
that are eligible for Chevron deference once the agency has been given the
required interpretational authority. Here, we endorse the position that the scope
of the delegation of interpretational authority extends only so far as Congress
has given the agency the authority to bind persons outside the agency with the
force of law, and no further. In practice, this means that interpretations entitled
to Chevron deference must take the form either of legislative rulemaking or
binding adjudication. There are compelling process reasons for limiting Chevron deference in this fashion. When agencies act through legislative rulemaking
or binding adjudication, members of the public ordinarily will be afforded an
opportunity to be heard before an interpretation is adopted. Extending Chevron
deference to less formal interpretations would permit evasion of these procedural guarantees.
The third operating principle concerns the strength of the presumption of
implied delegation of interpretational authority that comes from the grant and
the exercise of agency power to act with the force of law. Presumptions, by their
very nature, can be overcome by contrary evidence. We argue that the presumption in favor of Chevron deference should be subject to rebuttal based on the
totality of the statutory circumstances. Thus, before courts employ, the two-step
Chevron doctrine, they may entertain evidence and argument that Congress
clearly did not intend the agency to function as the primary interpreter with
respect to the issue in dispute.
In Part V, we return to the fourteen questions about Chevron's domain that
remain unresolved, and indicate how those questions should be analyzed in light
of the background principles and operating principles we identify in Parts II
through IV. Many of these questions, such as whether Chevron deference should
apply to interpretations announced in interpretative rules that are not legally
binding, have easy answers: Such interpretations are not entitled to Chevron
deference. Other questions, such as whether Chevron applies when multiple
agencies have authority under a statute or whether there should be a scope-ofjurisdiction exception to Chevron, have answers that are more complex. In any
event, however, we believe the framework established in this Article for answering such questions should result in a more uniform and consistent set of
responses than have prevailed up to this point.
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UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT CHEVRON'S DOMAIN

By and large, the history of the Chevron doctrine has been one of triumphal
expansion. There is no evidence that the Court itself viewed Chevron as an
especially notable decision when handing it down in 1984.17 The decision first
took on the status of a canonical statement about deference in the hands of
Reagan-appointed judges on the D.C. Circuit.1 8 It is difficult to pinpoint exactly
when the decision came to be recognized as the leading case about deference by
the Supreme Court, but it was almost certainly only after one of Reagan's D.C.
Circuit judges, Antonin Scalia, was elevated to the Supreme Court in 1986 and
made the promotion of Chevron one of his causes. 19 By 1990, it was clear that
Justice Scalia's campaign had largely succeeded; all the Justices by that time
had signed' onto one or more cases applying Chevron's two-step procedure.2 °
Since then, the story of Chevron's domain has been one of steady expansion,
at least insofar as fields of law are concerned. Chevron itself concerned an issue
of environmental law: the meaning of the term "stationary source" under
the Clean Air Act. 2' Not surprisingly, the decision took hold first in environmental law and related areas. 2 Over time, however, the Chevron doctrine
has gradually displaced formulations about deference developed in other
fields, including those with substantial bodies of precedent that preexisted
Chevron and deviated from it in important respects, such as labor law 2 3 and tax
17. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlightsfrom the Marshall
Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,606, 10,613 (1993) (reporting, based on an analysis of Justice Thurgood
Marshall's papers, that the Justices engaged in little discussion about the draft opinion in Chevron and
concluding that no one on the Court appreciated the implications of the decision).
18. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 7, at 1041-42.
19. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 377-83 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 133-34
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
20. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647-48 (1990); Dole v.
United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 42 (1990); Sullivan v. Everhardt, 494 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1990); KMart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-92 (1988).
21. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
22. See, e.g., United States v. -Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985); Chem.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985); Natural Res. Def. Council v.
Thomas, 805 F.2d 410, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 437 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
23. Up through the early 1990s, the Court often cited pre-Chevron authority in describing the
deference owed to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) with respect to questions of law. See
Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1991) (citing pre-Chevron NLRB cases for
standard of review); NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1990) (same); cf.
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574
(1988) (indicating that Chevron ordinarily would apply to NLRB legal determinations). The Court's
pre-Chevron labor law standard was highly deferential, but was not expressed, as is Chevron, in terms
of mandatory deference to agency views. See Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 786 (stating that the NLRB
is entitled to "considerable deference"). More recently, the Court has again cited Chevron in an NLRB
case and framed the inquiry in terms of Chevron's two-step procedure, although the Court was still
careful not to quote language from Chevron suggesting that deference is mandatory. See Holly Farms
Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398-99 (1996). See generally Jonathan D. Hacker, Note, Are Trojan
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In terms of fields of law, Chevron's two-step doctrine is as ubiquitous as
if Congress had written it into the APA.
With respect to the types of legal issues eligible for Chevron deference, the
doctrine's expansion has been more uneven. Although the Justice Department
has urged Chevron deference at every possible turn, the Supreme Court has
recognized some limitations. For example, the Court has held that Chevron does
not apply to legal issues concerning the scope of judicial private rights of action
because in these circumstances, it is the court, not the agency, that is charged
with administration of the statute. 25 The Court has also refused to apply
Chevron to agency interpretations that take the form of "post-hoc rationalizations of counsel ' 26 (although recent decisions have sown some confusion about
this).2 7 Furthermore, the Court has, in a series of cases, insisted that Chevron
28
does not trump prior interpretations of statutes adopted by the Court itself.
law.

Horse Union Organizers "Employees"?: A New Look at Deference to the NLRB's Interpretation of
NLRA Section 2(3), 93 MICH. L. REV. 772, 775-76, 788-89 (1995) (citing pre-Chevron precedent, as
illustrating a "long history of Supreme Court deference to the Board's experience and expertise," but
asserting that courts today assess NLRB interpretations under Chevron). We argue below that NLRB
adjudications are not entitled to Chevron deference because NLRB orders are not self-executing. See
infra notes 276-85 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., At. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r, 523 U.S. 382, 387 (1998) (applying Chevron's two-step
analysis in evaluating Treasury regulations interpreting the Internal Revenue Code). Although commentators generally view Chevron as the prevailing standard in tax cases, the extent and consistency with
which the courts have applied Chevron deference to Treasury regulations remains a matter of some
debate. See, e.g., David A. Brennen, Treasury Regulations and JudicialDeference in the Post-Chevron
Era, 13 GA. ST. U. L. Rev. 387, 389 (1997) (comparing pre-Chevron and post-Chevron deference to
Treasury regulations and suggesting that "every major Supreme Court case since 1984 involving the
validity of a Treasury regulation is consistent with Chevron"); John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax
Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 35, 57-63 (1995)
(recounting the slow progression of courts applying Chevron deference to Treasury regulations, and
accusing the Supreme Court of ignoring Chevron in favor of pre-Chevron standards as late as 1991).
25. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990); see also Crandon v. United States,
494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing against deference to agencies' interpretations
of a criminal law, which is administered by the courts).
26. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 485 n.3 (1991) (White, J., concurring) (denying deference to EEOC litigating position);
Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 174-75 (1989) (giving no deference to interpretation
of statute advanced in the government's brief but not reflected in a regulation).
27. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (distinguishing Georgetown and affording
Seminole Rock deference, discussed infra note 87, to an interpretation advanced in agency's amicus
brief); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1996) (distinguishing Georgetown and
affording Chevron deference to proposed agency rule adopted in response to litigation); Estate of
Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 476 (1992) (characterizing as a "difficult question"
whether deference is ever appropriate to interpretations developed during litigation).
28. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 295 (1996); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37
(1992); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990); see also Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1989) (noting, outside the Chevron
context, that "[a] rule of law that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous, or
incomplete statutory provision is no less binding than a rule that is based on the plain meaning of a
statute"). See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J.
2225 (1997); Rebecca Hanner White, The Stare Decisis "Exception" to the Chevron Deference Rule,
44 FLA. L. REv. 723 (1992).
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The last two Terms have witnessed an acceleration the Court's consideration
of questions about Chevron's domain. The Court has rendered four important
decisions about the scope of the Chevron doctrine. These decisions provide an
appropriate introduction to the questions about Chevron's domain that have
come to the fore, and reveal the lack of a unifying perspective in the Court's
approach to these questions. In this Part, we review these four recent decisions,
and then briefly catalogue the fourteen questions about Chevron's domain that
have yet to be resolved by the Court.
A. FOUR RECENT DECISIONS
29

1. United States v. HaggarApparel Co.
The first of the four decisions required the Court to decide whether Chevron
applies under a statutory scheme that calls for a court to exercise de novo
review in considering a challenge to administrative action. More specifically,
the question was whether regulations issued by the United States Customs
Service are entitled to Chevron deference in a suit for refunds of customs duties
filed in the Court of International Trade (CIT). The statute governing such suits
had long been interpreted as requiring the CIT to conduct a trial de novo to
determine how much duty was owed, 30 and the CIT had conducted such a trial
31
in the proceeding under review.
Notwithstanding the traditional understanding that de novo review is incompatible with deference, 32 the Supreme Court held that Chevron is fully applicable to interpretations of statutes contained in regulations issued by the Customs
Service when such interpretations are drawn into question in refund suits. The
Court discerned no incompatibility in a court conducting a trial de novo to
determine the facts while simultaneously deferring to an agency's interpretation
of law. 3 3 The Court was willing to assume that Congress has the power "to
direct the court not to pay deference to the agency's views, ' ' 3 that is, to spell

29. 526 U.S. 380 (1999).
30. See Haggar Apparel Co. v. United States, 127 F.3d 1460, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing cases),
vacated by 526 U.S. 380 (1999).
31. See id. at 1462. Refund suits are technically not actions for judicial review of action by.the
Customs Service, but are original actions filed in court seeking a refund of duties unlawfully imposed.
The importer in Haggar Apparel argued that Customs Service regulations were addressed only to
customs officers, and were not binding on courts hearing original actions for refunds, but the Court
rejected this contention. HaggarApparel,526 U.S. at 386-90.
32. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
755 (1989); United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 369 (1967); see also Aronson v. IRS,
973 F.2d 962, 965 (1st Cir. 1992) (Breyer, C.J.) (noting that, where statute provides for de novo review,
the court does not defer to agency's interpretation of that statute); Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694,
697-98 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (confirming that de novo review means that "the legal issue
presented is to be reviewed nondeferentially").
33. As the Court put it, "Deference can be given to regulations without impairing the authority of the
court to make factual determinations, and to apply those determinations to the law, de novo." Haggar
Apparel, 526 U.S. at 391.
34. Id.
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out unambiguously that questions of law as well as questions of fact were to be
decided de novo. But, the Court did not find such a directive in the refund
statute.
Haggar Apparel can be seen as seeking to specify the strength of the
presumption in favor of deference announced in Chevron and what it takes to
overcome it. 3 5 The decision suggests the presumption is quite strong. The
direction to the CIT to conduct a trial de novo clearly suggests that Congress
had little faith in fact-finding by the Customs Service, but the Court was
unwilling to generalize from this expression of congressional preference for
judicial decisionmaking. In effect, the Court seemed to say that Congress must
speak explicitly if it wishes to turn off the Chevron doctrine; any doubts and
ambiguities, at least as manifested in the statement of the standard of review,
will be construed in favor of continued application of Chevron.36
It would be a mistake, however, to read Haggar Apparel as a definitive
statement about the strength of the presumption in favor of Chevron deference
in all circumstances. The Court's analysis hewed closely to the specifics of the
statute applicable to refund suits in the CIT, and could be readily distinguished
in other circumstances. Still, there is no question that the Court's attitude was
extremely sympathetic to the application of Chevron deference.
37

2. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre

Less than two weeks later, the Court turned to another issue about the scope
of the Chevron doctrine: whether Chevron applies to legal interpretations
adopted by agencies in adjudication rather than rulemaking. The case involved a
provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act making aliens ineligible for
withholding of deportation if they have "committed a serious nonpolitical
crime" before entry into the United States. 38 The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) denied relief to the respondent under this provision, relying on an
interpretation of "serious nonpolitical crime" adopted in the prior adjudication
of another deportation case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit adopted a more lenient interpretation, and reversed. 39 The Supreme
Court reversed in turn, holding that the BIA's interpretation was entitled to
Chevron deference, and should have been upheld.4 °

35. Accord Claire R. Kelly & Patrick C. Reed, Once More unto the Breach: Reconciling Chevron
Analysis and De Novo Judicial Review After United States v. Haggar Apparel Company, 49 AM. U. L.
REV. 1167 (2000).
36. This characterization is consistent with the Court's treatment of the contention that Chevron
deference was "inconsistent with the historical practice in customs cases." HaggarApparel, 526 U.S. at
393. The Court's response was that the history "is not so uniform and clear as to convince us that
judicial deference would thwart congressional intent." Id.
37. 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1994 & Supp. In 1997).
39. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 121 F3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1997).
40. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424-25.
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The extension of Chevron to interpretations rendered in adjudications is
potentially a major clarification of the scope of the doctrine. Chevron itself
involved an interpretation advanced in a regulation, 4 ' and the majority of cases
following Chevron have involved regulations. Some commentators have argued
that Chevron's notion of an implied delegation of interpretative authority can be
reconciled with other features of administrative law only if Chevron is limited
to legislative rulemaking.42 On the other hand, the Court on several occasions
without comment has applied Chevron to agency interpretations set forth in
adjudications or even more informal decisional contexts.43 None of these
decisions, however, addresses the question whether it is proper to extend
Chevron deference to such interpretations; they offer at most sub silentio
holdings. In the face of these conflicting signals, the lower courts understandably have exhibited considerable confusion about whether Chevron deference
applies to agencies that lack rulemaking power 44 or to agency interpretations
advanced in procedural formats other than notice-and-comment rulemaking.4 5
Yet, it would be a mistake to read Aguirre-Aguirre as having established that
all interpretations adopted by agencies in adjudications are eligible for Chevron
deference. Some features of the decision point toward such a broad holding.
Most notably, the Court nowhere mentioned whether the Attorney General had
the power to implement the withholding of the deportation remedy through
legislative rulemaking.46 This omission may suggest that the Court did not
regard it as relevant whether Congress had delegated legislative rulemaking
power to the agency. However, the Court also stressed language in the statute
providing that "[t]he Attorney General shall be charged with the administration
and enforcement" of the Act, and that the Attorney General's decision "shall be

41. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 858-59 (1984)
(describing the promulgation of the regulation in question).
42. See Duffy, supra note 6, at 199-203; Herz, supra note 6, at 200-03.
43. See Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 452-53 (1999) (Medicare
Provider Reimbursement Manual); Nationsbank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995) (letter of Comptroller of Currency); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston &
Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 413-14 (1992) (adjudication by Interstate Commerce Commission);
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647-48 (1990) (informal adjudication);
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574 (1988)
(NLRB adjudication); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 978-79 (1986) (no-action decision
of the Food and Drug Administration).
44. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (agency lacking
rulemaking power not entitled to Chevron deference); Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d
437, 441-43 (en banc) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 516 U.S. 152 (1996).
45. See, e.g., Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1307-08 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (tariff
classification ruling of Customs Service adopted without notice-and-comment rulemaking not entitled
to Chevron deference), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000); In re Appletree Markets, Inc., 19 F.3d
969, 973 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Absent executive rulemaking, it remains the duty of courts to construe the
statute in order to divine congressional intent.").
46. The Attorney General does have such power. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2000).
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controlling" with respect to all issues of law."7 These provisions, the latter in
particular, would seem to qualify as express delegations of interpretational
power to the Attorney General, eliminating any need to invoke a Chevron-like
presumption of implied interpretational power at all. The Court also stressed
that the decision implicated questions of foreign relations, where courts have
traditionally deferred to the executive branch. 48 Given these context-specific
factors, Aguirre-Aguirre does not necessarily resolve the question whether
interpretations advanced in adjudications by other agencies, operating under
different statutes, are similarly entitled to Chevron deference.4 9
3. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.5 °

Questions about Chevron's domain were again on the Court's agenda in the
1999 Term, this time in a more controversial form. In one notable decision, the
Court by a vote of five to four invalidated one of the Clinton Administration's
major domestic policy initiatives: regulations promulgated by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to restrict the marketing and distribution of tobacco
products to minors.
Acting through notice-and-comment rulemaking, the FDA had interpreted the
jurisdictional provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), in
particular the provisions authorizing the FDA to regulate "drugs" and "de-

47. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 111 1997)).
Although the statute says that the determination of "the Attorney General" shall be controlling, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a)(1) (2000), the Attorney General has delegated his authority under the Act to the Board of
Immigration Appeals. See Aguirre-Aguirre,526 U.S. at 425.
48. See Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425 (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)). See
generally Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and ForeignAffairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649 (2000).
49. The question of how far Chevron applies to adjudications by the INS was critical in the
high-profile litigation involving Elian Gonzalez, the six-year-old Cuban boy who washed ashore in
Florida after fleeing from Cuba with his mother, who died in the attempt. The key question was who
had the legal authority to speak for Elian in determining whether he would seek asylum in the United
States. The INS, in an informal adjudication, determined that Elian's Cuban father had such authority.
Despite expressing some misgiving about this interpretation, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit held that
the ruling was entitled Chevron deference and affirmed. See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1349-54
(lth Cir. 2000). On petition for rehearing, the court was confronted with the argument that the
Supreme Court's intervening decision in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), established that Chevron was inapplicable. Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez, 215 F.3d 1243, 1245 (11th Cir. 2000);
see also infra notes 59-82 and accompanying text (describing the Christensen decision). Christensen
denied Chevron deference to an agency opinion letter and stated that Chevron applies only to agency
actions having the "force of law," such as "formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking."
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit, however, concluded that the
reference in Christensen to formal adjudication was only "illustrative," and "not to be an exhaustive or
complete list of agency acts due deference." Gonzalez, 215 F.3d at 1245 n.3. Accordingly, the court of
appeals declined to "extend" Christensen to informal adjudications, see id. at 1245, and adhered to its
decision to give Chevron deference to the INS's legal determination regarding who had legal authority
to speak for Elian. The Supreme Court refused to stay the Eleventh Circuit's decision and denied a
petition for certiorari, see Gonzalez v. Reno, 120 S. Ct. 2737 (2000), resulting in Elian's return to Cuba
with his father.
50. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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vices,"' 5' to be broad enough to support its regulation of tobacco products. 52 On
review, the FDA urged that this interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference. The tobacco industry and its supporting amici offered a variety of
arguments in opposition, including the contention that Chevron ought not to
apply to interpretations that implicate the scope of an agency's regulatory
jurisdiction.5 3
The Court has never resolved whether there should be a "scope of jurisdiction" exception to Chevron deference, 54 and it did not directly address this
possibility in Brown & Williamson either. Instead, relying on arguments based
on the structure of the Act, a long history of administrative disclaimers of
authority over tobacco, and inferences from other tobacco-specific statutes, the
majority concluded that Congress had a "clear intent" to preclude FDA jurisdiction over tobacco under the FDCA.55 In other words, the Court assumed that
Chevron applied, and resolved the case against the agency at step one. The
dissenters also assumed that Chevron applied, but would have upheld the FDA's
tobacco policy as consistent with both the plain language and general purposes
of the FDCA.5 6
Notwithstanding the appearance of business-as-usual on the Chevron front in
Brown & Williamson, the final section of the majority opinion suggested what
could become a significant modification to Chevron's two-step approach. Observing that Chevron deference rests on the assumption that congressional ambiguity or silence is an implied delegation to the agency to "fill in the statutory
gaps," the majority suggested that this assumption is not plausible where
"extraordinary" issues about the scope of the agency's jurisdiction are concerned.5 7 Congressional silence in this context, the majority suggested, is more

51. 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)-(h), 393 (2000).
52. See Nicotine in Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are Nicotine
Delivery Devices Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61
Fed. Reg. 44,619 (Aug.. 28, 1996).
53. Brief of Respondent Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Brown & Williamson (No. 98-1152),
available at 1999 WL 712572, at *37-38; Brief of Amicus Curiae Product Liability Advisory Council,
Inc., in Support of Respondents, Brown & Williamson (No. 98-1152), availableat 1999 WL 712593, at
*13-17.
54. See Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 43 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing against
recognition of such an exception); Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Moore, 487 U.S. 354,
381-82 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing against jurisdictional question exception);
id. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (urging recognition of jurisdictional question exception). The
lower courts have divided over the question. Compare Air Courier v. United States Postal Serv., 959
F.2d 1213, 1225 (3d Cir. 1992) (Becker, J., concurring) (stating that Chevron deference to jurisdictional
questions limited), and N.Y. Shipping Ass'n v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(indicating deference inappropriate to jurisdictional interpretation), with Ok. Nat'l Gas Co. v. FERC, 28
F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concluding that Chevron deference to jurisdictional questions is
appropriate), and Transpacific Westbound Rate Agreement v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 951 F.2d 950, 952-54
(9th Cir. 1991) (giving deference to agency decision to regulate a new type of rate agreement).
55. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126; see id. at 132, 143.
56. See id. at 170-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 159.
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likely to mean that Congress intended to reserve authority to itself to determine
whether there should be future regulation.58
This reverse presumption regarding congressional silence, although appearing at the end of an elaborate analysis of statutory interpretation at step one,
could turn out to be an important qualification to Chevron. One way of reading
the majority opinion is that, as in Haggar Apparel, the Court was addressing
what is required to overcome the presumption in favor of deference to an
agency's interpretation of a statute that it is charged with administering. On this
reading, the Court in effect said that the presumption of delegated interpretative
power is overcome if the totality of the circumstances suggests Congress had a
contrary intention. If the legal issue as to which Congress was silent is an
"ordinary" one, the usual presumption that Congress intended the agency to
resolve such issue prevails. However, if the legal question as to which Congress
is silent is "extraordinary," then this congressional silence should be interpreted
to mean that the agency is not entitled to mandatory deference. Under this
reading, Brown & Williamson adopted the functional equivalent of an exception
to Chevron deference in cases that involve ambiguities about the scope of an
agency's jurisdiction.
An alternative reading, which is more in keeping with the majority's protestations that congressional intent to deny FDA jurisdiction over tobacco was clear,
is that the majority's remarks about the inferences to be drawn from congressional silence were designed simply to reinforce the conclusion that the controversy was resolved properly at Chevron step one. Only time will tell which
reading is correct. Meanwhile, the underlying question of whether there should
be a "scope of jurisdiction" exception to Chevron remains unresolved.
4. Christensen v. HarrisCounty5 9
The most important of the Court's recent engagements over the scope of the
Chevron doctrine reveals most clearly the lack of consensus within the Court
regarding the basic principles to be used in resolving questions about Chevron's
domain. Christensen involved a section of the Fair Labor Standards Act that
permits state and local governments to fulfill overtime obligations to public
58. A somewhat similar argument was advanced a year earlier by the dissenting opinions in AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 407 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the long
history recognizing that States have exclusive authority to regulate intrastate telecommunications
means that Congress must expressly confer such authority on FCC before it can regulate intrastate
service); id. at 413 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same). See also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct.
903 (2001) ("The implausibility of Congress's leaving a highly significant issue unaddressed (and thus
delegating its resolution to the administering agency) is assuredly one of the factors to be considered in
determining whether there is ambiguity" (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 590 n.*
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotations omitted))); cf
NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1951) (refusing to defer to the Labor Board's
determination whether the Congress of Industrial Organizations was required to disclaim affiliation
with the communist party because the issue "goes to the heart of the validity of the proceedings on
which the order is based").
59. 529 U.S..576(2000).
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employees by giving them compensatory time off rather than additional money
compensation. 60 The question was whether this provision applies only when
there is an agreement between the governmental unit and its employees for
payment in "comp-time," or whether a governmental unit can unilaterally
impose such a requirement. The Department of Labor's Wage and Hour division, appearing as amicus curiae, took the position that an agreement is required. 6' The Department urged that this reading was entitled. to Chevron
deference, and pointed in support to an opinion letter signed by the Acting
Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division adopting this position.6 2
Writing for a majority of five, Justice Thomas held that the Wage and Hour
Division's interpretation was not entitled to Chevron deference. 6 3 The majority
distinguished between interpretations set forth in agency actions that have the
"force of law" and interpretations contained in agency actions that do not have
the force of law. As examples of actions falling in the former category, the
majority cited those adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication. As examples of actions falling in the latter category, the
majority mentioned opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines. 64 Only interpretations having the force of law, the
majority indicated, are eligible for Chevron deference. Interpretations that lack
this attribute, such as an opinion letter, should be assessed under the deference
standard set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,65 which asks whether the agency's
interpretation has the "power to persuade. 6 6 The majority found the opinion
letter unpersuasive, and hence, entitled to little weight under the Skidmore
analysis.6 7
The Court's decision in Christensen represents a potentially significant contraction of the scope of Chevron. Unfortunately, the majority did not explain why
having the force of law should mark the dividing line between interpretations
entitled to Chevron deference and those entitled to Skidmore deference. The
distinction was presented as a restatement of precedent, but was not linked in
any way to the underlying premises of the Chevron doctrine.
Moreover, the majority decision's invocation of the force of law as the
defining attribute for actions entitled to Chevron deference does not correspond
exactly with its illustrations. Agencies sometimes issue regulations having the
force of law without following notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. For
example, both procedural rules and interim rules promulgated pursuant to the

60. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2000).
61. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Christensen (No.
98-1167), availableat 1999 WL 1128266, at * 10-21.
62. See id. at *15 (citing Opinion Letter from Wage & Hour Div., Dep't of Labor (Sept. 14, 1992),
availableat 1992 WL 845100).
63. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586-88.
64. See id. at 587.
65. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
66. Christensen,529 U.S. at 587.
67. See id.
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APA's "good cause" exception are legally binding, and yet, are excused from
notice-and-comment requirements.6 8 Christensen is unclear about whether these
sorts of rules are entitled to Chevron deference. And where do interpretative
rules-not mentioned by the majority-fit within its categories? Interpretative
rules are often said not to have the force of law, 69 and like procedural rules and
interim rules issued under the good cause exception they are exempt from
notice-and-comment requirements.7 ° Yet, some agencies routinely use notice-andcomment in adopting interpretative rules. 7' Christensen leaves the door open to
the possibility that Chevron would apply to interpretative rules if the agency
voluntarily affords notice-and-comment before such rules are promulgated.
Justice Scalia, writing for only himself, disagreed sharply with the majority's
analysis of applicability of the Chevron doctrine.7 2 According to Justice Scalia,
"Skidmore deference to authoritative agency views is an anachronism," brought
to an end by Chevron.73 In his view, the key question in determining whether
Chevron applies is whether the agency interpretation is "authoritative. 7 4 Justice
Scalia had no doubt that the Department of Labor had authoritatively interpreted
the statute as requiring a voluntary agreement. The opinion letter might not have
established this standing alone; however, the Solicitor General's amicus curiae
brief on behalf of the Department of Labor had vouched for the position set
forth in the opinion letter.75 As far as Justice Scalia was concerned, the brief
established that the interpretation was authoritative, and thus the Court should
have evaluated the government's interpretation under Chevron.76
Justice Breyer, dissenting on behalf of himself and Justices Ginsburg and
Stevens, 77 offered a third view of the relevance of Chevron.7 8 Justice Breyer
appeared to agree with Justice Scalia that the opinion letter was authoritative

68. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2000).
69. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., DistinguishingLegislative Rules from InterpretativeRules, 52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 547, 552 (2000).

70. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A).
71. See infra note 356 (noting the practice of the IRS of using notice and comment procedures in
issuing interpretative rules).
72. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589-91 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
In extra-judicial writing, Justice Scalia has been a proponent of broad application of the Chevron
doctrine. See Scalia, supra note 6.
73. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
74. Id. at 591 n.*. Justice Scalia in fact said that three factors are relevant: whether (1) the statute is
ambiguous; (2) agency personnel responsible for administering the statute have interpreted it; and (3)
the interpretation is authoritative. See id. Of these three factors, only the third has real bite. The first and
second simply restate general conditions for deference under any standard.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Although Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, did not formally join the Breyer dissent, he
stated in a footnote to his own dissent "that I fully agree with Justice Breyer's comments on
[Chevron]." Id. at 595 n.2.
78. See id. at 596-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, in extra-judicial writing, has been
critical of aspects of the Chevron doctrine. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law
and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.363, 372-382 (1986).
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and for this reason was entitled to Chevron deference.7 9 However, he
strongly disagreed with the notion that Skidmore deference is an anachronism. According to Justice Breyer, it was entirely appropriate for the
majority to rely on Skidmore, because Chevron had made "no relevant
change" in the deference doctrine articulated in Skidmore.80 In his view,
Chevron had simply offered "an additional, separate legal reason for deferring to certain agency determinations, namely, that Congress had delegated
to the agency the legal authority to make those determinations.,"' Where
such a specific delegation does not exist, however, courts should continue to
look to the factors emphasized by Skidmore, such as the expertise of the
agency, whether its views were thoroughly considered, and whether they
were consistently observed. Justice Breyer thus suggested that both Chevron
and Skidmore were applicable and that both supported affirmance of the
agency interpretation.8 2
In short, two of the Court's recent decisions involve questions regarding what
kinds of agency decisions are entitled to Chevron deference once an agency has
been charged with administration of a statute: Aguirre-Aguirre holds that in
some circumstances an interpretation rendered in an adjudication should be
afforded Chevron deference, whereas Christensen holds that an interpretation in
an opinion letter should not be. Two other decisions involve questions about the
strength of Chevron's presumption of delegated interpretational power and
when this presumption can be overcome: HaggarApparel holds that the specification of a de novo standard of review does not overcome the presumption, at
least in the customs context, and Brown & Williamson raises, but does not
resolve, the question of whether there should be a scope-of-jurisdiction exception to the presumption.
B. OTHER UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS

Numerous other questions about Chevron's domain have arisen in the lower
courts. In many instances, these issues have given rise to conflicts among the
courts of appeals, or have been specifically reserved by the Supreme Court. We
have identified fourteen questions that remain unresolved.
Several of the contested questions concern the threshold issue: when Congress can be said to charge an agency with administration of a statute in such a
way that gives rise to the inference that Congress intends the agency to exercise
primary interpretational authority.

79. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J.,dissenting) ("Justice Scalia may well be right that
the position of the Department of Labor, set forth in both brief and letter, is an 'authoritative' agency
view that warrants deference under [Chevron].").
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 597.
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1. Does Chevron apply to an agency that lacks legislative
rulemaking
83
authority? (An issue subject to conflict in the circuits.)
2. Does Chevron apply to an agency that lacks both legislative rulemaking
authority and the power
to render adjudications having the force of law?
84
(An unresolved issue.)
3. Does Chevron apply to statutes that are enforced by multiple agencies?
85
(An issue as to which the Supreme Court has reserved decision.)
4. Does Chevron apply to cross-referenced statutes, as when a general
statute cross-references a statute that an agency is charged with administering, or when a statute an agency is charged with administering crossreferences a general statute or general principles of common law? (An
86
issue that has caused multiple conflicts in the circuits.)

83. The Seventh Circuit and the Federal Circuit have held that agencies without rulemaking
authority are ineligible for Chevron deference. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (refusing to grant Chevron deference to Patent Office because it does not have
legislative rulemaking authority); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437, 441-43
(7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (refusing to accord Chevron deference to Federal Railroad Administration
because it lacks legislative rulemaking authority), aff'd on other grounds, 516 U.S. 152 (1996). On the
other hand, the D.C. Circuit and the Fifth Circuit have indicated that they believe such authority is
unnecessary for Chevron to apply. See OSG Bulk Ships, Inc. v. United States, 132 F.3d 808, 812 n.7
(D.C. Cir. 1998) ("But where, as here, Congress has not explicitly delegated rulemaking authority to the
agency charged with administering the statute, the Chevron analysis is the appropriate means by which
to evaluate the agency's interpretation of the statute."); Estiverne v. Sak's Fifth Ave., 9 F.3d 1171, 1173
(5th Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron to FTC commentary and interpretative readings under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act despite the court's recognition that "commentaries and opinions of the FTC are not
law"); see also Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 81 F.3d 228, 230-31 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing without
resolving whether Chevron deference is owed to agencies without rulemaking authority).
84. The Supreme Court has consistently denied Chevron deference to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which insofar as it enforces the Civil Rights Act of 1964, lacks both
legislative rulemaking authority and the power to render binding adjudications. See infra notes 133 and
286. But the Court has never generalized from this result, and has at times assumed that Chevron
deference extends to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which may be indistinguishable
from the EEOC in this regard. See infra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
85. Under pre-Chevron case law, the fact that a statute was administered by multiple agencies was a
factor that courts occasionally cited for giving reduced deference to an agency's interpretation. See N.
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
144-45 (1977). But the Court has not resolved how this factor computes under Chevron. In Bragdon v.
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998), the Court flagged but left unresolved the question of whether enforcement
by multiple agencies is incompatible with Chevron deference. See id. at 642 ("[W]e need not pause to
inquire whether this causes us to withhold deference to agency interpretations under Chevron."). In
Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 478-80 (1999), the Court noted that Congress gave three
agencies the authority to issue regulations implementing different provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act; but the Court concluded that it was unnecessary to determine if any agency was
entitled to deference because all three agencies had adopted an interpretation that the Court found to be
impermissible. See id. at 482.
86. For example, the Freedom of Information Act exempts from disclosure material "specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000). The circuits split over whether
Chevron applies to the Internal Revenue Service's conclusion that a provision of the Internal Revenue
Code protecting the confidentiality of tax return information qualifies for this exemption. Compare
Aronson v. IRS, 973 F.2d 962, 965-67 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that the IRS is entitled to deference
because the operative statute prohibiting disclosure is the Internal Revenue Code, which is administered
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5. Does Chevron apply to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations?
87
(An issue that has produced some uncertainty in the lower courts.)
Other issues are more properly viewed as raising questions regarding what
type of agency interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference once an agency
is charged with a statute's administration.
6. Does Chevron apply when a Chevron-qualified agency renders an interpretation in an adjudication? (An issue resolved as to the INS in AguirreAguirre,88 but not more generally.)
7. Does Chevron apply when a Chevron-qualified agency renders an interpretation in an interpretative rule? (An issue left open in Christensen and
subject to a conflict in the circuits.) 89
8. Does Chevron apply when a Chevron-qualified agency renders an interpretation in a procedural rule exempt from the notice-and-comment requirements of APA section 553? (An unresolved issue.) 90

by the IRS), with Grasso v. IRS, 785 F.2d 70, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that the IRS is not
entitled to deference); De Salvo v. IRS, 861 F.2d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 1988) (same), and Church of
Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 146, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same). The Supreme Court eventually resolved
the issue, but did so without mentioning the underlying disagreement over the application of Chevron.
See Church of Scientology v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (holding.that I.R.C. § 6103 is included within
FOIA's statutory exemption). For other examples of cross-referencing issues, see infra notes 301-20.
87. Most lower courts have distinguished between Chevron deference and Seminole Rock deference,
so-named for Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), in which the Court held that
an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to "controlling weight unless
it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation." Id. at 414. See generally Scott H. Angstreich,
Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations,34
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 49 (2000); John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and Judicial Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1996). But lower courts have
occasionally applied Chevron to agency interpretations of agency regulations. See Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc. v. United States, 106 F.3d 376, 378 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (relying on Chevron in deferring to Customs
Service's interpretation of its own regulation); Malcomb v. Island Creek Coal Co., 15 F.3d 364, 369
(4th Cir. 1994) (applying Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations); see
also Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("It would seem
that there are few, if any, cases in which the standard applicable under Chevron would yield a different
result that the 'plainly erroneous' or 'inconsistent' standard set forth in [Seminole Rock] .....
88. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
89. Some courts of appeals have extended Chevron deference to interpretative rules. See, e.g., Nat.
Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for
Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1995); Johnson City Med. Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d
973, 975-76 (6th Cir. 1993). Others have not. See, e.g., S. Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119
F.3d 816, 832-33 (10th Cir. 1997); Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 985 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997);
Massachusetts v. FDIC, 102 F.3d 615, 621 (1st Cir. 1996); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Pena, 44
F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1996).
90. Courts to date have shown no reluctance about extending Chevron deference to procedural rules.
See, e.g., W. Coal Traffic League v. Surface Transp. Bd., 216 F.3d 1168, 1171, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(applying Chevron deference to order characterized by the agency as a procedural rule); Union of
Concerned Scientists v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 920 F.2d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(citing Chevron as supporting deference to a challenged agency procedural rule); see also Anthony,
supra note 10, at 52-54 (listing and discussing other cases). This could conceivably change with the

2001]

CHEVRON'S DOMAIN

9. Does Chevron apply when a Chevron-qualified agency renders an interpretation in a proposed or interim rule? (An unresolved issue.) 9'
10. Does Chevron apply when lower-level employees in a Chevron-qualified
92
agency render an interpretation? (An unresolved issue.)
Finally, there are issues that speak to when courts should deem the presumption of delegated authority to interpret to have been overcome by contrary
evidence of congressional intent.
11. Does Chevron apply when a statute mandates a more rigorous standard of
review than is otherwise required by the APA? (An issue resolved in
Haggar Apparel as to the de novo standard applied in customs refund
cases, 9 3 but not more generally.)
12. Does Chevron apply to interpretations that modify the scope of an
agency's jurisdiction? (An issue subject to a conflict in the circuits and
94
raised, but not resolved, in Brown & Williamson.)
13. Does Chevron apply to interpretations that raise constitutional questions?
95
(An issue as to which the Court has sent conflicting signals.)

decision in Christensen, however, where the Court described the rules entitled to Chevron deference as
those that have been promulgated through notice-and-comment proceedings.. Christensen, 529 U.S. at
587. The APA exempts procedural rules from the notice-and-comment requirements. See supra note 68
and accompanying text.
91. The Supreme Court has applied Chevron to interim rules, but without remarking on the
distinction between interim and final rules. See Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 697-98
(1991) (deferring to interim agency regulations); United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 668-71
(1986) (affording Chevron deference to the Secretary of Energy's decision establishing interim rates for
hydroelectric power). Lower courts, however, have occasionally declined to give Chevron deference to
interim rules. See Orr v. Hawk, 156 F3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 1998) (declining to afford Chevron
deference to interim rule because it was not subject to public participation through notice and
comment); see also Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 E3d 1331, 1341 (4th Cir. 1995) (analogizing interim
rules to policy statements, to which the Fourth Circuit does not give Chevron deference).
92. Courts have sometimes granted Chevron deference to interpretations by lower level employees,
and sometimes have not. The circumstances in which the issue arises have to date been too diverse to
generate a square circuit conflict. See, e.g., Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61
F.3d 170, 181-82 (3d Cir. 1995) (granting Chevron deference to interpretation of the Hyde Amendment
articulated in two letters from the Director of the Medicaid Bureau of the Health Care Financing
Administration to all state Medicaid directors); Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d
884, 894 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying Chevron to a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Education to all
chief state school officers clarifying United States Department of Education policy regarding the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the education of children with attention deficit
disorder); Metro. Washington Airports Auth. Prof'l Fire Fighters Ass'n Local 3217 v. United States,
959 F.2d 297, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (denying Chevron deference to a letter from an agency employee of
unidentified status responding to an inquiry from the union president as to the meaning of a statutory
provision); see also Anthony, supra note 10, at 51-52 (listing and discussing other cases).
93. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 54 (noting conflict in the circuits). See generally notes 50-58 and accompanying
text.
95. Compare Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988) (stating that Chevron doctrine does not apply when agency interpretation
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14. Does Chevron apply to interpretations that are inconsistent with judicial
to a conflict in the circuits with respect to
precedent? (An issue subject
96
precedent.)
court
lower
After reviewing the general principles that govern the determination of
Chevron's domain, and more specific operating principles that can be derived
from these general principles, we return in Part V to indicate how each of the
foregoing questions should be answered.
II. Two

DEFERENCE DOCTRINES

In this Part, we consider the first of two background principles that exert a
pervasive influence over Chevron's domain: whether there is one deference
doctrine or two. The opinions in Christensen v. HarrisCounty reveal a cleavage
of views among the Justices on this issue. Five Justices (the five joining Justice
Thomas's majority opinion) recognize two deference doctrines: Chevron deference, which requires judicial deference to any reasonable agency interpretation
of statutory ambiguity, and Skidmore deference, which relies on a variety of
contextual factors to determine whether an agency's interpretation has "power
to persuade."9 7 Four Justices, in contrast, appear to believe that there is only one
deference doctrine. Justice Scalia, .speaking only for himself, believes Chevron
is the sole deference doctrine today and that Skidmore is an anachronism.9 8
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer also appear to believe that there is only
one deference doctrine, of which Chevron and Skidmore are simply separate
manifestations. 99 On this understanding, the decision to defer always turns
ultimately on whether the agency interpretation is persuasive; Chevron simply
marks off one set of circumstances in which deference is strongly indicated.
We argue in this Part that the Christensen majority was correct both as a
matter of precedent and of policy. The Court on numerous occasions in the
post-Chevron era has recognized the continued viability of both Chevron defer-

would raise serious constitutional question), with Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991)
(applying Chevron after concluding that agency interpretation was not in fact unconstitutional).
96. Although the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that its own statutory interpretation
precedents trump Chevron, see cases cited supra note 28, it has not addressed the question whether the
same holds for circuit court statutory interpretation precedents. See Pierce, supra note 28, at 2253. The
courts of appeals are divided on the question. Compare Satellite Broad. & Communications Ass'n of
Am. v. Oman, 17 F.3d 344, 348 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding Chevron trumps circuit precedent), and
Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (same), with Bankers Trust N.Y.
Corp. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed Cir. 2000) (concluding circuit precedent trumps
Chevron), and Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996) (same), and EEOC v. Metro. Educ.
Enters., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225, 1229-1230 (7th Cir. 1995) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 519 U.S. 202
(1997).
97. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
98. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000).
99. See id. at 596-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.). Although Justice Stevens also
authored a dissent and did not formally join Justice Breyer's dissent, in a footnote he recorded his full
agreement with Justice Breyer's comments about Chevron. See id. at 595 n.2.
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ence and Skidmore deference. Moreover, having two deference doctrines rather
than one makes sense. There is a case for a rule that makes deference mandatory
in certain circumstances and a case for a more general standard indicating when
deference is appropriate. The legal system probably works better if both doctrines are available than if courts are limited to either the one or the other.
A. CHEVRON VERSUS SKIDMORE

The background and reasoning of the Chevron decision are well known and
have been rehearsed many times. The question before the Court was whether
the EPA could define "stationary source" under the Clean Air Act'0 to mean an
entire plant. Under this "bubble" definition, if the net effect of adding a new
emitting device would not increase the aggregate pollution from the entire plant,
the Act's rigorous new source pollution standards would not be triggered. The
Court used the case to announce its now-famous two-step inquiry.' ° ' The first
step is to determine whether Congress has addressed the precise issue in
controversy. The Court found no evidence in either the text of the statute or its
legislative history that Congress had considered whether the bubble definition
of stationary source was permissible. 10 2 Turning to the second step-whether
the agency interpretation represents a "reasonable" or "permissible" reading of
the Act-the Court found that the agency's bubble policy was a reasonable
effort to balance the competing policies of environmental protection and accommodation of further economic growth, and thus was a permissible reading of the
03

Act.'
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. 104 is a somewhat less familiar precedent, at least to
today's administrative lawyers. The question at issue was whether the time
firefighters were on call in the evenings at a packing plant was "working time,"
and hence required overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.' 0 5 Writing
for the Court, Justice Robert Jackson conceded that Congress had not delegated
to any administrative agency responsibility "to determine in.the first instance

100. 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(3) (1982).
101. The Court stated:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute,
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
102. See id. at 848, 851, 861-63.
103. Id. at 863-64.
104. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
105. Id. at 135-36.
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whether particular cases fall within or without the Act."' 10 6 Nevertheless, he
noted that the Labor Department was charged with authority to investigate
practices regarding overtime pay, and could bring actions for injunctions to
restrain violations of the Act. 107 Pursuant to these functions, the Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division had issued an interpretative bulletin that
addressed the problem of "waiting time."' 0 8 The Labor Department had filed an
amicus curiae brief with the Court outlining how it would apply the standards
set forth in that bulletin to the case of the firefighters.' 0 9
Justice Jackson acknowledged that the views of the Administrator, as reflected in the bulletin and the brief, were not conclusive or binding on the
courts. ° Nevertheless, those views were the product of "more specialized
experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to come to
a judge in a particular case.""'1 Moreover, there were important considerations
of uniformity at stake: "Good administration of the Act and good judicial
administration alike require that the standards for public enforcement and those
for determining private rights shall be at variance only where justified by very
good reasons."' 12 Justice Jackson sought to reconcile these competing considerations with the following oft-quoted standard:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator
under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and1 all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if
3
lacking power to control.'
The Court accordingly reversed and remanded with instructions to the lower
courts to reconsider the issue in light of the Administrator's interpretative
bulletin, as elaborated in the government's amicus brief.
The Chevron doctrine and the deference invoked in Skidmore differ along a
number of dimensions." 14 First and most obviously, the question whether the
agency exercises delegated power plays radically different roles under the two
106. Id. at 137.
107. See id.
108. Id. at 138.
109. See id. at 139.
110. There was no statutory provision "as to what, if any, deference courts should pay to the
Administrator's conclusions." Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 140.
113. Id.
114. The contrast between Chevron and Skidmore parallels different justifications for courts deferring to constitutional interpretations by politically accountable branches of government. See Robert A.
Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretative Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law,
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regimes. A finding that there has been an appropriate congressional delegation
of power to the agency is critical under Chevron. 1 5 Under Skidmore, however,
it does not matter whether Congress has delegated authority to an agency to
administer the statute as long as the agency has relevant expertise.' 16 Indeed,
the Skidmore Court acknowledged that the courts, not the agency,
exercised the
7
relevant delegated power under the Fair Labor Standards Act.' 1
Second, deference under Chevron is an all-or-nothing proposition. Either the
court finds that the statute is ambiguous-in which case the agency's interpretation controls if it is reasonable-or the court finds that the answer is clear at step
one, and hence must be resolved by the court de novo. " 8 Skidmore, on the other
hand, appears to view deference to agency interpretations along a sliding
scale." 9 Skidmore is properly regarded as a deference doctrine because the
court cannot ignore the agency interpretation-the court must assess that interpretation against multiple factors and determine what weight they should be given.
After undertaking this analysis, however, agency interpretations receive various
degrees of deference, ranging from none, to slight, to great, depending on the
court's assessment of the strength of the agency interpretation under consideration.
Third, the contextual factors mentioned by Skidmore, such as the thoroughness of the agency's decision, its logic, its consistency with prior interpretations,
and the degree of expertise the agency brings to the issue,' 20 play little-if
any-role under Chevron. Under Chevron's step one-where the inquiry focuses on whether Congress has directly spoken to the issue in question-the
Skidmore factors play little or no role. 121 Skidmore's persuasion factors are more
relevant at step two of Chevron, but even here they appear to play a greatly
diminished role. 12 2 For example, the Court on several occasions has reaffirmed

85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 696-701 (2000) (noting contrast between "textualist" and "institutional
competence" theories of deference in constitutional law).
115. See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) ("A precondition to deference
under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority."); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (instructing that deference rests on either
express or implied delegation of power to agency).
116. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
117. Id. at 137.
118. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
119. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 10, at 14; Merrill, supra note 3, at 977.
120. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
121. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. A possible exception would be the understanding that agency
interpretations contemporaneous with the adoption of the statute are entitled to deference. This
understanding has been justified in part on the ground that such interpretations are more likely to reflect
the intentions of the Congress that enacted the statute. See, e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
122. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 416-20 (1993) (recognizing that
agency had adopted "a variety of approaches" to the question over the years, and suggesting that the
lack of consistency was relevant but not dispositive to the reasonableness of the interpretation);
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 110 (1992) (noting that agency interpretation had been "consistently held" in finding that it was reasonable).
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that the Chevron framework permits agencies to change their interpretations of
statutes, provided they give adequate explanations for their revised views. 123
This is in tension with the Skidmore factors, which give longstanding and
consistent agency interpretations greater weight than recent and fluctuating
views. 124
Fourth, Chevron makes judicial deference to agency interpretations
mandatory in any case in which the court concludes the matter should be
resolved at step two and the agency interpretation is "reasonable" or "permissible."' 12 5 The agency is entitled to deference as a matter of right.
Skidmore, in contrast, makes clear that the weight given to the agency
interpretation is always ultimately up to the court. The agency's interpretation is not binding on the court, as "an authoritative pronouncement of a
might be. 126 Rather, the agency is entitled to deference only if
higher court"
27
it earns it.'
B. THE REAFFIRMATION OF SKIDMORE

Especially in the period immediately after the triumph of the Chevron
doctrine, courts and commentators tended to assume that Chevron had wiped
out Skidmore deference-and all other pre-existing approaches to deference as
well. 128 Some of the Supreme Court's post-Chevron decisions also seem to

123. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (dictum); Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1991); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64. See generally David M. Gossett, Comment,
Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 64 U. CI. L. REv. 681
(1997) (reviewing Supreme Court and select lower court practice regarding changed agency interpretations under Chevron).
124. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976) (calling for reduced deference under
Skidmore when the interpretation in question conflicts with earlier agency pronouncements); Morton v.
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974) (emphasizing importance of consistency under Skidmore deference);
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pena, 44 F3d 437, 446 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring) ("[Clonsistency ought to matter only when the agency is seeking to persuade .. "),
aff'd sub nom. Bd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 516 U.S. 152
(1996).
125. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (instructing that reasonable interpretation is to be given
"controlling weight").
126. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139, 140 (1940).
127. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Comment, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Problems of
Commitment, Non-Contractability, and the Proper Incentives, 44 DuKE L.J. 1133, 1153 (1995) (noting
that the traditional deference factors make the agency "earn" deference); see also Theodore W. Wem,
Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is
the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1539-40 (1999) (applying the "earns"
characterization to Skidmore deference).
128. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 6, at 456 (suggesting that Chevron "declare[d] the victor in a
forty-year war between advocates of the deferential model and defenders of independent judgment");
Schuck & Elliot, supra note 7, at 1024 (stating that Chevron "swept aside" the Skidmore criteria);
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2075-76 (suggesting that future debate will be between "broad" and "narrow"
readings of Chevron). See generally Scalia, supra note 6 (arguing that Chevron renders traditional
deference factors obsolete).
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reflect this understanding. 129 As more recent decisions make clear, however,
Skidmore lives on as a viable deference doctrine, serving a supplementary or
backstopping role to Chevron. 30
The first decision that unmistakably suggests a continued role for Skidmore13in1
the post-Chevron world is EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO)
At issue was whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act protects U.S. citizens
who work for U.S. companies outside the territorial limits of the United States.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had issued an interpretative guideline indicating that Title VII applies in these circumstances, and
sought deference for its view in the Supreme Court. Pre-Chevron case law had
32
afforded the EEOC only Skidmore deference for its interpretative guidelines.
The Court had reasoned that, because the EEOC lacks authority to issue
substantive regulations,13 3 its guidelines have roughly the same status as the
34 Over the objections of Justice Scalia,135
interpretative bulletin in Skidmore.
ARAMCO followed this pre-Chevron precedent rather than Chevron, and evaluated the EEOC's claim for deference under the Skidmore factors. 3 6
Subsequently, in Bragdon v. Abbott, 137 the Court again signaled its understanding that Chevron and Skidmore are distinct, and that both are viable doctrines.
The case involved the question whether HIV-infected individuals who do not
have AIDS are "disabled" within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In answering in the affirmative, the Court relied in part upon
interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act, from which the ADA's definition of
disability had been drawn. 138 Because the Rehabilitation Act is enforced by all

129. See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990) (rejecting Chevron deference
because Congress did not delegate authority to the agency to implement the statutory provision in
question; not addressing whether Skidmore deference should nevertheless apply).
130. The principles underlying Skidmore deference have a long historical pedigree. The Skidmore
factors pre-date the case itself, as Chief Justice Marshall and other nineteenth century justices
recognized the importance of respecting certain longstanding and consistent executive branch interpretations of statutes. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 393 (1999) ("As early as 1809,
Chief Justice Marshall noted in a customs case that '[i]f the question had been doubtful, the court
would have respected the uniform construction which it is understood has been given by the treasury
department of the United States upon similar questions.' " (quoting United States v. Vowell, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 368, 372 (1809))); see also Merrill, supra note 3, at 975 (citing examples from the 1800s of
judicial deference to executive interpretations based on longstanding and contemporaneous construction).

131. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
132. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976). For an overview of the courts'
general reluctance to afford the EEOC significant deference, see generally Wern, supra note 127.
133. The EEOC is authorized only to issue "procedural regulations" under the Civil Rights Act. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2000). In contrast, the EEOC does have substantive rulemaking authority under
the Americans with Disabilities Act. See infra note 292.
134. See Gen. Elec., 429 U.S. at 141.
135. See ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 259-60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
136. See id. at 257-58.
137. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
138. See id. at 641-42. The Court also relied in part on regulations issued by the Department of
Justice, which the Court indicated were entitled to Chevron deference: as the agency "directed by
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agencies, 1 39 the Court reserved judgment as to whether Chevron was applicable
in these circumstances. Quoting Skidmore, the majority stated: "It is enough to
observe that the well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a statute
'constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance.' ,,140 As in ARAMCO, the decision in
Bragdon unmistakably implies that there are two deference doctrines, and that
when Chevron does not apply, it is appropriate to turn to Skidmore for guidance.
Christensen v. Harris County is the most recent decision reaffirming that
there are two deference doctrines and that Skidmore deference applies in default
of Chevron. Yet Christensen is hardly a bolt out of the blue. In addition to
ARAMCO and Bragdon, other post-Chevron decisions also indicate that Skidmore remains a viable legal doctrine. 14 Even if this view was not completely
settled before Christensen, there can be no dispute that it now represents the
considered view of a majority of the Court.
C. WHY TWO DOCTRINES ARE BETTER THAN ONE

Of course, there is no point in having two doctrines if one will do. As we
have seen, however, Chevron and Skidmore are distinctly different doctrines and
appear to operate in different circumstances. Moreover, having a doctrine like
Skidmore available as a fallback to the mandatory deference doctrine of Chevron serves a number of valuable functions.
The virtue of having two doctrines can be seen most clearly if one assumes
(as Christensenappears to hold) that Chevron is confined to situations in which
an agency is exercising delegated power to bind persons with the force of law. If
Chevron deference is limited in this fashion, and no other deference doctrine
exists, then there would be no basis for courts to draw upon the accumulated
experience of agencies in resolving interpretational questions where the agency
has not spoken with the force of law. It would be mandatory deference or
nothing. This makes little sense. Interpreters in a variety of contexts draw upon
the views of other interpretative bodies, especially when these views are well

Congress to issue implementing regulations, to render technical assistance explaining the responsibilities of covered individuals and institutions, and to enforce Title III in court, the Department's views are
entitled to deference. See Chevron..." Id. at 646 (citations omitted).
139. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 authorizes the head of any Executive Branch
agency, regardless of the. agency's mission or expertise, to promulgate regulations to carry out that
statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
140. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 642 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)).
141. See, e.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 135-36, 137 n.9 (1997) (applying
Skidmore deference to an interpretation of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
advanced by the Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, and suggesting that the
Director's opinions might not be entitled to Chevron deference); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995)
(stating that Bureau of Prisons guidelines are akin to interpretative rules and are entitled to "some
deference"); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991)
(stating that the Secretary of Labor's interpretative rules and informal guidelines should not be given
Chevron deference because they are not exercises of her delegated lawmaking authority, but are entitled
to "some weight" under Skidmore).
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reasoned, reflect some type of comparative advantage (such as technical expertise or greater familiarity with the legal background), have been relied upon, or
have been implicitly ratified by the legislature.' 4 2 These are precisely the types
of factors that Skidmore indicated are relevant to whether courts should defer to
agency interpretations. 143 Declaring Chevron the exclusive basis for deference
would impoverish the process of statutory interpretation by preventing courts
from considering these sources of authority, with no good justification.
A more subtle danger of having just one doctrine is that this would lead to
over-application and hence dilution of the idea of mandatory deference. Much
of the debate over the scope of the Chevron doctrine has been framed as a
choice between Chevron deference and de novo review. If this were indeed the
choice, then defining Chevron's scope broadly would make sense for all the
normative reasons articulated not only in Chevron, but Skidmore as well. But
expanding the Chevron doctrine to cover most or all of the universe of situations in which deference is possible would constitute an over-application of the
notion of mandatory deference, and as a byproduct of over-application, would
likely lead to dilution of the practice of deferring to agency interpretations of
law.
This danger arises because Chevron is strong medicine. The Chevron decision requires courts to accept any agency interpretation that is reasonable, even
if it is not the interpretation that the court finds most plausible. 1'44 If, in an effort
to draw upon the benefits of deference, the courts extend Chevron deference to
every type of agency or to every agency interpretation no matter how informal,
the courts would perceive themselves as forced to accept agency interpretations
in inappropriate circumstances-such as where the interpretation is rendered
without public input or after insufficient agency deliberation. This perception, in
turn, would create pressure to develop escape valves, most likely in the form of
an expanded conception of the judicial role at step one. Thus, if Chevron were
the only basis for deference, the doctrine would tend to become very broad, but
very riddled with exceptions.
Evidence of these transformative pressures can be found in Justice Scalia's
judicial and extra-judicial writings on Chevron. Justice Scalia has consistently
argued for the broadest possible conception of the scope of the Chevron
doctrine, urging, for example, that it applies to agencies that lack the power to

142. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
APPLICATION OF LAW 1312-13 (1994) (suggesting that judicial deference to agency
interpretations should turn on an assessment of the "specialized competence" of the agency in resolving
the particular question at issue); Merrill, supra note 3, at 1003-12 (discussing rationale for following
precedent of other interpretative bodies).
143. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
144. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.ll (1984) ("The
court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have
adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.").
THE MAKING AND
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render binding legal rulings 14 5 and to interpretations by agencies issued in
opinion letters or in briefs. 146 This advocacy has helped cement his reputation
as being "a fierce, sometimes strident defender of Chevron."'147 Yet, at the same
time, he has adopted an extremely aggressive conception of the judicial role at
step one' 48 and, to a lesser extent, step two. 1 4 9 Most strikingly, Justice Scalia
has taken the position that it is appropriate for courts to take policy considerations into account as part of the ordinary tools of statutory construction
deployed at step one. 150 The upshot of this position is that Justice Scalia invokes
Chevron more consistently than other Justices, but also ends up deferring to
agency views less than other Justices. In Justice Scalia's hands, Chevron has the
paradoxical result of diluting, rather than5 strengthening, the practice of deference to executive understandings of law. ' '
Recognizing two deference doctrines significantly removes the pressure to
expand and then to evade mandatory deference under Chevron. With two
doctrines, the scope of Chevron deference can remain relatively narrow, because
many of the benefits of deference can also be obtained under the Skidmore
fallback deference doctrine. In addition, if the domain of Chevron remains
compact and centered on those circumstances in which deference is most clearly
appropriate, there will be significantly less pressure to devise escape valves
from Chevron deference.
The more difficult question is whether Skidmore should be the sole rubric for
deferring to agency interpretations, as Justice Breyer may have been suggesting

145. See EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259-60 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(urging the EEOC is entitled to Chevron deference, even though it lacks legislative rulemaking power).
146. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 589-91 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (supporting Chevron deference for agency opinion letter).
147. Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12
CARDozo L. REV. 1663, 1663 (1991).
148. See, e.g., Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 464-69 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); MCI
Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229,
242-46 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring); Maislin Indus., U.S., v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116,
136-38 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Scalia, supra note 6, at 520-21 (arguing that the range
of reasonable interpretations available to agency necessarily turns on how narrowly the statutory
ambiguity is defined).
149. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903, 918-919 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (reversing
EPA interpretation of nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act under a Chevron step-two
analysis); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 386-92 (1999) (Scalia, J.) (reversing, in part,
FCC interpretation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 under Chevron by relying on what appears
to be a step-two analysis).
150. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 515.
151. See Merrill, supra note 8, at 366-73 (warning that textualist method favored by Justice Scalia
may lead to less deference under Chevron); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749,
776 (1995) (arguing that Justice Scalia's textualist method of interpretation increases frequency of a
court substituting its judgment for an agency's); Schapiro, supra note 114, at 681-82 (noting that Justice
Scalia finds ambiguity less often at step one); cf. Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the
Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia, 28 CoNN.L. REV. 393, 395 (1996) (arguing that Justice
Scalia defers to agency interpretations about as often as other Justices).
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in his Christensen dissent. One of us has argued in previous writing that in a
head-to-head comparison between Chevron-style deference and Skidmore-style
deference, the latter has many appealing characteristics. 152 But the Skidmore
approach also has its drawbacks, especially if we take a systemic view of the
problem of achieving legal coherence in the modem administrative state. There
are a variety of functional reasons for preferring agencies to courts as front-line
interpreters today, and these reasons are all advanced more effectively by a
doctrine of mandatory deference than by a doctrine such as Skidmore.
One reason for preferring agency interpretations, which is alluded to by
Chevron itself,15 3 is that agencies are more politically accountable than are
courts. Choosing between two or more permissible interpretations of a statute is
a political act, involving the exercise of discretion in channeling the coercive
powers of the state in one direction rather than another.' 54 A robust deference
doctrine therefore helps minimize the occasions in which courts are tempted to
employ statutory interpretation to impose their policy preferences on a public to
which they are not accountable.
A second reason for preferring agency interpretation, emphasized by Peter
Strauss, is that this may be the only practical way today to achieve uniformity in
federal law. 15 5 The problem is that federal statutory programs continue to
proliferate, while the Supreme Court's capacity to resolve conflicts among the
circuits about the meaning of federal law is limited and fixed. 156 Thus, if we
insist that courts always have the final say about the meaning of federal statutes,
the increasingly common result will be that federal law will come to mean
different things in different circuits. Other than the Supreme Court, the only
entities with the power to adopt nationally uniform interpretations are the
federal administrative agencies. Consequently, if uniformity cannot be achieved
by pushing interpretational conflicts up to the Supreme Court, it may be
necessary to resolve these conflicts by pushing them down to the agency level.
A final problem, which has received less attention but may be of increasing
importance, is that federal statutory programs have become so complex that it is
beyond the capacity of most federal judges to understand the full ramifications
of the narrowly framed interpretational questions that come before them. The
environmental laws are a primary illustration of this phenomenon,' 57 but they

152. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 1025-31.
153. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864-65 (1984).
154. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in Administrative Law, 64 "hx. L. REv. 469 (1985).
155. See Peter L. Strauss, One-Hundred-Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1118-29
(1987).
156. The problem has grown considerably more acute since Strauss wrote his article. The Court in
recent years has been deciding only about 75 argued cases per year as opposed to the 150 per year it
was deciding in the mid-1980s.
157. See, e.g., Sydney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the
Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DuKE L.J. 819, 824-40.
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are by no means unique. The extraordinary complexity of much of federal
statutory law may mean that the goal of resolving statutory ambiguities in such
a way as to further the purposes of the statute 158 is increasingly becoming a task
beyond the grasp of generalist judges. The point is not just that these statutes
have multiple or conflicting purposes, as emphasized by some public choice
scholars. 15 9 There is the further problem that these purposes are often locked in
a Byzantine web of interlocking provisions that can be fully comprehended only
by a full-time legal expert. A strong practice of deference to agency interpretations may thus be necessary if we are to persist in seeking to make law
internally coherent.
Each of these reasons for deferring to agency interpretations would be
advanced to a degree by Skidmore-type deference; they would certainly be
advanced further under a regime of Skidmore deference than under a regime of
de novo judicial review of all questions of law. But there can be no doubt that
these rationales would be furthered to an even greater degree by some kind of
mandatory deference doctrine. Skidmore's multi-factored standard clearly entails more judicial discretion than does Chevron's two-step approach. The
discretionary nature of the inquiry means that application of the Skidmore
factors would' largely be confined to the courts of appeals, rather than the
Supreme Court. This would make it more difficult for the Supreme Court to
reign in the courts of appeals, if they (or some of them) exhibit a tendency to
interfere unduly with agency policymaking through aggressive statutory interpretation. 160 Application of the Skidmore factors would also make it more difficult
to secure national uniformity in federal regulatory law. Furthermore, because
Skidmore makes "persuasiveness" the ultimate touchstone for deference, it
presupposes that judges can understand and assess the agency's reasons for
adopting particular interpretations of complex regulatory statutes, which may be
an increasingly questionable premise.
It is thus plausible that a regime that deploys a significant measure of
Chevron-style deference is preferable to a regime confined solely to Skidmorestyle deference. Chevron deference, especially if identified by relatively brightline triggering conditions, can help insulate federal courts from political
controversies, promote uniformity, and secure a greater measure of internal
coherence in the interpretation of complex statutory regimes. If the sphere of
mandatory deference is closely congruent with the set of circumstances in
158. This conception of statutory interpretation has been associated most prominently with the Legal
Process School. See, e.g., HART & SACKS, supra note 142, at 1124-25 ("The first task in the interpretation of any statute (or of any provision of a statute) is to determine what purpose ought to be attributed
to it." (emphasis omitted)).
159. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains,50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Jonathan R.
Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). For an overview and criticism, see generally JERRY L. MASHAW,
GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997).

160. See Anthony, supra note 10, at 14 ("[A] process of weighing multiple and perhaps incommensurable factors can yield unpredictable results and unsure doctrine.").
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which such deference is clearly appropriate-a very big if-then mixing a rule
of Chevron deference together with a residual standard of Skidmore deference
may well be superior to a regime of pure Skidmore deference. The argument is
similar to the case for having both per se rules and a rule of reason in antitrust
law, 16 1 or having categorical rules and balancing tests under the First Amendment, 162 or indeed for having a mix of rules and standards in law more
generally. 163 If courts have a high level of confidence that they have identified a
set of circumstances in which certain outcomes are nearly always justified, then
a rule is better than a standard, provided the rule identifies the appropriate
circumstances in a consistent and predictable fashion.
In any event, with its decision in Christensen, the Court appears to have
firmly embraced the notion that there are two deference doctrines, as defined by
Chevron and Skidmore. This background principle has important implications
for Chevron's domain. Recognizing Skidmore as the default alternative to
Chevron gives courts three choices rather than two in reviewing agency interpretations of statutes. Instead of Chevron deference and no deference, we have
Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, and no deference. This larger menu of
options allows Chevron to be given a relatively narrow domain, one that
hopefully captures those circumstances where deference is most appropriate.
Skidmore then steps into the breach and allows courts to give appropriate weight
to agency interpretations outside the core area where Chevron holds sway. In
those areas where independent judicial interpretation of the law is thought to be
desirable-for example in interpreting statutes like the APA designed to constrain agency discretion-then obviously neither Chevron nor Skidmore would
apply.
III.

THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE

The second background principle concerns the source of law that gives rise to
the Chevron doctrine. Three possibilities have been identified in the legal
literature: (1) the Constitution; (2) federal common law; and (3) the Congress,
in the form of a background presumption about congressional intent. Academic
writers have argued for each of these three possibilities. 64 The Court, in recent
descriptions of the Chevron doctrine, has rather consistently opted for the
congressional intent theory.' 65 Although the matter is not entirely conclusive,
we agree that on balance this is the best rationalization for the doctrine. What
this means is that Chevron has roughly the same status in law as a federal
statute. Skidmore, in contrast, is grounded in federal common law; it has
161. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 361-64 (1986).
162. See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
163. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 66-79
(1983); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1186-87 (1989).
164. See infra notes 166-214 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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roughly the same status in law as a judicially developed canon of interpretation.
The recognition that Chevron is grounded in congressional intent rather than in
some other source of law also has important and hitherto unappreciated implications for Chevron's domain.
A. CHEVRON AND THE CONSTITUTION

Commentators have occasionally suggested that the Chevron doctrine rests
on the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Indeed, Richard Pierce,
the leading proponent of this view, has pronounced Chevron "one of the most
66
important constitutional law decisions in history."'
The argument, as articulated by Pierce and Douglas Kmiec,1 67 another proponent, is that Chevron represents a kind of second-best solution to the nondelegation doctrine. The first-best solution would be to require Congress to resolve all
contested policy issues; 68 however, the courts have been unable to develop
workable standards to enforce this understanding. ' 69 The second-best solution is
to have executive agencies resolve contested policy issues that Congress does
not itself resolve.

Pierce and Kmiec have offered slightly varying accounts to explain why
having agencies rather than courts fill policy gaps indirectly promotes the
principle of legislative supremacy. Pierce notes that if the judiciary swears off
all involvement in policymaking, this will enhance the power of the executive,
traditionally the legislature's principal rival. Recognizing that the failure to
resolve policy disputes serves only to enhance its rival, Congress will have a
strong incentive to resolve such disputes itself. As Pierce cleverly puts it, the
nondelegation doctrine is a command-and-control regime that failed; Chevron
166. Pierce, supra note 28, at 2227; see also Pierce, supra note 154, at 523-54 (advancing a similar
argument).
167. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269 (1988); see also Starr, supra note 6, at 308 (suggesting that
Chevron advances separation-of-powers principles).
168. There have been recurring calls for greater judicial enforcement of the understanding that only
Congress has the power to exercise discretionary legislative authority. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993); Marci

A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807 (1999); cf
Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 673 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). The Court has been unmoved by these arguments; indeed, it recently and unanimously
overturned a decision of the D.C. Circuit that relied on the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate rules
promulgated by the EPA modifying ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act. See Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903, 911-14 (2001).
169. Other than two cases decided during the period of judicial resistance to the early New Deal, see
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935), the Court has never struck down a federal statute on the ground that it impermissibly
delegates powers that only Congress can exercise, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct.
903, 913 (2001); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989) (rejecting nondelegation
challenge to Federal Sentencing Commission); id. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court
has "almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be [delegated]"). See generally Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 484-86 (1998)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (summarizing history of nondelegation doctrine).

2001]

CHEVRON'S DOMAIN

thereby deterring
serves as a market mechanism that puts a price on delegation,
70
Congress from departing from the constitutional structure. 1
Kmiec offers a different analysis, focusing on the fact that Congress has
mechanisms for overseeing policymaking by executive agencies, but does not
regularly engage in oversight of courts. 17 1 In addition, he suggests that Congress is more likely to overturn agency decisions it does not like than to
overrule judicial decisions it finds objectionable. 72 For both reasons, a doctrine
that steers contested policy disputes from courts to agencies will magnify
congressional influence over policy, because Congress has more influence over
agencies than courts.
Regardless of the precise mechanism through which the transfer of policymaking authority from courts to agencies enhances congressional control over
policy, Pierce and Kmiec draw a similar conclusion: Chevron should be understood as a constitutionally based command to courts to abstain from making any
decisions that turn on the resolution of policy disputes. 73 Courts of course
should enforce clear expressions of congressional intent because doing so
directly preserves the principle of legislative supremacy. But when the issue at
hand turns on policy rather than law, the agency should have the final word.
Such a rule serves indirectly to preserve the principle of legislative supremacy.
The thesis that the Chevron doctrine is grounded in the Constitution is
ingenious. There is no question that the doctrine implicates extremely important
questions about the allocation of power in the administrative state, and that the
Court in Chevron "justified its commitment to deference in terms resonant with
revealed constitutional truth."' 74 Moreover, the thesis can explain two of the
central mysteries surrounding the Chevron doctrine. The first is why Chevron
deference is mandatory, whereas the traditional deference doctrine (which lives
on in the form of Skidmore deference) is discretionary; obviously, if the
Constitution compels deference, then courts have no choice but to defer. The
second is how to square a doctrine of mandatory deference with the APA. The
APA directs reviewing courts to decide "all relevant questions of law,"' 175 and
almost certainly was understood at the time of its enactment as requiring that
courts decide questions of law de novo. 17 6 The theory that the Constitution
compels Chevron thus also explains why the doctrine supersedes the APA, a
mere statute.

170. See Pierce, supra note 28, at 2232.
171. See Kmiec, supra note 167, at 282.
172. See id. at 281-82. Whether this generalization is accurate is open to question. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991)
(presenting evidence that Congress monitors judicial statutory interpretation decisions closely and often
overrides such decisions).
173. See Kmiec, supra note 167, at 277-78; Pierce, supra note 28, at 2236-37.
174. Farina, supra note 6, at 457.
175. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
176. See Duffy, supra note 6, at 193-96.
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A number of difficulties with the constitutional argument render it less than
persuasive, however. One problem, as Pierce acknowledges, is that although the
Chevron doctrine may implicate important separation of powers concerns, the
opinion "does not cite any provision of the Constitution."' 177 The decision
echoes Pierce and Kmiec in emphasizing that it is better to have contested
policy disputes decided by executive agencies than by courts. 178 But Chevron
does not suggest that the nondelegation doctrine or any other principle of
separation of powers compels this outcome. The opinion instead argues that
agencies typically have greater expertise about technical and specialized subjects than do courts, 1 79 and that agencies are indirectly accountable to the public

through the elected President, whereas federal courts are not.1 80 The former is a
general policy argument. The latter contention has constitutional overtones, and
certainly could be presented as a constitutional argument if, pace John Ely, we
regard the Constitution as incorporating a meta-principle of promoting democratic decisionmaking.1 8 1 But Chevron does not present the promotion of
democratic accountability as a constitutional argument, nor do Pierce and
Kmiec rely on any democratic meta-principle as the constitutional underpinning
182
of Chevron.
Second, it is debatable that the Chevron doctrine is designed to promote the
principle of legislative supremacy. It may be equally plausible to claim that
Chevron "drive[s] the last nail in the sporadically reopened casket of the
nondelegation doctrine."' 18 3 In a key passage, Chevron notes that delegation of
legislative power is ubiquitous, and says "it matters not" whether such delegation comes about because of a deliberate decision by Congress to utilize agency
expertise; because Congress failed to anticipate a problem; or because "Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on
each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the
agency."' 84 Thus, the Court appeared to renounce any effort to police attempts
185
by Congress to shirk its constitutional responsibilities.
Third, not only is it debatable whether Chevron was intended to promote
nondelegation objectives, it is also doubtful that it does so in practice. As a
number of commentators have argued, Chevron reduces the ability of the courts
177. Pierce, supra note 28, at 2227.
178. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984).
179. See id. at 865. Kmiec puts little weight on the traditional expertise rationale. See Kmiec, supra
note 167, at 283.
180. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
181. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
182. Whether the Constitution does in fact incorporate a pervasive principle favoring democratic
decisionmaking is, of course, hotly disputed. See, e.g., Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful
Conversation, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 481 (1997).
183. Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism,and the Interpretationof Federal Statutes, 32
WM.& MARY L. REV.827, 834 (1991).

184. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
185. For the understanding that the nondelegation doctrine prohibits congressional "shirking" of
political responsibility, see SCHOENBROD, supra note 168, at 9-12.
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to monitor deviations by agencies from their legislative mandates, whether in
the form of agency aggrandizement or agency abrogation.1 86 If Congress describes the agency's mandate in a way that contains gaps or ambiguities (which
is inevitable), and Chevron requires courts to defer to any reasonable interpretation of these gaps and ambiguities, then Chevron seems to offer an opening for
87
agency aggrandizement (or abrogation), without any effective judicial check.1
This feature of Chevron might be cured, in part, by recognizing an exception to
Chevron for decisions that implicate the scope of an agency's jurisdiction. So
far, however, the Court has not recognized such an exception, and Chevron's
Justice Scalia, argues adamantly that no such exception
chief judicial champion,
88
should exist.'
Fourth, the notion that it is constitutionally problematic (as opposed to simply
undesirable) for courts to exercise discretion in resolving contested policy
issues finds little support in our history and traditions. Courts are often forced to
make policy, for example in rendering common-law decisions and in interpreting open-ended clauses of the Constitution. Moreover, as Justice Scalia has
noted, policy analysis also plays a role in statutory interpretation.' 89 Certainly,
in areas of the law where courts serve as the primary enforcement agents,
antitrust for example, courts draw upon notions of policy in resolving questions
of statutory meaning and application.' 90 This judicial role may be unfortunate,
but it is well entrenched, and it is doubtful that the Court would ever say it is
unconstitutional.
B.

CHEVRON AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW

At the other extreme, one can argue that Chevron should be understood as a
norm of judicial self-governance adopted by the Supreme Court in its supervi-

186. See Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of Powers in the
Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757 (1991); Farina, supra note 6, at 487-88, 498; Ernest Gellhorn &
Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 990 (1999); Herz,
supra note 6, at 189; Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in
Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1463, 1522-29 (2000); Sunstein, supra note 6, at
2097-2100.
187. Indeed, it was at one time suggested that the Constitution requires de novo judicial review of all
questions of law in cases affecting private rights. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 45-46 (1932). If
this conclusion is correct, then far from being compelled by the Constitution, Chevron's mandatory
deference doctrine would be unconstitutional.
188. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 380-82 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
189. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 515.
190. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) (recognizing the "common law" nature of
antitrust); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (same); Standard Oil
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-62 (1911) (same); N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197, 404 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (same). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (1985) (discussing antitrust laws as an example
of "delegated lawmaking" by courts).
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sory capacity over the lower courts. Under this view, Chevron is a rule of
federal common law developed by courts based on their own authority.' 9 '
The common-law conception of Chevron has greater difficulty than the
constitutional theory in explaining some of the features of the Chevron doctrine.
If Chevron is a judicially developed norm, it is particularly difficult to explain
why the doctrine supercedes the instruction in the APA that courts are to "decide
all relevant questions of law."' 192 It is generally assumed that common-law rules
are subordinate to rules of positive legislation. 193 The only way to maneuver
around this objection, consistent with the characterization of Chevron as a
judge-made rule, is by analogizing Chevron to a canon of interpretation. Courts
use canons in interpreting statutes all the time, and application of these canons
can thus be said to be a constituent feature of what it means for courts to

"decide questions of law."' 1 9 4 If Chevron is just another canon of interpretation,
then application of the Chevron doctrine is no more inconsistent with the
exercise of independent judicial judgment than it is for courts to refer to rules of
grammar or canons like the doctrine of lenity.
But the canon analogy runs into difficulties of its own. Most canons of
interpretation are merely weak presumptions, and are not followed when some
other canon seems more appropriate or other contextual evidence suggests that
the canon yields an improper result. t 95 Thus, if Chevron is just a canon, this
makes it difficult to explain why Chevron deference is described as being
mandatory. The canon analogy also raises a host of problems regarding how the
doctrine relates to other canons. As Professor Sunstein has recounted, canons
perform a variety of functions: some are syntactic, others offer generalizations
about congressional intent, and still others reflect constitutional or other substan-

191. See Maureen B. Callahan, Must FederalCourts Defer to Agency Interpretationsof Statutes?: A
New Doctrinal Basis for Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REv.
1275; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: ClearStatement Rules as
ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 618-19 (1992); David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous
Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327, 357-362 (2000); Cass R.
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons,67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 329 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons]; White, supra note 28, at 746-49. Although Cass Sunstein has recognized that Chevron
itself appears to rest on a presumption of congressional intent, see Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2084, he

has consistently situated Chevron within a universe of canons of construction, and has argued that in
many circumstances these canons trump Chevron. See, e.g., CASS R. SuNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS
REVOLTION 142-44 (1990) [hereinafter SuNsrEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION]; Sunstein, supra note

6, at 2105-19; Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra, at 330-35. This perspective in effect treats
Chevron as but one of many canons.
192. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
193. For a recent (and extreme) example of such an argument, see Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the PrecedentialEffect of Roe and Casey?,
109 YALE L.J. 1535 (2000).
194. Diver, supra note 3, at 569; see Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 21 (1985); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1983).
195. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPETATION 283 (1994); SUNsTErN,
AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 191, at 150-57.
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tive values.19 6 Determining how the
"Chevron canon" fits into this melange of
97
canons would be a daunting task. 1
These objections carry force, but are not necessarily fatal. Some judicially
developed norms approach the level of mandatory duties. An example is the
norm that lower courts are obliged strictly to follow Supreme Court precedents
unless and until the Supreme Court overrules them.' 9 8 This norm does not
derive from the Constitution or any statute; the Court has developed the norm as
part of its general supervisory authority over lower courts. Conceivably, Chevron could be regarded similarly as a norm grounded in the Court's supervisory
authority that instructs lower courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities (although this would still leave unanswered why
the Court speaks as if it too is bound by Chevron).
Still, there are additional problems with the conception of Chevron as a
common-law norm. One is that the Court rarely speaks of Chevron if it were a
judge-made norm. There are some exceptions. In one case, for example, the
Court spoke of "our practice to defer to the reasonable judgments of agencies
with regard to the meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes that they are charged
with administering,' 99 suggesting perhaps that Chevron is grounded in judicial
practice rather than in some external source of law. But this sort of locution is
rare. Chevron itself 2°0 and most post-Chevron decisions 20 ' describe the doctrine
as flowing from the implicit instructions of Congress.
Second, conceiving of Chevron as a judge-made norm robs it of much of its
normative force. Most strong canons have some constitutional underpinning
(like the doctrine of lenity 20 2 or the federalism canons 20 3), or reflect institutional

196. See Sunstein, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 191, at 150-57.

197. Chevron does not function the same way other canons do. Canons are judge-made rules of
thumb designed to assist courts in determining the meaning of statutes. Chevron does not perform this
task. Rather, its role is to assist the court in deciding who gets to attribute meaning to the statute once
the court concludes that the meaning is not clear. See Duffy, supra note 6, at 197 (stating it is
"impossible to consider Chevron a traditional canon of statutory construction, because the doctrine is
not a rule to help the court determine a meaning"). Indeed, Chevron appears largely agnostic about how
a court should go about ascertaining whether a statute has a clear or unambiguous meaning at step one,
stating only that this inquiry will proceed using "traditional tools of statutory construction." Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984); see also INS v. CardozoFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987).
198. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997); Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167,
180 (1990); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); Thurston
Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983) (per curiam); Hutto v. Davis, 454
U.S. 370, 375 (1982).
199. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996) (emphasis added).
200. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
201. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000); Dunn v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 479 n.14 (1997); Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines,
Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,447-48 (1987).
202. See, e.g., Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 830-31 (1974); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 347-49 (1971); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820).
203. See, e.g., Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
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imperatives (like the judge-made norm requiring lower courts to follow Supreme Court precedents until overruled). 2° Chevron lacks these sorts of justifications. Thus, rationalizing Chevron on the ground that it is a common-law
norm regarding how courts should treat administrative interpretations undermines its status as a cornerstone of modem administrative law.
Third, the Court has already developed one common-law deference doctrine: the Skidmore doctrine. Skidmore is relatively easy to explain and
justify in terms of norms of judicial self-governance. The factors that
Skidmore holds as relevant in determining the persuasiveness of an administrative interpretation-the thoroughness of the agency's reasoning, the consistency with which the interpretation has been maintained, the degree of
specialized expertise involved, and whether the interpretation has engendered reliance or has been ratified by Congress-are the same sorts of
factors that courts point to when determining whether to follow a nonbinding precedent of a coordinate judicial system.2 °5 In contrast, as we have
seen, Chevron is more difficult to situate within the traditions associated
with judge-made norms of self-governance. It would be anomalous to have
two common-law deference doctrines, particularly when it is difficult to
explain one of these doctrines in such terms.
C. CHEVRON AS PRESUMED CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

The third possibility-and the one that finds the most support in the Court's
own language-is that Chevron deference "arises out of background presumptions of congressional intent. 2 °6 The Chevron decision itself rests on a finding
of an "implicit" delegation from Congress. 20 7 Subsequent decisions have affirmed that "[a] precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional
delegation of administrative authority. '20 8 Many commentators, including Justice Scalia writing in a law review article about the Chevron doctrine, have
argued that the doctrine rests on a presumption about congressional intent.20 9
The congressional-intent theory can solve the puzzles about why Chevron
deference is mandatory, and why it supersedes the APA-and it does so as well
as the constitutional theory, and even more effectively than the common-law
theory. Deference is mandatory because Congress has commanded it. The
command is only implicit-presumed rather than express-but it is a command
all the same. Courts must obey Congress when it speaks in a matter permitted
by the Constitution. Hence, courts must follow the Chevron doctrine when

204. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
205. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 1007-10.
206. Dunn, 519 U.S. at 479 n.14.
207. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
208. Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990).
209. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 10, at 4; Herz, supra note 147, at 1666; Manning, supra note 87,
at 623-27; Scalia, supra note 6, at 516-17; Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A
Reinterpretationof Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 87 DUKE L.J. 986, 993-96 (1987).
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viewed as an implied command arising from the delegation of certain powers to
administrative agencies.
Grounding Chevron in implied congressional intent also solves the conflict
with the APA. Chevron deference is consistent with the APA's direction to
courts to decide all relevant questions of law because virtually all the statutes
that reflect an implicit delegation of interpretational authority either postdate the
APA or have been reenacted since its passage. Congress's presumed intentions,
as reflected in these later-in-time statutes, thus supersede the directive in the
previously enacted APA. 21 ° In effect, every time Congress has made an implied
delegation to an administrative agency, it has silently amended section 706 of
the APA.
As with the constitutional theory and the common-law theory, the understanding that Chevron rests on congressional intent is not without its difficulties. The
principal problem is the evidence supporting the presumption that Congress
generally intends agencies to be the primary interpreters of statutory ambiguities is weak. 21 At the time Chevron was decided, there was no established
background understanding that a decision by Congress to confer general rulemaking or adjudicatory authority on an agency would be deemed a decision to
transfer primary interpretational authority to the agency. If anything, the understanding was to the contrary.21 2 In addition, Congress has never acted to signal
general disapproval of courts exercising independent review in matters of
statutory interpretation.21 3 Thus, Chevron's attribution of a general intention to

210. See Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don't Get It, 10
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 23-26 (1996).

211. See Farina, supra note 6, at 470-76 (arguing that Congress just as plausibly intends that courts
exercise independent judgment when it confers authority on agencies subject to APA-style judicial
review); Strauss, supra note 155, at 1120 ("Chevron appears to reach this conclusion [that mandatory
deference is required] as a general imperative of judicial behavior, unconnected to congressional wishes
reflected in any given law."); Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2090-91 ("Congress's fear of agency bias or
even abdication makes it most doubtful that the legislature has sought deference to the agency under all
circumstances.").
212. This was true in at least two respects. First, pre-Chevron case law generally provided that
agency interpretations embodied in an exercise of a general rulemaking power were entitled to less
deference than interpretations rendered pursuant to a specific grant of rulemaking power. See, e.g.,
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S.
247, 253 (1981); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 309 (1979). Second, the pre-Chevron
understanding was that general grants of rulemaking power in organic statutes generally conferred only
power to issue procedural or interpretative rules, not legislative rules. See Anthony, supra note 10, at 45
& n.209; Frederic P. Lee, Legislative and InterpretativeRegulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (1940). Chevron,
in contrast, implicitly adopts the presumption that a general grant of rulemaking power is a delegation
of substantive rulemaking power covering all gaps and ambiguities in the statute. See also infra note
222 (discussing judicial revisionism in the understanding of the FTC's general grant of rulemaking
authority).
213. The principal legislative initiative prior to Chevron regarding the general practice of judicial
deference to agency interpretations of law was the Bumpers Amendment, which sought to compel de
novo judicial review of questions of law in all cases. See Farina, supra note 6, at 473-74. Although the
effort failed, it drew strong bipartisan support, "hardly suggesting that Congress is in fact strongly
committed to the deference doctrine." Merrill, supra note 3, at 995 n. 111.
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Congress that agencies be the front-line interpreters of regulatory statutes has
been described. by even its strongest defender as "fictional." ' 4
In the end, however, we think that the congressional-intent theory is the best
of the three explanations for the legal foundation of Chevron deference. Regardless of the plausibility of this theory as an original matter, it finds support in the
Chevron decision itself, in the Court's subsequent decisions explaining Chevron, and in Justice Scalia's article. It is the most common view among commentators. Most importantly, as we explain in the next Part, the proposition that
Congress intends to make agencies the primary interpreters of administrative
statutes has a certain logical force, provided we conceive of the type of
legislation that gives rise to Chevron deference in the correct manner. Thus,
although the congressional-intent theory has its difficulties, these difficulties are
on the whole probably less severe than those surrounding the other two theories.
The presumed-intent theory has another hidden virtue that other conceptions
about Chevron's underlying rationale (or mixed conceptions of its rationale)
lack-it can generate relatively determinant answers to the many questions
about the scope of the Chevron doctrine that have proliferated in recent years.
This alone may provide a sufficient justification for regarding Chevron as
resting on congressional command, rather than a constitutional or a commonlaw deference doctrine.
D.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CHEVRON'S DOMAIN

The conclusion that the Chevron doctrine rests upon background presumptions of congressional intent has a number of highly significant implications for
Chevron's domain. We will highlight three major ramifications here, and consider others in subsequent parts of the Article.
First, if Chevron rests on a presumption about congressional intent, then
Chevron should apply only where Congress would want Chevron to apply. In
delineating the types of delegations of agency authority that trigger Chevron
deference, it is therefore important to determine whether a plausible case can be
made that Congress would want such a delegation to mean that agencies enjoy
primary interpretational authority.2 15 This suggests that Chevron's domain should
be relatively narrow, rather than broad, corresponding to delegations of power
that single out agencies that have been given especially significant types of
responsibility.
Second, if Chevron depends upon a presumption about congressional intent,
then Congress has the power to turn off the Chevron doctrine when it wants. A
presumption of congressional intent is obviously just that-a presumption-and

214. Scalia, supra note 6, at 517.
215. See Anthony, supra note 10, at 4 (emphasizing that "[t]he threshold issue for the court is always
one of congressional intent: did Congress intend the agency's interpretation to bind the courts?");
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2084 (describing Chevron's "central point" to be that courts "must defer to
agency interpretationsif and when Congress has told them to do so" (emphasis added)).
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must give way to evidence that Congress harbored a different intent. Thus,
courts should consider evidence from the context of particular statutes that
Congress has produced a different set of directions than those that follow from
application of the Chevron doctrine. This implication too points toward a
narrow rather than a broad domain for Chevron.
Third, if Chevron rests upon a presumption about congressional intent, then
the Chevron doctrine has the full force and effect of a federal statute. All norms
and canons grounded in common law must give way to the Chevron doctrine.
Chevron's roots in congressional intent may mean that Chevron has a relatively
narrow domain. But within that domain it is a powerful and, of course,
mandatory deference doctrine.
IV.

THREE OPERATING PRINCIPLES

With these background principles in mind, we are now in a position to
describe three operating principles that courts should follow in resolving questions about Chevron's domain. These operating principles can be thought of as
collectively comprising the threshold inquiry that courts should undertake in
deciding whether to apply the Chevron doctrine or the Skidmore doctrine (or to
answer statutory interpretation questions de novo). Somewhat fancifully, our
operating principles can be described as the elements of "step zero" in the
Chevron doctrine: the inquiry that courts should undertake before moving on to
step one of Chevron, or turning instead to Skidmore (or resolving the issue de
novo).
The three principles emerge as answers to three questions about Chevron,
understood to be a doctrine of mandatory deference based on an implied
delegation of interpretational power from Congress. First, what type of power
must Congress confer upon an agency in order to trigger the presumption that
Congress has impliedly delegated interpretational authority to the agency-that
is, what must Congress do to "charge" an agency with administration of a
statute? Second, what is the scope of the implied delegation once granted-that
is, what kinds of agency interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference once
an agency is appropriately charged? Lastly, what sorts of evidence will defeat
the presumption of implied delegation of interpretational authority to an agency,
and suggest instead that Congress has directed the court to apply Skidmore
deference or to interpret the statute de novo?
The reason for distinguishing sharply between these three questions is to
promote analytical clarity. Both the case law 21 6 and the commentary 21 7 tend to
merge these questions into a single, undifferentiated inquiry. In most circum-

216. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000); Metro. Stevedore Co. v.
Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997).
217. Professor Anthony merges the first two inquiries into one. See Anthony, supra note 10, at
36-40. As he puts it, "[T]he key question in each case is whether Congress delegated the authority to
issue interpretations with the force of law in this format." Id. at 42.
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stances, doing so is probably harmless enough. Nevertheless, the analytical
division between these three questions makes it easier to see where the points of
disagreement lie in the more problematic cases, and allows us more readily to
identify sensible answers.
A. IMPLIED DELEGATIONS OF INTERPRETATIONAL POWER

Although the Supreme Court has stated on multiple occasions that Chevron
deference applies when an agency has been charged with administration of a
statute by Congress, 2 8 no significant precedent exists at the Supreme Court
level as to what this means. The lower court authority that exists suggests that
the concept is opaque, and, if applied as a rule of decision, would produce as
many disagreements as it resolves.2 1 9 Analytically speaking, however, this is the
place to start. We need to know what sort of powers Congress must confer on an
agency to render it eligible for Chevron deference before we can proceed to
consider what sorts of interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference and
when the presumption of delegated interpretational power is overcome.
One thing is clear. We know that a decision by Congress to give an agency
authority to promulgate legislative rules implementing a statute is enough to
charge the agency with administration of the statute. 220 This is the conventional
view of what happened in Chevron itself: the EPA adopted an interpretation of
the statutory term "stationary source" in notice-and-comment rulemaking conducted pursuant to the agency's general grant of rulemaking power under the

218. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
219. Consider, for example, the provision in the Superfund Act authorizing the EPA to grant certain
petitions for reimbursement by parties who engage in voluntary cleanups and authorizing parties who
are denied reimbursement by the agency to bring a private right of action in federal district court
seeking reimbursement. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) § 106(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2) (2000). The EPA probably can be said to "administer"
CERLCA as a general matter, and would appear to "administer" the reimbursement provision, at least
insofar as the statute delegates to EPA case-by-case adjudication authority to pass initially on petitions
for reimbursement. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(A). However, the EPA probably cannot be said to
"administer" the private right of action. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990)
("Congress established an enforcement scheme independent of the Executive and provided ... direct
recourse to federal court where ... rights under the statute are violated."). The circuits have split over
the question of whether in these circumstances the EPA is entitled to Chevron deference for legal
interpretations made in the course of denying petitions for reimbursement at the agency level. Compare
Dico, Inc. v. Diamond, 35 F.3d 348, 351-52 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1994) (declining to defer to EPA's decision),
with Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 920-23 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (reaching opposite conclusion).
220. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 673 (1997) (stating that agency given authority "to
prescribe legislative rules" is entitled to Chevron deference); Sykes v. Columbus & Greenville Ry., 117 F.3d
287, 294 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing statutory provision granting general rulemaking authority for the proposition
that the named agency was charged with administering the statute in question); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d
657, 660 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Visiting Nurse Ass'n of N. Shore v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 999 n.1,
1002 (1st Cir. 1996) (same); Warren v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 65 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1995)
(same); cf EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-57 (1991) (concluding that an
agency that lacks substantive rulemaking authority is not entitled to Chevron deference).
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Clean Air Act. 2 21 The controversy over what it means for Congress to charge an
agency with administration of a statute therefore centers on what other sorts of
delegated powers, short of legislative rulemaking, also qualify as implied
delegations of interpretational authority to agencies. For example, is an agency
given the power to adjudicate complaints, but not to promulgate legislative rules
(such as the Federal Trade Commission before 1973),222 entitled to Chevron
deference? 223 Or, is an agency that investigates and prosecutes offenses, but has
neither rulemaking nor adjudicative power (such as the U.S. Attorneys' offices) 2 24 entitled to Chevron deference?
Given Chevron's foundation in the concept of delegation of powers, we
believe Christensen correctly identified the power to bind persons outside the
agency with the "force of law" as the defining characteristic of agencies entitled

221. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1) (2000) ("The Administrator is authorized to prescribe such
regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter .... "). Curiously, the Court in
Chevron did not cite this authority. See Duffy, supra note 6, at 199-200. This general-rulemaking clause
dates from the 1963 version of the Act. See Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206 § 8(a), 77 Stat.
392, 400. The 1963 Act was rather toothless, and in fact the legislative history casts doubt on whether
Congress intended the general rulemaking provision to be a grant of substantive rulemaking power, as
opposed to a grant to make only procedural and interpretative rules. See Conference Rep. No. 88-1003
(1963), reprintedin 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1285 (noting that conference committee dropped the modifier
"procedural" before "regulations" because this was thought to be "too restrictive," but not stating that
substantive as opposed to interpretative rules were contemplated). By the time Chevron was decided in
1984, however, the understanding was that general rulemaking provisions are presumed to confer
authority to issue substantive rules. See Nat'l Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. FDA, 637 F.2d 877, 880 (2d Cir.
1981) (general rulemaking clause in Food and Drug Act authorizes substantive rules); Nat'l Petroleum
Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (general rulemaking clause in Federal Trade
Commission Act authorizes substantive rules). The Chevron Court appeared to assume without inquiry
that the stationary source rule was a valid substantive rule.
222. Section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 conferred power on the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) "to make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions
of this subchapter." Federal Trade Commission Act § 6(g), 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (2000). For decades, this
was understood to mean that the FTC had only the power to issue procedural and interpretative rules.
Indeed, in 1964, a thorough analysis of the FTC sponsored by the Administrative Conference of the
United States concluded without qualification that section 6 (g) did not give the FTC the power to
promulgate legislative rules. See Carl A. Auerbach, The FederalTrade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MIN. L. REv. 383, 457 (1964). Several years later, however, in an opinion by
Judge Skelly Wright, the D.C. Circuit ruled that everyone had been wrong about this and that the FTC
in fact did have the authority under section 6(g) to promulgate substantive legislative rules. See Nat'l
Petroleum Refiners Ass'n, 482 F.2d at 678. Congress ratified this decision, after a fashion, by adopting
legislation in 1975 conferring explicit legislative rulemaking power on the FTC subject to certain
substantive and procedural limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2000).
223. See City of Boston v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 898 F.2d 828, 831 & n.5 (1st
Cir. 1990) (concluding that an agency is charged with administering a statute if Congress has conferred
the authority to enforce statutory provisions through case-by-case adjudication); see also Wagner Seed
Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (concluding that agency vested with authority to
evaluate petitions for reimbursement under CERCLA was "the administering agency for purposes of
Chevron").
224. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARv. L. REV. 469,
489-92 (1996) (urging the extension of Chevron to interpretations of federal criminal law by federal
prosecutors, but acknowledging that this is contrary to existing judicial authority).
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to Chevron deference. 2 5 There are several mutually reinforcing reasons for
selecting the power to act with the force of law as the key variable in determining
which agencies are entitled to statutory deference.
First, asking whether the agency has authority to act with the force of law
focuses on a question that will always have a yes-or-no answer and serves as a
meaningful basis for distinguishing the agencies charged with administration of
a statute from run-of-the-mill executive units. All administrative agencies have
certain powers inherent in their status as units of the executive branch; all
executive officers have inherent authority to interpret the law, 22 6 and all executive units have authority to bind subordinate employees to instructions issued by
the head of the office (and perhaps by the President as well).227 Given these
inherent powers, virtually all units in the executive branch will at least occasionally render official interpretations of statutes, whether by issuing interpretative
rules, agency manuals, or other informal guidelines. 22 8 Thus, focusing on
authority to render these sorts of interpretations, which bind subordinate employees but not persons outside the agency, does not distinguish agencies "charged
with administration" of a statute from virtually any other administrative entity.
In contrast, Congress must always explicitly confer the authority to bind
actors outside the agency with the force of law. 229 Congress only gives a subset

225. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) ("Interpretations such as those in
opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law--do not warrant Chevron-style deference."); see also
Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (stating that an interpretation is not
entitled to Chevron deference when it "does not appear to be embodied in any regulation or similar
binding policy pronouncement to which such deference would apply" (emphasis added)).
226. See Frank H. Easterbrook, PresidentialReview, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 905, 905 (1990); Gary
Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IowA L.
REv. 1262, 1279-88 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations
for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 46 (1993).
227. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 5.93-99 (1994). This understanding is reflected in the "housekeeping statute,"
originally enacted in 1789, which provides that "[t]he head of an Executive department or military
department may prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its
employees, the distribution and performance of its business and the custody, use, and preservation of its
records, papers, and property." 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
308-12 (1979) (describing history of "housekeeping statute" and holding that it does not authorize
legislative regulations).
228. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 388 (1999) ("It is of course possible,
even common, for agencies to give instructions or legal opinions to their officers and employees in one
form or another, without intending to bind the public.").
229. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) ("It is axiomatic that an
administrative agency's power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated
by Congress."); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) ("The legislative power of the
United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by governmental
departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to the
limitations which that body imposes."); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1983) ("[T]he universe of each agency is limited by the legislative specifications
contained in its organic act."); Noah, supra note 186, at 1498 ("As creatures of statutes lacking any
independent constitutional pedigree, agencies cannot invoke some kind of inherent authority to justify
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of agencies such power and usually does so only with respect to a limited set of
issues. Moreover, in every case, the source of authority to make legally binding
decisions must be a duly enacted statute of Congress. The understanding that
agencies can bind persons with the force of law only pursuant to an express
delegation of authority from Congress has its roots, of course, in the nondelegation doctrine. 230 Any doubt about the matter is resolved by section 558(b) of the
APA, which provides, "A sanction may not be imposed or a substantive rule or
order issued except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law. ''23' Thus, by inquiring whether Congress has conferred power on
an agency to act with the force of law, we ask a question that readily differentiates some agencies (and some issues resolved by agencies) from other agencies.
Second, there is a certain logic to making the power to act with the force of
law the linchpin in determining whether an agency has been delegated implied
authority to act as the primary interpreter of law. John Duffy has recently
advanced one version of the logical argument. According to Duffy, if Congress
delegates power to an agency to bind persons outside the agency with the force
of law (say through legislative rulemaking) and simultaneously leaves a gap or
ambiguity in the.very statute that confers this delegated power, then the agency
in effect has been delegated authority to fill the gap or resolve the ambiguity by
rule.232 If the agency fills the gap with such a rule, then under the APA, the only
questions for the court are whether the rule violates the statute, and if not,
whether it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.2 33 These two
actions that find no warrant in their enabling legislation."). For example, it was common ground among
the Justices in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999), that it was necessary to
identify a specific source of delegated authority for the FCC's rules implementing the local competition
provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See id. at 377-78 (Scalia, J.); id. at 407-08 (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230. As an original matter, it was thought that only Congress had the power to make binding
legislative rules and only Article III courts had the power to render binding adjudications. See Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution."); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 275 (1856) (judicial power may be exercised only by Article III courts); Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825) (stating that Congress may not delegate "powers which are
strictly and exclusively legislative"). These understandings have been compromised in the face of
necessity, see, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 222-24 (1989) (pipeline-safety user
fees); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-74 (1989) (sentencing guidelines), but the
understanding remains that the power to make legislative rules or binding adjudications may be
exercised by units outside the legislative or judicial branch only pursuant to an express delegation from
Congress. This understanding also undergirds the Court's decisions refusing to permit Congress to
delegate legislative authority to a single House of Congress, a committee of Congress, or a legislative
agency. See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252 (1991); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Such self-delegations would permit units or
agents of Congress to bind the public with the force of law without complying with the constitutional
requirements for the enactment of statutes. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of
Separationof Powers, 1992 SUP. CT. REv.225, 235-36, 252.
231. 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (2000) (emphasis added); see Duffy, supra note 6, at 198.
232. See Duffy, supra note 6, at 199-202.
233. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
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inquiries closely track Chevron's step one and step two. Hence, the Chevron
doctrine can be derived deductively from the nature of legislative rulemaking
and the judicial review provisions of the APA.
The problem with this argument is that it can be countered by an opposite and
equally logical contention: If Congress enacts a law like the APA that instructs
courts to resolve all questions of law, and Congress subsequently confers power
on courts to review agency action under a particular statute, then Congress has
in effect delegated power to the courts to fill gaps and ambiguities under the
statute. Thus, the opposite of the Chevron doctrine-de novo review of all
questions of law-can also be derived deductively from the judicial review
provisions of the APA and other statutes. As a matter of a priori argumentation
from the structure of the APA and particular grants of authority to agencies, it is
not clear that this syllogism is any less compelling than the first.
A more nuanced version of the argument linking Chevron and the power to
bind persons outside that agency with the force of law may, however, overcome
this objection. This version adds to the mix the further observation that Congress cannot expect that all agency action, or even most of it, actually will be
subject to judicial review in any particular instance.2 34 Thus, if Congress enacts
a statute that contains a gap or ambiguity, and simultaneously confers power on
an agency to implement the statute in a way that is legally binding, then
Congress should expect that the agency view as to the meaning of the gap or
ambiguity will often become the law of the land. One cannot attribute the same
expectation to Congress when it provides that the agency's rules will be subject
to judicial review under the APA. It may be that no court will ever be asked to
review one of the agency's rules or, if asked, will ever reach the merits.
Thus, the combination of enacting an ambiguous statute and conferring
powers on an agency to make legally binding decisions under that statute
represents a choice to give the agency the primary power of interpretation, at
least in many if not most cases. Because the agency will necessarily become the
primary interpreter by default if no judicial review takes place, it probably
makes sense, if only in terms of preserving uniformity, to make the agency the
primary interpreter in all cases.
Third, asking whether the agency has authority to act with the force of law
appears to generate outcomes that largely coincide with judicial intuitions about
what sorts of agencies are entitled to Chevron deference. All courts agree that
agencies with grants of legislative rulemaking authority are entitled to Chevron
deference, 3 5 and most courts have concluded that agencies that have authority
to render binding adjudications are entitled to Chevron deference.2 3 6 On the
234. For example, less than one percent of Social Security disability cases that are eligible for
judicial review are in fact appealed to a court. See JERRY L. MAsHAw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTCE 186 (1983).
235. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (discussed supra at notes 37-49 and
accompanying text); Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 419 (1992)
(interpretation reflected in order of Interstate Commerce Commission entitled to Chevron deference);
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other hand, courts have shown no inclination to extend Chevron deference to
interpretations of law implicit in the decisions of prosecutors to indict or to
bring an enforcement action.2 37 This intuition seems to make little sense when
we look to the policy justifications for strong deference, such as drawing upon
agency expertise and assuring uniformity in interpretation of law. 238 But once it
is recognized that Chevron deference is based on a congressional delegation of
authority to act with the force of law, the exclusion of prosecutorial agencies is
readily explainable. Prosecutors interpret the law, but their interpretations lack
binding force on persons outside the agency. Thus, prosecutors do not satisfy
the basic precondition for the exercise of Chevron deference.
One possible objection to making a congressional delegation to act with the
force of law the sine qua non for Chevron deference is that this is formalistic
and overbroad. What we are really looking for, the objection might run, is
evidence that Congress has bestowed discretionary authority on an agency to
make policy. The power to act with the force of law is not necessarily coterminous with the exercise of discretionary policymaking authority. This is especially true with respect to agencies given the power to enter legally binding
orders through adjudication. 23 9 Sometimes agencies use adjudication to make
Freeman v. Burlington Broadcasters, Inc., 204 F3d 311, 322 (2d Cir. 2000) ("An agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute it is charged with administering is entitled to Chevron deference not only
when the agency interprets through rule-making, but also when it interprets through adjudication.");
Ward v. Booker, 202 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2000) ("An agency's interpretation of a statute by
formal regulation or adjudication is entitled to [Chevron] deference .... "); Mid-Am. Care Found. v.
NLRB, 148 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[W]hen an agency adopts a particular interpretation of a
statute through an adjudication ... , that interpretation normally would be entitled to Chevron deference."); Microcomputer Tech. Inst. v. Riley, 139 F.3d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Even the adjudicative interpretations of policy-making agencies are entitled to Chevron deference."); Massachusetts v.
FDIC, 102 F.3d 615, 621 (1st Cir. 1996) ("An agency's formal interpretation, through a rulemaking or
adjudication, of a statute it administers, is accorded what has come to be known as Chevron deference."); U.S. Mosaic Tile Co. v. NLRB, 935 F.2d 1249, 1255 n.6 (lth Cir. 1991) ("Although the
agency action in Chevron involved a legislative regulation, the deference standards set forth in that case
are now applied to most agency actions, including administrative adjudications .... "); Midtec Paper
Corp. v. United States, 857 F.2d 1487, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that Chevron applies to agency
adjudications, and explicitly rejecting the contrary argument). But see Bob Evans Farms, Inc. v. NLRB,
163 F.3d 1012, 1016-20 (7th Cir. 1998) (suggesting Chevron applies to agency adjudications only
where the adjudication entails the exercise of policymaking discretion).
237. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[W]e have
never thought that the interpretation of those charged with prosecuting criminal statutes is entitled to
deference."); United States v. McGoff, 831 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Sanford N. Greenberg,
Who Says It's a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretationsof Statutes That Create Criminal
Liability, 58 U. Prrr L. REV. 1 (1996); cf Kahan, supra note 224, at 490. In contrast, the Court has
deferred to an interpretation implicit in enforcement action in the context of Seminole Rock deference.
See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 156-67 (1991).
238. See Kahan, supra note 224, at 493-506 (arguing that the policies underlying Chevron support
giving deference to prosecutor's legal interpretations).
239. Requiring that courts give mandatory deference to interpretations announced in adjudications is
also open to objection on the ground that it inverts the position of the courts in a system of separation of
powers. The Supreme Court does not defer to legal interpretations of courts of appeals, at least in the
strong Chevron sense, nor do courts of appeals defer to legal interpretations by district courts. Yet, if we
extend Chevron to legal interpretations announced by agencies in adjudications, in effect a judicial
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policy, but sometimes adjudication simply entails finding the facts and applying
them to settled principles of law, with the agency acting in effect as a "neutral
arbiter," rather than as a policymaker. 240 Thus, the objection might continue, we
should not select a single on-off criterion like the power to act with the force of
law as the signpost that Chevron deference is appropriate; instead, we should
seek to determine on a case-by-case basis whether 24the agency has in fact been
charged by Congress "to play a policymaking role.", '
This objection, however, identifies a problem that has its own built-in correction mechanism. If an agency with the power to make binding adjudications
declines to use that power to implement discretionary policy choices, then its
adjudications will provide no occasion for aggrieved parties to seek judicial
review of the agency's interpretation of law. The adjudicating agency that acts
only as a "neutral arbiter" (if there is such an entity) will presumably have its
orders challenged only on the grounds that it erred in finding the facts or in
applying the law to the facts. It will not be challenged for its interpretation of
law if it does not do any interpreting. Hence, the fact that such an agency is
theoretically entitled to Chevron deference even though it does not engage in
discretionary policymaking is not a problem.
Moreover, seeking to determine on a case-by-case basis (or even on an
agency-by-agency basis) whether an agency is using adjudication to make
discretionary policy would be cumbersome and unworkable. Chevron's twostep process is itself designed to distinguish between interpretational questions
that have only one possible answer (which are resolved at step one because the
agency has no discretion) and interpretational questions that entail choice and
hence implicate discretionary policy (which are resolved at step two). Thus, it
would seem more parsimonious to apply Chevron to all agency interpretations
rendered in adjudications that carry the force of law and let the Chevron test
itself identify the policy-laden interpretations, rather than to apply some independent screen that seeks to sort cases (or agencies) into policymaking and nonpolicymaking in deciding whether to apply Chevron at all. Further, it is unclear
how such a distinction would be implemented. The central insight of Chevron is
tribunal that has been given the power to review an agency tribunal is required to defer to reasonable
interpretations adopted by the tribunal subject to review. Notwithstanding this oddity, however, it is
well established that agencies can make policy through adjudication, see generally SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), and the Court has held in at least one context that interpretations adopted in
adjudication are entitled to Chevron deference, see INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999)
(discussed supra notes 37-49). We thus accept that when agencies are empowered to act with the force
of law through adjudication, the interpretations they adopt are eligible for Chevron deference. As we
emphasize later, only self-executing adjudications are legally binding in the sense required to bestow
Chevron defererence. See infra notes 275-85 and accompanying text.
240. Martin, 499 U.S. at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co.
v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 7 (1985)).
241. Id. at 154; see Bob Evans Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 1012, 1018-20 (7th Cir. 1998)
(suggesting that whether an interpretation adopted in an adjudication is entitled to Chevron deference
should be determined through a case-by-case inquiry into whether the agency is seeking to make
policy).
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that any question of statutory interpretation where the answer is not compelled
by traditional tools of interpretation entails the exercise of discretionary policy.
If this perception is accepted, then it is unclear where would we drawn the line
between interpretations that entail only "minor" policy choices as opposed to
those that entail "major" policy choices, or however the distinction is to be
drawn.24 2 All cases that cannot be resolved at step one entail policy choices,
large or small, and Chevron instructs that the agency is the preferred interpreter
in resolving all such questions.
Another possible objection to the force-of-law criterion is that it is circular.
Agency action has the force of law, the objection would run, only if it is given
mandatory deference by the courts. Thus, one cannot identify those agencies
entitled to mandatory deference by asking which agencies have authority to
bind with the force of law.243

This objection, however, confuses two things that are different: whether the
agency action has the force of law, and what standard of review courts apply in
determining whether the agency has acted in accordance with law. Agency
action has the force of law when, of its own force and effect, it commands
certain behavior and subjects parties to penalties or sanctions if they violate this
command. 244 Agency action either will or will not have such an effect independent of whether it is subject to judicial review, or if it is subject to review,
independent of what standard of review applies.
The independence of legal effect and the standard of review can be seen most
clearly in the case of a party who fails to file a timely petition for review
challenging an agency directive and then violates the directive. In these circumstances, if the directive has the force of law, the party who violates it can be
242. For example, in Bob Evans Farms, Inc., the court concluded that Chevron did not apply to the
question whether the method used by employees in protesting an employer's action should be
considered in determining whether their dismissal was an unfair labor practice, because this question
did not implicate policymaking authority. 163 F.3d at 1019-20. But it is hard to see why this does not
entail a policy choice: Disregarding the method of protest will dramatically increase the number of
incidents that are characterized as unfair labor practices relative to an interpretation that factors into the
inquiry the method of protest. The real hangup in Bob Evans Farmswas that the NLRB's interpretation
was contrary to circuit precedent. See 163 F.3d at 1020. The court should have resolved the matter by
applying the transition rules for pre-Chevron precedent, see infra notes 394-411 and accompanying
text, rather than by crafting an exception for interpretations that do not sufficiently implicate discretionary policy.
243. Professor Anthony's article on the scope of Chevron can be read as advancing this criticism.
See Anthony, supra note 10, at 39. He says that to speak of an agency having been given the authority
to act with the force of law
means simply that the courts may not subject the interpretations to independent judicial
review, but rather must accept them subject only to limited review for reasonableness and
consistency with the statute. Thus, an interpretation carrying the force of law gets only limited
review because by definition it is covered by delegation that contemplates only limited review.
Id.
244. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974); William T.
Mayton, A Concept of a Rule and the "SubstantialImpact" Test in Rulemaking, 33 EMORY L. REV. 889,
904-05 & n.42 (1984).
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subject to immediate legal sanctions. The only issue on judicial review from the
imposition of the sanctions will be whether the directive was violated; the time
for petitioning for review of the directive having passed, the legal foundation of
the directive will be immune from challenge by the party. The directive thus has
a direct coercive impact, without regard to whether it has been reviewed with
deference by a court (or indeed whether it has been reviewed at all).
The independence of binding legal effect and the standard of review can also
be seen by considering that the standard of review does not alter the legal
consequences of agency action that survives the process of judicial review.
Judicial review acts as a sieve or screen that negates some agency action. The
standard of review affects the odds that any particular agency decision will be
declared unlawful by a reviewing court. Whatever the standard of review,
however, agency action that does not survive the review process is not legally
binding-it is unlawful. Conversely, agency action that survives the review
process may be legally binding or may not be legally binding, depending upon
whether Congress has delegated power to the agency to issue directives that
result in the imposition of legal sanctions if they are violated. The standard of
review determines how much agency action survives the review process, but is
irrelevant to whether the action that does survive is legally binding. There is
thus no circularity in making the standard of review turn in part on whether the
agency action under review is legally binding.
What then are the powers that Congress must confer upon an agency in order
to make it eligible for Chevron deference? Basically, Congress must give an
agency the power either to promulgate legally binding rules or to render legally
binding adjudications. In both contexts, Congress has charged the agency with
the authority to act with the force of law on persons outside the agency.
Moreover, in determining whether Congress has delegated power to issue
legally binding rules or orders, the key question is whether the statute provides
that a violation of the agency directive can result in the immediate imposition of
sanctions unless the rule or order is set aside on review or stayed pending
review.
If Congress has not given an agency the power to act with the force of law,
either through the issuance of binding rules or adjudicatory orders, but has
given the agency something less (like the authority to investigate or institute
enforcement actions), then no presumption should arise that Congress intended
the agency to have the primary authority to interpret law. Such an agency
should never be eligible for Chevron deference, but should be at most entitled to
Skidmore deference.
B.

THE SCOPE OF DELEGATED INTERPRETATIVE POWER

Having determined what sorts of powers Congress must delegate to an
agency in order to give rise to a presumption that Congress has assigned
primary interpretational authority to the agency, the next step is to establish the
scope of this impliedly delegated power. Justice Scalia argued in Christensen
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that the relevant inquiry should be whether the agency has rendered an "authoritative" interpretation of the statute. 45 He suggested that an authoritative interpre'2 4 6
tation is one that "represent[s] the official position of the expert agency.
Requiring no more than an authoritative interpretation, however, decouples
the scope of Chevron deference from the act of Congress that gives rise to the
implication of delegated interpretative authority in the first place. Under the
authoritative interpretation test, once the court determines that an agency is
entitled to Chevron deference (for example, because it has been given the power
to promulgate legislative rules), then it does not matter whether the agency
issues its interpretation in a legislative rule. The agency can just as easily
announce the interpretation in an interpretative rule, a policy manual, a press
conference held by the agency head, or a brief filed in court. As long as the
interpretation represents the agency's official view, it gets the same Chevron
deference as if rendered in a legislative rule.
This sweeping conception of the scope of Chevron authority, however, is not
faithful to the logic of implied delegation on which Chevron rests. Delegations
of power to bind persons outside the agency with the force of law are strictly
limited in accordance with their terms: "The grant of such a power is never to
be implied., 2 47 This understanding follows both from the nondelegation doctrine, as well as from the APA's prohibition against agencies exercising governmental power "except
within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as
24 8
authorized by law."

245. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 590 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("[W]e have accorded Chevron deference not only to agency regulations,
but to authoritative agency positions set forth in a variety of other formats."). Other courts have used
similar phraseology, but without suggesting that "authoritative" constitutes any kind of legal standard or
term of art. For example, in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996), in reiterating
its refusal to defer to agency views expressed for the first time in litigation, the Court questioned "[t]he
deliberateness of such positions, if not indeed their authoritativeness." Id. at 741; see also Strickland v.
Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Servs., 96 F.3d 542, 547 (1st Cir. 1996) ("During the second stage of a
Chevron analysis, an inquiring court accords substantial respect to authoritative agency interpretations."); In re Appletree Mkts., Inc., 19 F.3d 969, 973 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[If there is no authoritative
statement from the Executive, the courts 'fill the [statutory] gap' by attempting to divine congressional
intent."); Batanic v. INS, 12 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[A]ccording to Chevron, it is an agency's
exercise of its expert judgment-in a sufficiently authoritative manner-that warrants our deference.");
cf Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("A speech of a
mid-level official of an agency, however, is not the sort of 'fair and considered judgment' that can be
thought of as an authoritative departmental position." (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462
(1997)); Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1455-56
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding that the agency head's explicit adoption, in a letter to an Assistant
Attorney General, of the interpretation advanced in an amicus brief rendered the brief "an authoritative
expression of the agency's views," and applying Chevron deference).
246. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 591 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
247. ICC v. Cincinatti, New Orleans, & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co., 167 U.S. 479, 494 (1897) (holding that an
agency cannot be given the power to promulgate legislative rules-that is, legally binding rules of
future effect-by implication); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-08 (1979) (holding
that authority to promulgate legislative rules cannot be derived by implication).
248. 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (2000).
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Given that the primary grant of power to bind persons with the force of law
cannot be expanded beyond its express terms, it follows that the derivative
grant, the implied power to exercise interpretational authority, should also not
be subject to expansion beyond the same boundary. Consequently, unless
Congress has expressly directed to the contrary, Chevron deference should be
limited to legislative rules and adjudications that result in binding and selfexecuting orders.24 9
This is admittedly a more restrictive view of the scope of Chevron deference
than some of the Court's decisions reflect. The Court has in a handful of cases
suggested that agency action more informal than legislative rulemaking or
binding adjudication may be entitled to Chevron deference. 250 However, the
Court has not explained in any of these decisions why, consistent with the
underlying logic of delegation, an agency should be entitled to mandatory
deference when it interprets a statute in a procedural format that does not
otherwise have the force of law. If Chevron deference rests on an implied
delegation of interpretational power, then this deference should not extend
beyond agency action undertaken pursuant to the underlying grant of governmental power that gives rise to the implied delegation.2
Confining the scope of Chevron deference to legislative rules and binding
adjudications is also supported by powerful process considerations. Perhaps

249. This is essentially the position adopted by the Administrative Conference of the United States
in 1989. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 89-5: ACHIEVING JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE
OF AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 31-33 (1989). We would note,
however, that the final recommendation adopted by the Administrative Conference speaks in terms of
the procedures followed by the agency, as opposed to whether the agency action has the force of law.
See id. at 33. Professor Anthony's report that gave rise to the recommendation, in contrast, was framed
in terms of whether the agency acted in a format that is legally binding. See Anthony, supra note 10. As
should be clear from our discussion, we believe that Professor Anthony's formulation is the better one.
250. See Your Home Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 452, 453 (1999) (Medicare
Provider Reimbursement Manual); Nationsbank (N.C.), N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995) (letter of Comptroller of Currency); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
496 U.S. 633, 647-48 (1990) (informal adjudication); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) (NLRB adjudication); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition
Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 978-79 (1986) (no-action decision of Food and Drug Administration).
251. We do not agree with the claim that Chevron deference should be limited to legislative
rulemaking because interpretations given mandatory deference by courts are functionally equivalent to
legislative rules. See Duffy, supra note 6, at 199-203. For the reasons set forth supra Part IV.A, whether
agency action has the force of law and whether courts give such action mandatory deference are
different questions. The difference is parallel to the distinction in constitutional law between whether
the legislature has passed a statute and whether the courts should defer to the legislature's judgment that
a statute it has passed is constitutional. The constitutional law analogue of Chevron is the doctrine
articulated over a century ago by James Bradley Thayer: that Congress, when it legislates, also is given
primary authority to determine whether its legislation is constitutional. See James Bradley Thayer, The
Originand Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893); see also
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to PoliticalDecisionmakers and the PreferredScope of JudicialReview,
88 Nw. U. L. REv. 296 (1993) (drawing an analogy between Thayer's standard of constitutional review
and Chevron's standard of administrative review). The fact that Thayer's thesis is highly controversial
confirms that there can be no simple equation between the power to act with the force of law and the
standard of review that courts apply in reviewing such legal enactments.
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most importantly, such a limitation generally preserves the right of public
participation in the development of administrative interpretations of statutes.
Both legislative rulemaking and binding adjudication are subject to procedural
rules that ensure a significant degree of public participation before an agency
may take final action. Less formal modes of interpretation lack these protections. 252
With respect to legislative rules, agencies must, subject to certain exceptions, 253 comply with the notice-and-comment provisions of section 553 of the
APA.2 54 As interpreted by the courts, these provisions require public notice of a
proposed agency interpretation, an opportunity to file written comments on the
interpretation, and a reasoned response by the agency to any comments that
raise material concerns.2 55 Public input is thus ensured, and the agency must be
responsive to that input to avoid a judicial remand.
Similarly, formal adjudications must comply with the hearing requirements of
sections 556 and 557 of the APA,25 6 and all adjudications that affect liberty or
property interests must comport with the requirements of due process.2 57 These
procedural requirements mean that the parties immediately affected have an
opportunity to submit some kind of brief addressing a proposed agency interpretation before it becomes final. Judicially developed norms of reasoned decisionmaking will compel the decisionmaker to provide an explanation for the
agency's resolution of the issue.2 58 Again, public input is ensured, and the
agency has a substantial incentive to be responsive to that input.

252. Christensen alludes to this process concern. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576,
587 (2000) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995), for the proposition that informal agency
interpretations are "not 'subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedur[e] Act, including public
notice and comment,' " and hence are "entitled only to 'some deference' "). Indeed, by describing the
two types of agency action entitled to Chevron deference as "notice and comment rulemaking" and
'formal adjudication," id. (emphasis added), Christensen can be read as incorporating procedural
limitations on the types of action that trigger Chevron deference that this Article rejects as unduly
restrictive. See infra notes 331-37 (discussing informal adjudication); infra notes 357-60 (discussing
procedural rules); infra notes 361-66 (discussing interim rules).
253. Procedural rules are exempt from the notice-and-comment requirements, as are substantive
rules if the agency finds for good cause that notice and comment would be "impracticable, unnecessary,
or contrary to the public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A)-(B) (2000).
254. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313 (1979) ("Certainly regulations subject to the
APA cannot be afforded the 'force and effect of law' if not promulgated pursuant to the statutory
procedural minimum found in that Act."); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969)
(Fortas, J.); id. at 775-76 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 780-81 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (holding NLRB
lacked authority to promulgate a legislative rule using adjudicatory procedures).
255. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48-49, 56-57
(1983). See generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 51-63 (1984)
(reviewing judicial interpretation of rulemaking procedures); 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RicHARD J.

298-399 (3d ed. 1994) (same).
256. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2000) (providing, among other things, for presentation of oral and
documentary evidence, cross examination, a transcript of testimony, findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and a general prohibition on ex parte communications).
257. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972).
258. See, e.g., Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34, 35 (1st Cir. 1989).
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
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To be sure, in the case of adjudication, participation by the general public is
not guaranteed as it is in the case of notice-and-comment rulemaking. The APA
does not require Federal Register notice of impending adjudications and the
issues they present,25 9 nor do third parties possess any general right of intervention.2 60 Nevertheless, informal sources of information often alert interested
persons to the existence of cases that raise important legal issues, and such
persons may be able to voice their concerns through permissive intervention or
by filing amicus briefs. At a minimum, at least one interested party will exist to
act as the virtual representative of other similarly situated persons.
In contrast, other modes of announcing agency interpretations do not offer
equivalent opportunities for public participation. Interpretative rules and policy
statements are specifically exempt from the notice-and-comment requirements
of section 553.261 Policy manuals and enforcement guidelines are similarly
assumed to fall within these exemptions. 262 Opinion letters, no-action letters,
and the like do not provide the same structured opportunities for participation
that formal adjudication does. Similarly, agency press conferences, speeches by
agency executives, and appellate or amicus briefs filed in the agency's name
typically offer no established forum for public input before they are released.
Confining the scope of Chevron deference to legislative rulemaking and
binding adjudication thus provides important assurance that interpretations
entitled to mandatory deference will be open to public criticism before they are
rendered, and agencies will have incentives to be responsive to these criticisms.
This correspondence between the delegation to act with the force of law and the
existence of rights of public participation is not accidental. General norms of
democratic governance and traditions of due process both stress the importance
of affording affected persons the right to be heard before they are subjected to
the coercive power of the state.2 63 Hence, it is not surprising that the provisions
of the APA, supplemented by due process decisions, afford rights of public
participation when agencies are given the power to bind persons with the force
of law. Limiting the scope of Chevron deference to interpretations rendered in
legislative rules and in binding adjudications preserves this strong connection

259. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000) (governing notice-and-comment rulemaking and requiring
publication of advance notice of such proceedings in the Federal Register), with 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557
(2000) (governing adjudications, yet lacking similar notice requirements).
260. See Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1999); AMAN & MAYTON, supra
note 255, at 215-19.
261. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (d) (2000).
262. See, e.g., Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir. 1999) (Bureau of Prisons program
statement); Truckers United for Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 139 F.3d 934, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(regulatory guidance); Creighton Omaha Reg'l Health Care Corp. v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 785 (8th Cir.
1997) (Medicare provider reimbursement manuals).
263. See generally Michael Asimow, On Pressing McNollgast to the Limits: The Problem of
Regulatory Costs, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 127-29 (1994); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1760-90 (1975).
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between the exercise of coercive governmental power and the right to be
heard. 2 6
A related process concern is the danger of evasion of the procedural protections of the APA if Chevron deference is extended beyond legislative rules and
binding adjudications. Agencies are often frustrated by the time and resources
required to comply with notice-and-comment hearing procedures and the rules
of binding adjudication.26 5 Yet the APA and due process law demand compliance with these procedures before agencies can take action that binds the public
with the force of law.
Expansion of the scope of the Chevron doctrine to include interpretations
rendered in informal formats creates an avenue for evasion of these requirements. Chevron's doctrine of mandatory deference represents a powerful transfer of authority from courts to agencies. The question is whether the agency
should be able to exercise this authority without going through the cumbersome
procedures associated with legislative rulemaking (or binding adjudication).
One can, of course, question whether the costs associated with legislative
rulemaking and binding adjudication are too high given limited agency resources. 266 But sanctioning an evasion of section 553 or of adjudicatory hearing
requirements via an expanded Chevron doctrine is not the proper solution. If the
current procedural matrix is too elaborate, then it should be relaxed across the
board, or modified in accordance with some criterion that more sensibly rations
scarce agency resources. The strategy of evading these requirements via an
expanded Chevron results in complete elimination of procedural protections on
a hit-or-miss basis, corresponding to no coherent design.
Indeed, limiting agency interpretations entitled to Chevron deference to those
rendered in an agency action that has the force of law would lend a salutary
quid pro quo feature to the Chevron doctrine. If an agency is willing to treat an
interpretation as legally binding, and in so doing to subject itself to the
procedural requirements associated with action that is legally binding, then the
agency would be "rewarded" by having its interpretation given mandatory
deference by the courts. In contrast, if an agency is unwilling to be bound by an
interpretation, or is unwilling to subject itself to rulemaking or adjudication
procedures in promulgating an interpretation, then the agency would not receive
the mandatory deference reward. Instead, the agency would be required to
"earn" deference for its interpretation under the Skidmore doctrine.2 67 This quid
264. Indeed, the legislative history of the APA reveals the understanding that " 'interpretative'
rules-as merely interpretations of statutory provisions-are subject to plenary judicial review." S.
Doc. No. 79-248, at 18 (1946). As Justice Scalia has observed, the assumption that interpretative rules
would be subject to de novo review presumably explains why the APA exempts interpretative rules
from the notice-and-comment provisions of section 553. See Scalia, supra note 6, at 514.
265. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" The Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
266. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify the Agency Rulemaking Process, 47
ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65-66 (1995).
267. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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pro quo feature would provide a significant incentive for agencies to use
rulemaking and binding adjudication as vehicles for promulgating important
interpretations of law, and conversely a disincentive to making policy in more
informal ways.26 8
C. OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION OF DELEGATION

Because the delegation of interpretational authority recognized in Chevron is
only an implied delegation, it can be overcome by evidence that Congress in
fact intends a different allocation of interpretational authority. The question then
becomes, how strong is the presumption of implied delegation of interpretational authority reflected in the Chevron doctrine and when can it be overcome?
Presumptions come in a variety of gradations. A presumption that reflects a
"super-strong" clear statement rule can be overcome only by "unambiguous
statutory text targeted at the specific problem., 269 A presumption that reflects an
ordinary clear statement rule, in contrast, requires only a finding that Congress
clearly intended to disaffirm the presumption based on the totality of the
statutory materials. 2 70 At their weakest, presumptions are nothing more than tie
breakers, and27can
be overcome by the slightest preponderance of the evidence to
1
contrary.
the
In trying to position the Chevron doctrine within this range of presumptions,
we would emphasize two general points developed in Parts II and III. First, as
developed in Part III, the Chevron doctrine is best understood as a rule of
presumed congressional intent. Thus, Congress should have the final say in
determining whether Chevron deference applies in any given context. This
points toward the desirability of conceiving of Chevron as a relatively weak
presumption. Strong presumptions usually reflect extraneous values (such as
constitutional considerations) that often distort legislative intent. Weaker presumptions function as off-the-rack approximations of legislative intent, and give way
more readily when there is evidence specific to the case at hand that legislative
intent is to the contrary.
Second, as emphasized in Part II, the Skidmore doctrine is always available as
a fallback to the Chevron doctrine, and Skidmore partially accommodates many

268. See Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 1999) (declining to extend
Chevron deference to interpretation set forth in agency amicus brief where agency had declined to
exercise rulemaking power "to address a fundamental issue on which the brief takes a radical stance").
269. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 191, at 612.
270. See Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (judicial presumption that Congress intends ordinary rules of preclusion to apply under federal statute can be overcome
"when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident"); cf Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141
(1967) (stating that judicial review is presumed to be available, which means that "only upon a showing
of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to
judicial review").
271. See Gary Lawson, Provingthe Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859, 890-91 (1992) (noting that default
standard for proof of propositions of law is whether an interpretation is better than any available
alternative).
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of the policy reasons for wanting courts to defer to agency interpretations of
law, such as drawing upon agency expertise and assuring uniformity in the law.
This too suggests that Chevron should operate as a relatively weak presumption.
Cutting against these considerations are the systemic reasons outlined earlier
in support of having a rule of mandatory deference such as Chevron as opposed
to relying solely on common-law deference of the Skidmore variety:2 72 the
desirability of insulating courts from political disputes, the need for a strong
rule of deference to assure national uniformity in the interpretation of federal
statutory programs, and the wisdom of relying on agency interpretations when
the law gets to be too complex for judges to understand it. A broad doctrine of
mandatory deference is necessary to realize these objectives.
There is no clearly correct way to resolve these incommensurate considerations. We suggest that Chevron be regarded as a middle range presumption, a
presumption in the nature of an ordinary clear-statement rule. Such a presumption can be overcome if, based on the totality of the statutory materials, a court
finds that Congress clearly intended a contrary allocation of interpretational
authority. In practice, therefore, any decision by Congress to give an agency
power to act with the force of law would give rise to the presumption that the
agency is to exercise primary interpretational authority when it takes such
action. However, this presumption would be subject to rebuttal in particular
circumstances based upon showing, considering the overall text, structure, and
history of the statutory enactment, that Congress clearly intended the courts to
perform this role.
V.

ANSWERING THE FOURTEEN UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS

Once we unpack the logic that underlies Chevron's doctrine of implied
delegation of interpretational authority, answering the fourteen unresolved questions about Chevron's domain identified in Part I.B. becomes, in most instances,
relatively easy. With respect to many questions, the answer in principle is
self-evident, although of course issues will always exist at the margins about
how the principle should be applied. With respect to other questions, some
further elaboration of Chevron's implicit logic of delegation is required. In all
instances, however, the path the inquiry should follow is much more clearly
illuminated.
A. WHEN DOES CONGRESS DELEGATE PRIMARY INTERPRETATIONAL
POWER TO AN AGENCY?

We have identified five unresolved questions that concern the threshold
question of what it means for an agency to be charged with administering a
statute by Congress.

272. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
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1. Does Chevron Apply to an Agency That Lacks Legislative Rulemaking
Authority?
The Supreme Court has never ruled that Chevron deference applies when
Congress has not delegated to an agency the power to implement a statute
through legislative rulemaking.27 3 Under the operating principles outlined in
Part IV, an agency is charged with administering a statute only if it has been
given delegated power to bind persons outside the agency with the force of law.
The primary type of delegation that satisfies this criterion is, of course, a grant
of legislative rulemaking authority, but agencies can also act with the force of
law on persons outside the agency by rendering binding adjudications. Thus, the
answer to the first question is that an agency need not have the power to issue
legislative rules to be eligible for Chevron deference, provided it has been given
the power to render binding adjudications.2 74
While this answer is clear in principle, further consideration must be given to
what it means to have the power to render a binding adjudication. Historically,
some agencies, most prominently the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 27 5 and

273. The lower courts are divided on the question of whether agencies lacking legislative rulemaking authority are entitled to Chevron deference. See supra note 83. The Court's own decisions send
conflicting signals. In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, the Court held that interpretations adopted in adjudications by the Attorney General's delegatee are entitled to Chevron deference, and made no inquiry into
whether the Attorney General has legislative rulemaking power. See 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999); see
also supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text. Although the Attorney General does have such power,
see supra note 46, the Court's indifference to this fact may suggest that it does not perceive such a grant
of authority to be a necessary condition of Chevron deference. On the other hand, in Martin v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499 U.S. 144 (1991), the Court considered the
implications of a split-enforcement administrative regime for the question of which agency gets
deference for its interpretation of agency regulations-so-called Seminole Rock deference. See supra
note 87. One agency (the Secretary of Labor) was given the power to promulgate legislative rules.
Another agency (the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission) was given the power to
resolve adjudications arising under the statute and rules. The Court held that, in these circumstances,
the agency given the rulemaking power was impliedly given the authority to interpret the rules, and the
agency given only the power to adjudicate had no such implied authority. See Martin, 499 U.S. at
154-55. This analysis might suggest that an agency that enjoys only the power to adjudicate is not
eligible for Chevron deference. The more recent decision in United States v. HaggarApparel Co., 526
U.S. 380 (1999) (discussed supra notes 29-36), in which the Court held that assignment of the power to
a court to determine facts de novo is not inconsistent with giving the primary power of interpretation to
the agency with rulemaking authority, might also support this inference.
274. But see discussion supra note 239 (noting the tension between this understanding and the
established understanding of the position of courts under a system of separation of powers).
275. Under the original Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, the FTC was authorized to issue
orders requiring companies to cease and desist using unfair methods of competition. See FTC Act, Pub.
L. No. 63-203, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914). The Act provided no civil or criminal penalties for violation of
a FTC order. See id. If voluntary compliance did not result, the FTC was authorized to apply to a
federal circuit court of appeals for the enforcement of the order. See id. "Thus, if the order was
affirmed, any punishment was for contempt of the court's order, and not strictly for violation of the
Commission's order." 5 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED
STATurEs 3707 (Earl W. Kintner ed. 1982). In 1973, Congress amended the Act to give the FTC the
power to impose penalties for the violation of its orders that have become final. See Pub. L. No. 93-153
§ 408(c)-(d), 87 Stat. 576, 591-92 (1973) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(l)-(m) (2000)). With
this change, FTC orders became self-enforcing.
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the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB),2 7 6 have been empowered to hear

complaints and issue cease-and-desist orders, but their orders are not immediately binding upon the parties. Rather, the agency must file an action in court
seeking judicial enforcement of the order before a party can be subject to
sanction or held in contempt for violation of the agency's order.277 Because the
order is not legally binding of its own force, the factual and legal basis of the
order is subject to judicial review if and when the agency brings an enforcement
action, even if the party subject to the order has not otherwise filed a petition for
review of the order.2 78
Other agencies, however, are given the authority to issue orders that are
self-executing. 279 Violation of a final self-executing agency order, in contrast to
an FTC- or NLRB-type order, can result in immediate imposition of sanctions
or can form the basis of a judicial enforcement action.2 8 ° Moreover, if an
agency brings an action to enforce a self-executing order, and the time for
judicial review has passed, the legal and factual basis for the agency's decision
is not subject to collateral attack in the enforcement action.2 8 '

276. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), (e) (2000). The National Labor Relations Act was in this respect
patterned after the original Federal Trade Commission Act. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON EDUC. AND
LABOR, 74TH CONG., COMPARISON OF S. 2926 (73D CONGRESS) AND S. 1958 (74TH CONGRESS) 34 (Comm.
Print 1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at
1361 (1949).
277. Patrick Hardin and his co-authors have written:
An order by the National Labor Relations Board is not self-executing. Although phrased
primarily in the form of a "cease-and-desist" order, it merely prescribes what action is
necessary to redress and remedy conduct found to be unlawful. If the party or parties against
whom a Board order has been issued refuse to obey, the Board has no inherent authority to
enforce the order. To secure enforcement, it must apply to an appropriate U.S. court of
appeals. Until the order is enforced by the appeals court, the respondent does not incur any
penalty for continued disobedience.
2

1877 (3d ed. 1992) (citations omitted).
278. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2000) (NLRB order subject to judicial review when Board brings
enforcement action).
279. For example, orders of the Social Security Administration, the federal agency that renders the
largest number of adjudications, are self-executing. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2000) ("The findings and
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals
who were parties to such hearing."); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.955 (2000) (determination of administrative law judge is binding on all parties to a hearing unless appealed to Appeals Council); id. § 404.981
(decision of Appeals Council is binding on all parties unless appealed to federal district court).
280. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 717s(a) (2000) (authorizing FERC to seek judicial enforcement of orders
issued pursuant to the Natural Gas Act that it believes a party has failed to follow); 47 U.S.C. § 401(b)
(2000) (authorizing Federal Communications Commission, acting through the Attorney General, to
obtain judicial order enforcing any final order of the Commission that any party has failed or refused to
obey).
281. See Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991) (principles of
collateral estoppel and res judicata presumptively apply "to those determinations of administrative
bodies that have attained finality"); United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422
(1966) ("When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of
fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have
not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose."); see also ICC v. Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S.
PATRICK HARDIN ET AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
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The basic criterion for identifying agencies entitled to Chevron deferencewhether an agency can act with the force of law-suggests that only agencies
with the power to render self-executing orders should be eligible for Chevron
deference. Agency orders that must be brought to courts for enforcement are by
their very nature not legally binding on parties outside the agency. Indeed, it is
likely that one reason Congress denies certain agencies the power to issue
self-executing orders is that it does not trust such agencies to wield coercive
governmental power against private parties in the absence of judicial oversight.
In other words, the decision by Congress to require agencies to seek judicial
enforcement of their orders is a legitimate basis for drawing the conclusion that
Congress did not intend to delegate primary interpretational authority to such an
agency.
This conclusion means that the NRLB is not eligible for Chevron deference
for the legal positions it adopts through adjudication, because NLRB orders are
not self-executing.28 2 This result is somewhat counterintuitive, in that the Court
has often stressed that the NLRB exercises significant policy discretion,2 8 3 and
has said that the interpretations the NLRB adopts through adjudication are
entitled to significant deference. 28 4 Thus, it appears that the force-of-law criterion is arguably underinclusive in this particular instance. But any formal test
will be either over- or under-inclusive or both. Amending the force-of-law
criterion to permit the extension of Chevron deference to the NLRB adjudications would undermine the capacity of the test to act in other contexts as a clear
signaling device for congressional intent. In any event, there is no doubt that
NLRB adjudications are entitled to common-law deference of the Skidmore
variety, which is arguably a more appropriate standard in any event, given that
the Board has often been criticized for inconsistency in its policymaking
through adjudication.2 85

270, 278 (1987) (decision of ICC not to reopen a decision is not subject to judicial review absent new
evidence or changed circumstances once time for appeal of underlying order has passed); Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 111 (1977) (APA does not permit review of decision declining to reopen final
benefits determination that was not appealed within the time limits for direct appeal).
282. Although the Court has occasionally spoken as if Chevron applies to NLRB adjudications, it
has never squarely so held. See supra note 23.
283. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gullett Ginn Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U.S. 177 (1941).
284. See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1990); Beth Israel
Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 499 (1978); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944). See
generally Ralph K. Winter, Jr., JudicialReview of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court,
1968 SuP. CT. REV. 53 (reviewing rationale for judicial deference to NLRB decisions).
285. The Supreme Court has indicated that the Board is entitled to Chevron deference when it
proceeds by rulemaking. See Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 614 (1991) (Chevron applies to
NLRB substantive rule); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123
(1987) (applying Chevron to NLRB procedural rule). It appears, however, that the Board has rarely
engaged in substantive rulemaking. See HARDIN ET AL., supra note 277, at 738 (Supp. 1999) (reporting
that NLRB has issued only one substantive rule in its history). In the Board's early days, this reluctance
no doubt stemmed from doubts as to whether the Board's general grant of rulemaking authority, see 29
U.S.C. § 156 (2000), included the power to adopt substantive rules.
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2. Does Chevron Apply to an Agency That Lacks Both Legislative Rulemaking
Authority and the Power to Render Binding Adjudications?
The answer is again clear in principle: An agency that lacks both rulemaking
power and the power to render binding adjudications is not entitled to Chevron
deference. 28 6 Of course, Chevron is a doctrine about when it is appropriate to
recognize an implied delegation of primary interpretation authority. Congress is
always free expressly to delegate authority to an agency to interpret in other
formats, for example through the issuance of interpretative rules. However, we
are aware of only one reported decision involving a statute in which an agency
arguably has been given power to make binding interpretations of law through
less formal means than rulemaking or adjudication.2 8 7 Thus, this circumstance
is rare.
3. Does Chevron Apply to Statutes That Are Enforced by Multiple Agencies?
Chevron issues usually arise where a single agency is responsible for developing and enforcing policy under a statute. 288 Inthis context, only one agency can
be said to be "charged with administering" the statute. On the other hand,
several important statutes apply to all or virtually all administrative agencies,
including the APA, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). It is universally agreed that no single agency
with administration of these statutes,
with enforcement power has been charged
289
apply.
not
does
Chevron
that
hence
and

286. The Court has thus correctly concluded that the EEOC is not entitled to Chevron deference, at
least with respect to issues arising under the Civil Rights Act, because it lacks both substantive
rulemaking authority, see supra note 133 and accompanying text, and the power to render selfexecuting adjudicatory orders. The EEOC can attempt to resolve complaints by encouraging conciliation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000). However, the EEOC has no authority to enter orders
adjudicating such complaints; rather, its only authority if conciliation fails is either to file a civil action
in its own name, to refer the matter to the Attorney General for the filing of a civil action, or to issue a
"right to sue" letter permitting the aggrieved party to file a civil action. See id. § 2000e-5(f).
287. The Truth in Lending Act, as amended, includes a defense to liability where a party has acted in
"conformity with any interpretation or approval by an official or employee of the Federal Reserve
System duty authorized by the [Federal Reserve] Board to issue such interpretations or approvals." 15
U.S.C. § 1640(f) (2000). Although not formally expressed as a delegation, as the Supreme Court has
observed, the creation of the defense "signals an unmistakable congressional decision to treat administrative rulemaking and interpretationunder TILA as authoritative." Ford Credit Co. v. Mulhollin, 444
U.S. 555, 567-68 (1980) (emphasis added).
288. See Martin v. Occupational Health & Safety Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991)
(describing the typical unitary agency).
289. See Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137 n.9 (1997) (stating that Chevron does
not apply to agency interpretations of the APA); DuBois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d
1273, 1285 n.15 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that Chevron does not apply to an agency's interpretation of
NEPA because "we are not reviewing agency interpretations of the statute that it was directed to
enforce"); Prof'l Reactor Operator Soc'y v. NRC, 939 F.2d 1047, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that
Chevron does not apply to agency interpretations of the APA); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press v. United States Dep't of Justice, 816 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that agency not entitled
to deference when it interprets FOIA). One executive unit-the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ)-is charged with overseeing compliance with NEPA, and has issued regulations spelling out the
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Occasionally, however, more unusual schemes are encountered, in which
Congress gives more than one agency responsibility for implementation of a
statute. The Occupational Safety and Health Act calls upon one agency to
promulgate regulations, and another agency to resolve adjudications. At least
two other statutes have similar schemes: the Mine Safety and Health Act and the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.29 ° Under other statutes,
including the antitrust laws, 291 the Americans with Disabilities Act,292 and the
Rehabilitation Act, 293 enforcement responsibility is shared by more than one
agency.
Lower courts have held that divided enforcement is inconsistent with Chevron deference, because the contrary would mean that "either the same statute is
interpreted differently by the several agencies or the one agency that happens to
reach the courthouse first is allowed to fix the meaning of the text for all."29 4
Under the criteria articulated in Part IV, however, there is no necessary reason
why more than one agency cannot qualify for Chevron deference under a
statute. Conceivably, Congress could give two or more agencies the power to
issue binding regulations or adjudications. If so, then each of the agencies given
the appropriate powers should be entitled to mandatory deference.
This conclusion does not undermine the settled understanding that Chevron
does not apply to agency interpretations of general statutes such as the APA,
FOIA, and NEPA. 295 No agency has been delegated authority to implement
procedures for agencies to follow in complying with the statute. See 40 C.FR.§§ 1500-1508 (2000). As
to whether these regulations are entitled to Chevron deference, see infra note 296.
290. See George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the
OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315 (1987) (discussing Mine Safety Act). Similarly,
Congress has given rulemaking power under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA) to the Secretary of Labor (who has delegated it to the Director of the Office of Workmen's
Compensation Programs (OWCP)), and has conferred responsibility for adjudications on the Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board. See Director, OWCP v. O'Keefe, 545 F.2d 337, 342-43 (3d
Cir. 1976) (detailing the administrative scheme of the LHWCA).
291. For example, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission share enforcement
authority under section 7 of the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). Similarly, the same two
agencies both have the power to investigate possible antitrust violations, the Department of Justice
under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (2000), and the Federal Trade Commission under 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(a)-(b),
49 (2000).
292. The Americans with Disabilities Act delegates to the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission responsibility for issuing regulations to implement Title I of that statute (governing private sector
discrimination), see 42 U.S.C. § 12,116 (2000); it authorizes the Attorney General to issue regulations
under Title II of the statute (which applies to public sector employment), see id. § 12,134(a); and it
authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations pertaining to the transportation provisions of Title II and HI, see id. § 12,149(a).
293. See supra note 139.
294. Rapaport v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 F.3d 212, 216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see Wachtel v.
Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Suggestions have been made that
perhaps a different result is appropriate if the affected agencies have agreed on an allocation of lead
agency status or if all agencies agree upon the applicable meaning. See Rapaport, 59 F.3d at 221-22
(Rogers, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See generally Russell L. Weaver,
Deference to Regulatory Interpretations:Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 35 (1991).
295. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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these statutes through binding rulemaking or adjudication; hence, the precondition for Chevron deference has not been established.2 96
Moreover, making the power to act with the force of law the triggering
condition for Chevron deference is not a recipe for chaos. With any statutory
scheme in which uniformity is truly important, Congress is unlikely to delegate
legislative authority to two or more agencies, at least not without also specifying some formula for apportionment of that authority among the affected
agencies. For example, one agency may be given authority to adopt regulations
implementing some sections of a statute, while another agency is given authority to adopt regulations implementing other sections.29 7 In other circumstances,
two or more agencies with enforcement authority may reach an internal agreement over the appropriate division of their responsibilities for different types of
issues. 298
With respect to split enforcement regimes such as that under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the situation is somewhat more complex. Here,
one agency (the Secretary of Labor) is given the power to promulgate rules, and
another agency (the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission) is
given the power to render binding adjudications. 29 9 Under the suggested analysis, both agencies are entitled to Chevron deference when they render interpretations of the statute. This will not necessarily produce internal inconsistency or
conflict, however. When the Secretary of Labor promulgates a regulation, the
regulation is binding on the Commission. Thus, the Secretary's regulations, to
the extent they fill statutory gaps, will prevail over any contrary interpretation of
the statute by the Commission. 300 The Commission's interpretations will be
entitled to mandatory deference only insofar as they address issues that fall into
statutory gaps not covered by any regulation. As to such issues, there will be no
conflict between the Secretary and the Commission.
Of course, any system of multiple or split enforcement will create some
positive risk of conflict in statutory interpretation between the affected agencies.
In these circumstances (which should be rare), a reviewing court should shift to

296. The CEQ regulations implementing NEPA were not adopted pursuant to any delegated authority from Congress. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. There is no provision of NEPA (or any
other statute) that authorizes the CEQ to engage in rulemaking. Instead, the regulations appear to rest
on the inherent authority of the President to assure that the laws are faithfully executed. See National
Environmental Policy Act-Regilations, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (Nov. 28, 1978). Such rules are necessarily nonlegislative, and hence are entitled to Skidmore deference rather than Chevron deference. In a
pre-Chevron decision, the Supreme Court indicated that the CEQ regulations are entitled to "substantial
deference," see Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979); it has not revisited the issue since
Chevron.
297. This is the approach taken under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See supra note 292.
298. See supra note 291.
299. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
300. Recall that in Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, the Court held
that the Secretary's interpretation of the regulations prevails over the Commission's interpretation of the
regulations. See 499 U.S. 144, 154-55 (1991).
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common-law deference of the Skidmore variety, and enforce the interpretation
that has the greatest power to persuade.
4. Does Chevron Apply to Cross-Referenced Statutes?
Issues have arisen in a number of contexts as to whether or to what extent
Chevron applies when a general statute cross-references a statute that an agency
is charged with administering, or when a statute an agency is charged with
administering cross-references a general statute or general principles of common law. An illustration of the former is provided by the APA provision that
requires the use of formal adjudication procedures "in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing."3 0° Most courts have exercised de novo review in determining
whether any particular statute can be said to require a hearing "on the record"
and hence, formal adjudication procedures. 3 °2 However, the D.C. Circuit has
held that when the underlying statute is ambiguous, courts should give Chevron
deference to the agency's reasonable interpretation of what kind of hearing the
statute requires. 303
The logic of implied delegation provides substantial guidance in sorting out
this sort of issue, as can be seen by considering the D.C. Circuit decision in
closer detail. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) requires a
"public hearing" before the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues
corrective action orders.30 4 EPA had interpreted this to mean that only an
informal hearing rather than a trial-type hearing was required. The D.C. Circuit
was correct in concluding that this interpretation of RCRA was entitled to
Chevron deference. Congress had delegated authority to the agency to issue
binding regulations,30 5 and EPA's interpretation was embodied in procedural
regulations issued under that authority.30 6 Thus, the preconditions for Chevron
deference were satisfied as to this issue.
It does not follow, however, that EPA was entitled to Chevron deference with
respect to the separate and distinct issue whether such a hearing falls within the
definition of a hearing "on the record" within the meaning of the APA. 30 7 EPA
has not been delegated any authority to interpret the APA with binding authority. Hence, as to the question whether EPA's procedural regulations were subject

301. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000). Another illustration is provided by the provision of FOIA which
exempts from disclosure information that is "specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2000); see supra note 86.
302. See, e.g., City of W. Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 1983); Seacoast AntiPollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978).
303. See Chem. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
304. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(b) (2000).
305. See 42 U.S.C. § 6912(a)(1) (2000) (EPA Administrator authorized to prescribe "such regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter").
306. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., 873 F.2d at 1478-80 (summarizing history of regulations).
307. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000).
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to the formal adjudication
requirements of the APA, the court should have
30 8
exercised de novo review.

An example'of an agency statute that cross-references general law is provided
by decisions by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) that turn
on the interpretation of contracts that have been entered into by regulated
parties. 3 09 FERC's authority to regulate is established by the Natural Gas Act
and other federal statutes that FERC administers, but the interpretation of
contracts involves the application of general common law contract principles.
The circuits have split over whether FERC's interpretation of a contract entered
into by regulated parties is entitled to Chevron deference.3 10
The key question, as always, is whether Congress has delegated authority to
the agency to issue binding orders interpreting the contract in question. The
most straightforward version of the problem arises when an agency like FERC
is asked to interpret a tariff. Tariffs are services contracts that are filed with the
agency. 3 1' Duly filed tariffs have the force and effect of law unless set aside by

308. It appears from the reported opinion that the petitioner did not raise the APA argument. The
EPA's procedural regulations were challenged on the grounds that (a) they violated congressional intent
as manifested in RCRA as amended, and (b) they violated due process. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., 873
F.2d at 1480, 1483. In our opinion, the court resolved both issues correctly. If the petitioner had raised
the APA issue, then it would have been entitled to the court's independent judgment as to whether the
procedures adopted by EPA which included the submission of written evidence and argument, oral
presentations, an independent adjudicator, and questioning of the parties by the independent adjudicator
but not cross examination, see id. at 1479-constituted an "on the record" hearing subject to the
requirements of APA sections 556 and 557.
309. A statutory example is provided by cases considering whether to afford Chevron deference to
decisions of the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) interpreting a provision of the statute it
administers, the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Act (FSLMRA), which requires federal
agencies to furnish requested information about government employees to a union "to the extent not
prohibited by law." 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4) (2000). The provisions of "law" that bear on this inquiry
include the FOIA and the Privacy Act, both general statutes that apply to all agencies. Most courts
declined to afford Chevron deference to FLRA decisions under this provision, reasoning that the FLRA
is not charged with the duty of administering either FOIA or the Privacy Act. See, e.g., FLRA v. United
States Dep't of Def., 984 F.2d 370, 373-74 (10th Cir. 1993); United States Dep't of the Navy v. FLRA,
975 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1992); FLRA v. United States Dep't of Def., 977 F.2d 545, 547 n.2 (1lth
Cir. 1992); FLRA v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 941 F.2d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 1991); FLRA v. United
States Dep't of the Treasury, Fin. Mgmt. Serv., 884 F.2d 1446, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States
Dep't of the Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131, 1134 (3d Cir. 1988). At least the Fourth Circuit disagreed,
however, noting that union requests are filed under the FSLMRA and that the Act intended the FLRA to
develop and apply special expertise in the field of labor relations. See United States Dep't of Health &
Human Servs. v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129, 1133 (4th Cir. 1987); see also United States Dep't of Agric. v.
FLRA, 836 F.2d 1139, 1142 (8th Cir. 1988) (indicating its concurrence with the Fourth Circuit position
on this issue), vacated on othergrounds, 488 U.S. 1025 (1989). The Supreme Court eventually resolved
this dispute, without mentioning the disagreement over the applicability of the Chevron doctrine. See
United States Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 489 (1994) (holding that Privacy Act forbids
disclosure of employee addresses to union representatives through FSLMRA requests).
310. See Koch Gateway Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 136 F.3d 810, 815 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing
decisions and acknowledging circuit conflict).
311. For further background, see Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1330-40 (1998).
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FERC,3 12 and Congress has specifically authorized FERC to adjudicate complaints challenging the lawfulness of filed tariffs. 3 13 Given that Congress has
specifically authorized the agency to hear such actions, it is reasonable to
conclude that Congress has implicitly delegated authority to the agency to
interpret tariffs when questions arise in such proceedings about their meaning.31 4 Thus, under general Chevron principles, FERC interpretations of tariffs
rendered in proceedings challenging the lawfulness of tariffs should be entitled
to mandatory deference.3 15
Slightly more complicated are cases in which a regulated entity seeks a rate
increase, and a customer argues that FERC should deny the request because the
increase violates a settlement agreement previously entered into between the
regulated entity and the customer. Assuming that the settlement agreement was
filed with FERC,3 16 this situation is ultimately no different from the tariff
adjudication case. A settlement that is filed with and approved by the agency has
the same force as a tariff, and so in effect, the customer is asking the agency to
determine that a proposed rate increase violates an existing tariff requirement.
Again, Chevron deference seems appropriate insofar as adjudicating the rate
reasonableness claim requires interpretation of the settlement.31 7
It does not follow, of course, that Chevron deference should always extend to
agency interpretations of contracts. Deference depends on whether Congress
has delegated authority to the agency to adjudicate the meaning of the contract. 31 8 For example, if a customer brings an action seeking direct enforcement
of an existing tariff requirement, the Natural Gas Act says that federal district

312. See Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 576-84 (1981) (discussing the requirements of the
filed rate doctrine in the context of the Natural Gas Act).
313. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (2000).
314. But see supra note 239 (questioning on separation of powers grounds the appropriateness of
requiring courts to give mandatory deference to agency adjudications).
315. Most courts have so held. See Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d at 814; N.W. Pipeline
Corp. v. FERC, 61 F.3d 1479, 1486 (10th Cir. 1995); cf Dayton Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 843 F.2d
947, 953 & n. 12 (6th Cir. 1988) (declining to apply Chevron deference in this context).
316. The Natural Gas Act requires that contracts for the delivery of gas in interstate commerce be
filed with the agency just as tariffs must be filed. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c(c) (2000). Settlement
agreements between pipelines and their customers are commonly filed as contracts under this authority.
If a settlement agreement is not filed with FERC, but is drawn into question only indirectly in
determining the level of costs that a pipeline should be allowed to pass on to customers, then it would
seem that FERC has not been delegated authority in any direct sense to interpret the contract. Skidmore
deference is more appropriate in such circumstances. But see Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 3 F.3d
1544, 1549-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (extending Chevron deference to contract interpretation in these
circumstances).
317. The Court so held (on slightly different reasoning) in Nat. Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 811
F.2d 1563, 1569-72 (D.C. Cir. 1987); cf Mid La. Gas Co. v. FERC, 780 F.2d 1238, 1243 (5th Cir. 1986)
(declining to apply Chevron deference in these circumstances).
318. See Litton Fin. Printing v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 202-03 (1991) (holding that NLRB interpretations of collective bargaining agreements are not entitled to deference because enforcement of such
agreements has been delegated to the courts, not the NLRB).
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courts have "exclusive jurisdiction" to hear the complaint .3 9 Here, the delegation of authority runs to the court, not the agency, making Chevron deference
to
32 0
the agency's interpretation of the contract inappropriate in this context.
5. Does Chevron Apply to an Agency's Interpretation of Its Own Regulations?
The Supreme Court has long recognized that an agency's construction of its
own regulations is entitled to "substantial deference.",32 ' This proposition is
grounded in a separate line of cases that predates Chevron and has its own
name: Seminole Rock deference.32 2 The Supreme Court has consistently viewed
agency interpretations of statutes and agency interpretations of regulations as
governed by distinct deference doctrines. When we examine these doctrines
more closely, however, we can see a substantial parallel between the Chevron
doctrine and the Seminole Rock doctrine. Both impose a form of mandatory
deference 323 in that both provide that the agency interpretation is "controlling"
as long as it is "permissible," or to use the Seminole Rock phrase, so long as not
"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. 3 24 Moreover, although
the traditional justifications for deference to agency interpretations of regulations focus on such factors as the agency's greater familiarity with its own
regulatory text, 3 2 5 in one prominent decision the Court noted that "the power
authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency's
delegated lawmaking powers. 326 This statement appears to ground Seminole
Rock deference in the same type of implied delegation that underlies the
Chevron doctrine.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider in any comprehensive
fashion the rationale and proper formulation of Seminole Rock deference.3 27

319. 15 U.S.C. § 717u (2000). See Pan Am. Petrol. Corp. v. Superior Court of Del., 366 U.S. 656,
662 (1961) (stating in dictum that suit to enforce a filed rate should be brought under § 717u).
320. A difficult intermediate case is presented by the Federal Communications Act, where parties
claiming to be damaged by a common carrier may elect either to file a complaint with the agency or sue
in federal court. See 47 U.S.C. § 207 (2000). Suits filed in court are often stayed and referred to the
agency under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Cf United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59,
62-63 (1956) (question of tariff interpretation arising in judicial action brought under the Interstate
Commerce Act referred to agency under primary jurisdiction doctrine). Still, the fact that Congress has
provided for concurrent jurisdiction may negate any inference that it has implicitly delegated primary
interpretational authority to the agency with respect to tariff interpretation issues.
321. See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1995); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S.
144, 150 (1991); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986).
322. See supra note 87.
323. See Manning, supra note 87, at 627.
324. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
325. See Manning, supra note 87, at 629-30.
326. Martin, 499 U.S. at 151.
327. John Manning, in an insightful article, argues that agency interpretations of their own regulations should generally be entitled to Skidmore deference rather than Chevron deference. See Manning,
supra note 87, at 686-90. His argument, however, relies primarily on separation of functions concerns
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Nevertheless, the understanding of the limits of the Chevron doctrine set forth
herein has important implications for the scope of the Seminole Rock doctrine.
Chevron deference, we have argued, should be limited to interpretations
rendered in legislative rules and binding adjudications. Note, however, that if
we tack Seminole Rock deference on top of Chevron deference, this limitation
on the scope of the Chevron doctrine could be readily evaded. For example, an
agency could implement an ambiguous statute with an ambiguous regulation,
and then "clarify" the ambiguous regulation with an interpretative rule. Seminole Rock would seem to suggest that the interpretation contained in the
interpretative rule is entitled to mandatory deference. This has the effect of
extending the sphere of mandatory deference to an agency interpretation of a
statute embodied in a mere interpretative rule that lacks the qualities of delegated authority and public participation associated with legislative rules. If this
is permitted, the agency can easily evade the limitations on the scope of
Chevron deference and the procedural requirements of the APA.
To prevent this potential erosion of the limits on Chevron deference, Seminole Rock deference should at a minimum be subject to the same limitations that
apply to the scope of Chevron deference.3 2 8 In other words, interpretations of
regulations interpreting statutes should be entitled to mandatory deference only
if the interpretations are themselves embodied in legislative rules or binding
adjudications. Interpretations of regulations interpreting statutes that appear in
more informal formats, such as interpretative rules, policy statements, agency
manuals, or opinion letters, should be assessed under the standard articulated in
Skidmore.
B.

WHAT SORTS OF INTERPRETATIONS BY A CHEVRON-QUALIFIED AGENCY ARE
ENTITLED TO CHEVRON DEFERENCE?

The logic of implied delegation, as elaborated in Part IV, also yields a
straightforward set of propositions regarding what kinds of interpretations are
entitled to Chevron deference once an agency has been appropriately charged
with primary interpretational authority. First, an agency that has been given the
power to promulgate legislative rules is entitled to Chevron deference with
respect to interpretations advanced in legislative rules. Second, an agency that
has been given the power to render binding adjudications is entitled to Chevron
deference with respect to interpretations advanced in a final adjudication. Third,
an agency that has been given both the power to engage in legislative rulemak-

and their resonance with separation of powers traditions, rather than on the scope-of-delegation analysis
emphasized here. Id.
328. See Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entm't Ctr., 193 F.3d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1999) (declining
to accept agency interpretation of rule that would be tantamount to adopting a new substantive
regulation); cf Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so
maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication
rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.").
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ing and the power to render binding adjudications can choose to advance
interpretations entitled to Chevron deference either through rulemaking or
29
adjudication?
Before Christensen, there were numerous unresolved questions about what
kinds of agency decisions are entitled to Chevron deference. Christensen holds
that an opinion letter is not entitled to Chevron deference, and the Court's
rationale for so holding clearly precludes giving Chevron deference to interpretations found in policy statements, enforcement manuals, no-action letters, press
releases, and post-hoc rationalizations of agency counsel such as agency briefs.3 3 °
These conclusions, of course, are fully consistent with the principles endorsed
herein.
After Christensen, five questions appear to remain unanswered regarding
what kinds of agency interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference once we
conclude that an agency has been properly charged with administering a statute
by Congress.
6. Does Chevron Apply When a Chevron-QualifiedAgency Renders an
Interpretation in an Adjudication?
The answer is clear in principle: A Chevron-qualified agency is entitled to
Chevron deference for interpretations rendered in adjudications, provided the
agency has been delegated the power to render binding adjudications. As
previously discussed, a binding adjudication means a self-executing adjudication. 33 Thus, an agency is eligible for Chevron deference for interpretations
rendered in adjudications only if the adjudication results in a final, selfexecuting order-one that is binding without resort to a judicial enforcement
action.
On the other hand, Chevron deference need not be limited to "formal"
adjudications reached in accordance with the procedures of sections 556 and
557 of the APA.332 The dictum in Christensen arguably to this effect should be

329. This qualification on an agency's ability to chose between rulemaking and adjudication and still
receive Chevron deference-that the agency must have the power to act with the force of law in both
modes-is not at odds with the so-called Chenery doctrine. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,
202-03 (1947). Chenery in fact presupposes that the agency has been delegated authority to make
binding policy through either type of action. See id. at 200-01; see also Martin, 499 U.S at 154. Where
such a dual delegation has been made, then obviously agency interpretations rendered either through
legislative rules or binding adjudications should be given Chevron deference. If the agency has not been
delegated authority to make policy in both of these modes, however, then Chevron should not be used
to expand the agency's powers beyond the scope of the delegation.
330. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (listing nonbinding actions). Note
as well the presence in Christensen of an amicus brief filed by the United States supporting the
interpretation at issue. See id. at 582. Cf Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1997) (granting
Seminole Rock deference to an interpretation advanced in an amicus brief).
331. See supra notes 275-85 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 256 (describing formal adjudication procedures).
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disapproved.3 33 The touchstone is not the formality of the procedures used, but
whether Congress has delegated power to the agency to act with the force of
law. If in a particular context Congress has authorized an agency to resolve
controversies in a legally binding fashion, but with less formality than the APA
requires for formal adjudication, Chevron should still apply. Of course, due
process will impose a floor on what kinds of procedures Congress can direct an
agency to employ in resolving individual controversies that implicate liberty
and property interests.3 34 We assume that this floor will be sufficiently protective that adversely affected parties will always be afforded an opportunity to be
heard before the agency adopts any contested interpretation.
A more difficult question is whether individualized proceedings that are not
fully adversarial may qualify as adjudications for purposes of conferring Chevron deference. Many agencies permit individuals to file internal protests of
initial decisions by agency staff-for example, decisions denying benefits or
imposing taxes.3 35 These protests often are not fully adversarial, in that the
private party is permitted to argue but the agency staff does not respond before
the protest is resolved. In a recent post-Christensen decision, the D.C. Circuit
framed the adjudication inquiry, at least in part, in terms of whether the agency
staff and the regulated party take opposing positions in the proceeding.33 6 At
first blush, this may appear to be an appropriate limitation on the type of agency
decision entitled to mandatory deference, because nonadversarial adjudication
reduces the likelihood that any significant measure of public participation will
be allowed before the agency interpretation is adopted. But this falls into the
trap of making the procedures employed by the agency in any particular case
the test for Chevron deference, rather than asking whether the agency's decision
has the force of law. The force-of-law criterion should be relatively easy to
administer; 337 superimposing an adversarial process requirement would lead to
a morass. Bearing in mind that due process will. always impose a floor on the
procedures employed when an agency enters an order having the force of law,
we would counsel against grafting additional procedural preconditions to Chevron deference beyond those suggested by the logic of implied delegation.

333. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (stating that interpretations advanced in "formaladjudication"
are entitled to Chevron deference (emphasis added)).
334. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (reviewing federal adjudication
procedures for constitutionality under Due Process Clause). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The
Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 916-41, 960-68 (2000) (reviewing the
prerequisites for application of due process hearing requirements).
335. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1515(a) (2000) (protest of initial determination of duties by Customs
Service).
336. See In re Sealed Case, 223 F.3d 775, 779-80 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding by Federal Election
Commission of no probable cause that conduct violated Federal Election Campaign Act entitled to
Chevron deference).
337. It is still necessary, of course, to have some conception of what an "adjudication" means. For a
good start, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 369 (1978)
(defining adjudication as "a process of decision that grants to the affected party a form of participation
that consists in the opportunity to present proofs and reasoned arguments").

2001]

CHEVRON'S DOMAIN

7. Does Chevron Apply When a Chevron-Qualified Agency Renders an
Interpretation in an Interpretive Rule?
The APA recognizes a distinction between legislative rules and interpretative
rules.338 The distinction is one of the most confusing in all of administrative law
because legislative rules and interpretative rules differ along three different
dimensions: the purpose of the rule, its legal effect, and the procedures used in
promulgating the rule.339 In terms of purpose, a legislative rule can be defined
as one that articulates a new norm or modifies an existing norm, whereas an
interpretative rule interprets or clarifies an existing norm.3 4 In terms of legal
effect, a legislative rule is said to be legally binding on the regulated community
the same way a statute is, while an interpretative rule may bind agency
personnel, 34 ' but does not bind the regulated community. 342 In terms of procedure, legislative rules generally must be promulgated in accordance with public
notice-and-comment procedures, whereas the APA exempts interpretative rules
from these procedures.3 43 It is easy to see how the distinction between legislative and interpretative rules has led to confusion-different courts have distinguished between these rules on any and all of these three bases.3 4
Before Chevron, the Supreme Court afforded mandatory deference to legislative rules promulgated pursuant to explicit congressional delegations of rulemak-

338. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000). Legislative rules are not mentioned by name, but are recognized as
a residual category after excluding procedural rules, interpretative rules, and policy statements.
339. Exactly what constitutes a legislative as opposed to an interpretative rule has been a matter of
considerable controversy in the lower courts. See generally Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive" Rules,
"Legislative" Rules and "Spurious" Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1 (1994); Michael
Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DuKE L.J. 381; Mayton, supra note
244; Pierce, supra note 69; Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE L.J. 1463 (1992).
340. See Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 93-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reviewing the D.C.
Circuit case law distinguishing legislative and interpretative rules and emphasizing that norm interpretation is the distinctive feature of interpretative rules).
341. See Strauss, supra note 339, at 1475-87, for an instructive discussion of how interpretative
rules serve to bind agency personnel even though they do not have general legislative effect.
342. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin, 995 F.2d 1106, 1108-12 (D.C. Cir.
1993); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Asimow, supra note 339, at
383; Pierce, supra note 69, at 555-58.
343. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000).
344. During the late 1960s and 1970s a number of courts adopted yet another test for distinguishing
between legislative rules and interpretative rules-the substantial impact test. See, e.g., Lewis-Mota v.
Sec'y of Labor, 469 E2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972); Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 743-44 (3d Cir.
1969). Under this approach, rules that were especially important were legislative; rules of lesser impact
were interpretative. The substantial impact test sought to further the purposes of the APA's imposition
of mandatory rulemaking procedures, see Mayton, supra note 244, at 910-11, but was extremely
subjective in its application, and created uncertainty because agencies and parties could not know in
advance what the courts would regard as sufficiently important to warrant rulemaking procedures. By
the mid-1980s, this test was generally abandoned. See, e.g., Cabais v. Egger, 690 E2d 234, 237 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); see also Asimow, supra note 339, at 397-98. For a discussion of the tendencies of courts to
be especially inventive in matters of administrative procedure in the late 1960s and 1970s, see Thomas
W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997).
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346
ing authority, 345 but gave at most Skidmore deference to interpretative rules.
Christensen v. Harris County, 34 7 ruling that Chevron deference applies only to
agency interpretations advanced in a format that has the "force of law,, 3 48 might
be read as foreclosing Chevron deference to interpretative rules. As noted, one
of the grounds for distinguishing between legislative and interpretative rules is
whether the rule is legally binding-that is, whether it has the force of law.
Nevertheless, Christensen did not list "interpretative rules" among its examples
of agency action not entitled Chevron deference.34 9 Moreover, Justice Scalia in
his concurring opinion went out of his way to declare that Chevron "in fact
involved an interpretative regulation. 3 5 ° Chevron involved an interpretative
regulation, however, only in the first sense of the distinction between legislative
rules and interpretative rules; the regulation at issue in Chevron offered an
interpretation of an existing norm, the Clean Air Act's term "stationary source."
However, the agency clearly intended that the regulation would be legally
binding, and it was promulgated in accordance with notice-and-comment rulemaking. 35 ' Under two out of the three meanings of legislative rule, therefore,
the rule in Chevron was legislative. Christensen thus leaves the question
whether interpretative rules are entitled to Chevron deference in a state of some

confusion.3 52

The operating principles set forth in Part IV make clear that Chevron deference extends only to interpretations rendered in decisional formats that bind
parties outside the agency with the force of law. With respect to rules, therefore,

345. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S.
416, 425-26 (1977).
346. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 & n.15 (1980); United States v. Stapf,
375 U.S. 118, 127 n.l (1964).
347. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
348. See id. 587.
349. The Court mentioned opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines. See id.
350. Id. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
351. See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans and
Approval and Promulgation of Implementations Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct. 14, 1981) (summarizing and responding to eighty-one comments received on proposed rule adopting bubble definition).
352. The ink was hardly dry on the decision when the Court granted certiorari in another case that
could settle the question whether Chevron applies to interpretative rules. See Mead Corp. v. United
States, 185 F.3d 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000). Mead Corp. presents the
question whether Chevron applies to atypical orders issued by the Customs Service called tariff
classification rulings. 185 F.3d at 1306. These rulings, like "revenue rulings" issued by the Internal
Revenue Service, should probably be categorized as interpretative rules because they do not bind
persons outside the agency and they are not promulgated through notice-and-comment procedures. See
Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484 (1990) (revenue rulings "do not have the force and effect of
regulations"). However, tariff classification rulings are atypical of interpretative rules in two respects:
They are expressly authorized by a statute that delegates authority to the Customs Service to adopt
regulations providing for "binding rulings," 19 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (2000), and they are expressly said to
be "binding" on Customs personnel, 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(a) (2000). It is possible to argue, therefore, that
tariff classification rulings, unlike most interpretative rules, have the "force of law," Christensen, 529
U.S. at 587, and hence are entitled to Chevron deference.
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Chevron deference extends only to rules that conform to the classical definition
of a legislative rule. As Michael Asimow has written:
A legislative rule is essentially an administrative statute-an exercise of
previously delegated power, new law that completes an incomplete legislative
design. Legislative rules frequently prescribe, modify, or abolish duties, rights,
or exemptions. In contrast, nonlegislative rules do not exercise delegated
lawmaking power and thus are not administrative statutes. Instead, they
provide guidance to the public and to agency staff and decisionmakers. They
353
are not legally binding on members of the public.
As we have seen, there are several different ways of defining interpretative
rules,35 4 and there is no need to be dogmatic in insisting on a single definition.
Insofar as interpretative rules are understood to mean what Asimow calls
"nonlegislative rules"-that is, rules that do not legally bind the public-they
are not entitled to Chevron deference. If interpretative rules are defined in some
other way-for example as rules that clarify the meaning of a preexisting norm,
rather than rules that articulate a new norm355-then interpretative rules may or
may not be entitled to Chevron deference depending on whether they are legally
binding on the public. The principle is clear, even if the labeling is subject to
fluctuation.3 56
8. Does Chevron Apply When a Chevron-Qualified Agency Renders an
Interpretation in a Procedural Rule Exempt from the Notice-and-Comment
Provisions of APA Section 553?
Legislative rules come in two varieties: substantive and procedural. As in the
law of civil procedure, the dividing line between the two is somewhat elusive.357 The principal significance of the distinction is that procedural rules, like
interpretative rules and policy statements, are exempt from the notice-andcomment provisions of section 553 .
Under the operating principles set forth in Part IV, it is clear that legal
interpretations reflected in procedural rules are entitled to Chevron deference,
provided those rules are legally binding. If the procedural rules are adopted
pursuant to a grant of delegated power, ordinarily they will be binding, even if
353. Asimow, supra note 339, at 383 (footnote omitted).
354. See supra notes 338-44 and accompanying text.
355. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589-90 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (characterizing the rule in Chevron as interpretative).
356. Occasionally agencies will employ notice-and-comment procedures in adopting interpretative
regulations. For example, this is the practice of the Treasury Department with respect to interpretative

tax regulations. See

MICHAEL

I. SALTZMAN, IRS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

3.02[3] (2d ed. 1991). Under

the analysis urged here, if such regulations do not have the force of law they are not entitled to Chevron
deference. Thus, if the Treasury wants to secure Chevron deference from the courts for its regulations, it
must explicitly make them legislative rather than interpretative.

357. See GARY

LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

358. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2000).

273-74 (1998).
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they are promulgated under the APA's exception from notice-and-comment
requirements. Again, the dictum in Christensenarguably to the contrary should
be disregarded.3 59
Application of Chevron in this context represents an exception to the generalization noted in Part IV.B. that the force-of-law criterion permits public participation before interpretations entitled to mandatory deference are adopted. If a
procedural rule is of a technical nature, this will be of little consequence,
because there will be little interest in commenting on such rules. On the other
hand, if a procedural rule affects substantive rights, then the agency may decide
to follow the notice-and-comment procedure out of an abundance of caution,
given the vague line that divides procedural rules from substantive rules and the
risk of invalidation if the agency guesses wrong. 360 Still, under the current
structure of the APA, there will be some procedural rules that will be binding
and hence entitled to Chevron deference, notwithstanding that some members of
the public would like to comment on them before they are adopted but have
been denied any such opportunity. The correspondence between the force-oflaw criterion and public participation is strong, but it is not perfect.
9. Does Chevron Apply When a Chevron-Qualified Agency Renders an
Interpretation in a Proposed or Interim Rule?
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,36 1 the Supreme Court

recognized in dicta that "a proposed regulation does not represent an agency's
considered interpretation of its statute.' 3 6 2 Nevertheless, on several other occasions, the Court has given Chevron deference to proposed or interim regulations
363
lower courts have generally paid heed to
The lw
issued by various agencies.
what the Court said in Schor rather than what the Court has done.3 6 Still, the
divergence in the Court's practice here has created yet another potential source
of confusion.
The answer to the question whether Chevron extends to interpretations in
proposed or interim rules follows in a straightforward fashion from the logic of

359. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. (describing rules entitled to Chevron deference as those
adopted in notice-and-comment proceedings).
360. The D.C. Circuit, for example, has held that the procedural rule exception "does not apply
where the agency 'encodes a substantive value judgment.' " Reeder v. FCC, 865 F.2d 1298, 1305 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
361. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
362. Id. at 845 (dismissing significance of proposed regulation alleged to be inconsistent with final
regulation).
363. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) (applying Chevron deference
to proposed regulation developed from position taken by the agency in the course of the same
litigation); Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 697-98 (1991) (deferring to interim agency
regulations); United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657, 668-71 (1986) (affording Chevron deference
to the Secretary of Energy's decision establishing interim rates for hydroelectric power).
364. See Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48
F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995) (analogizing interim rules to policy statements, to which the Fourth Circuit
does not give Chevron deference).
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implied delegation. If a rule is legally binding, then it is eligible for Chevron
deference. If it is not legally binding, then it is not so entitled. Because proposed
rules are virtually never legally binding, Chevron deference will not extend to
these kinds of rules. Of course, even if Chevron does not apply, preliminary or
tentative agency expressions of view should be entitled to whatever weight they
deserve under the Skidmore standard.
Interim rules, in contrast, may be legally binding if they are adopted pursuant
to delegated rulemaking power and the agency properly establishes that the rule
falls within section 553's "good cause" exception.36 5 For example, sometimes it
is imperative that there be a legislative rule in place, but because of an
unanticipated development (such as judicial invalidation of a prior rule) there is
not enough time to complete the full gauntlet of notice-and-comment before
publishing the rule.366 In these circumstances, the agency can generally show
that there is good cause to promulgate a binding interim rule, to be followed in
due course by a final rule promulgated after notice-and-comment. Such interim
rules should be entitled to Chevron deference.
Here again, we see an instance where Chevron deference applies under the
force-of-law criterion and yet public participation is denied. In the case of
interim rules that qualify for the good cause exception, the sacrifice in public
input is probably less serious than it may be in other contexts, because this lack
of input usually will be only temporary. In most cases, full notice-and-comment
will be permitted before a final rule is adopted by the agency.
10. Does Chevron Apply When Lower-Level Employees in a Chevron-Qualified
Agency Render an Interpretation?
The Supreme Court has not focused on the question whether interpretations
by lower-level agency employees are entitled to Chevron deference, and the
circumstances in which the issue arises have to date been too diverse to generate
a square circuit conflict. 367 The question does not arise where agency rules are
concerned, because rules are almost always issued in the name of the agency
itself, or in the name of a division of the agency which has been expressly
delegated authority to issue such regulations. 368 Rather, it comes up almost
exclusively in the context of interpretations rendered in adjudications, including
both informal adjudications, such as result in the issuance of an opinion letter,
and formal adjudications where initial decisions are rendered by administrative
law judges (ALJs).
After Christensen, opinion letters issued by lower-level employees, assuming
they are not legally binding, are clearly not entitled to Chevron deference. The

365. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2000).
366.
agency
367.
368.

Cf. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 206-07 (1998) (striking down attempt by
to respond to invalidated rule with new rule that was made retroactive).
See supra note 92.
See Strauss, supra note 339, at 1467.
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question whether interpretations reflected in other types of adjudications rendered by lower-level employees are entitled to mandatory deference should be,
as always, resolved under the force-of-law criterion; if the employee's decision
has the force of law then it is entitled to Chevron deference, and if the decision
does not have the force of law, it should be assessed under Skidmore.
An adjudicatory order should be understood to have the "force of law" in this
context only if it is legally binding both inside the agency (that is, binding on
other agency personnel) and outside the agency (that is, binding on the parties
to the adjudication). In some contexts, initial decisions are merely recommendations to a higher body within the agency, in which case the decision clearly is
not binding in either sense, and thus, is not entitled to Chevron deference. In
other circumstances, initial decisions by ALJs are legally binding on the parties
to the adjudication unless an internal appeal is taken. 369 Even here, however,
such decisions often are not treated as binding precedent by the agency itself. In
other words, they are not regarded as legally binding inside the agency in future
proceedings raising the same issue. Such decisions also do not qualify for
Chevron deference. Indeed, it would be extremely odd to give ALJ decisions
greater legal force in court than they have within the agency itself.
Adhering to the force-of-law criterion thus appears to generate clear and
predictable answers to questions regarding when interpretations by lower-level
employees are entitled to Chevron deference. In contrast, the answers will often
be unclear under Justice Scalia's suggestion that lower-level employee interpretations should be subject to Chevron deference if they are "authoritative. 37 °
Would an opinion letter by a division chief be authoritative if not vouched for in
an amicus brief? What if it was merely shown to the agency head and not
disapproved? What if the recipient had a right to appeal to the agency head, but
did not take an appeal? The permutations are endless, and there are no established criteria or guidelines for fleshing out the meaning of "authoritative" in
this context. One virtue of the force-of-law criterion is that it generates reasonably clear answers to questions about Chevron's domain that will otherwise
prove quite vexing.
C.

WHEN IS THE PRESUMPTION OF DELEGATED INTERPRETATIONAL
AUTHORITY OVERCOME?

Our last set of issues concern the area of greatest uncertainty: What does it
take to overcome the presumption of mandatory deference that flows from the
delegation of power to an agency to bind with the force of law? We have
identified four issues that fall within this area, each of which presents different
considerations.

369. This is true, for example, in the Social Security Administration. See supra note 279.
370. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 591 n.* (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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11. Does Chevron Apply When a Statute Mandates a More Rigorous Standard
of Review Than Is Otherwise Required by the APA?
The Supreme Court's decision in HaggarApparel raises the question whether
Congress can turn off the Chevron doctrine by imposing a more demanding
standard of review than that prescribed by the APA. As argued in Part IV.c.,
Congress should not have to conform to any specific formula (such as prescribing "de novo review" or "independent judicial determination of questions of
law") before the Chevron presumption is overcome. Rather, courts should ask
whether the totality of the circumstances indicates a clear congressional intent
that courts not give mandatory deference to agency interpretations of law.
In this light, Haggar Apparel is questionable precedent. The decision is
perhaps most readily explainable by the fact that the application of de novo
standard of review in customs refund suits long pre-dated Chevron and reflects a
world in which legislative rulemaking was less common. Hence, Congress's
adoption of the de novo standard here cannot be said to reflect any judgment
about the degree of deference owed to Customs Service regulations. Should a
case arise in which Congress adopts a de novo standard that more clearly
applies to questions of law, or indeed in which Congress adopts any kind of de
novo review standard post-Chevron, there will be a much stronger basis for
concluding that Congress intended to displace Chevron deference. 37 ' Because
Chevron is only a presumption about congressional intent, and nothing more,
such context-specific evidence of a contrary intention should be given full
effect.
12. Does Chevron Apply to Interpretations That Modify the Scope of an
Agency's Jurisdiction?
The most important-and vexing---question involving Chevron's domain is
whether there should be an exception for interpretations that implicate the scope
of the agency's jurisdiction. Chevron's most serious failing may be its disregard
for the courts' role in keeping agencies within the scope of their delegated
authority. By stripping courts of primary interpretational authority where Congress has charged an agency with administration of a statute, Chevron simultaneously disarmed courts from being able to act in a consistently vigilant manner
in policing the boundaries of agency power.372
The Supreme Court has not advanced very far in deliberating about whether
it is appropriate to give Chevron deference to agency interpretations that affect
the scope of their delegated power. The most complete debate occurred in
separate concurring and dissenting opinions filed by Justice Brennan and Justice

371. For an interesting argument that Chevron should not apply on direct review of decisions of the
Patent Office, given that the overall scheme of the patent law indicates that the Patent Office has not
been delegated regulatory authority, see Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative
State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 127, 164-67 (2000).
372. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
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Scalia respectively in Mississippi Power & Light v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore.3 73
Justice Brennan noted that Chevron rests on the understanding that an agency
has been "entrusted to administer" a statute. He argued that "[a]gencies do not
'administer' statutes confining the scope of their jurisdiction, and such statutes
are not 'entrusted' to agencies. ' 37 4 Justice Scalia responded primarily by asserting the impossibility of drawing the line Justice Brennan was proposing.37 5 He
noted the difficulty of distinguishing "between an agency's exceeding its authority and an agency's exceeding authorized application of its authority. To exceed
authorized application is to exceed authority. Virtually any administrative action
can be characterized as either one or the other, depending upon how generally
one wishes to describe the 'authority.' ,376
The understanding that Chevron rests on an implied delegation of legislative
power helps us to see that Justice Brennan was surely right in principle:
Congress cannot be presumed to intend that courts defer to agency judgments
about the scope of their jurisdiction.3 77 Courts have never deferred to agencies

with respect to questions such as whether Congress has delegated to an agency
the power to act with the force of law through either legislative rules or binding
adjudications.37 8 Similarly, it has never been maintained that Congress would
want courts to give Chevron deference to an agency's determination that it is
entitled to Chevron deference, or should give Chevron deference to an agency's
determination of what types of interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference.
It is assumed that the court must determine whether power has been delegated

373. 487 U.S. 354 (1988). The majority opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, did not address the
possibility that FERC's decision allocating high-cost electric power within a multi-state power pool was
entitled to deference.
374. Id. at 386-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
375. Justice Scalia also purported to deny Justice Brennan's premise that Congress does not intend
that agencies be given authority to determine the scope of their jurisdiction. However, he offered no
evidence or argument that would support the contrary presumption. See id. at 381-82 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).
376. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Nat'l
Mediation Bd., 29 F3d 655, 676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Williams, J., dissenting) ("[A]ny issue
may readily be characterized as jurisdictional merely by manipulating the level of generality at which it
is framed."); Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations That
Delimit the Scope of the Agency's Jurisdiction,61 U. CHI. L. REv. 957 (1994).
377. See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990) ("[I]t is fundamental 'that an agency
may not bootstrap itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction.' " (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm'n v.
Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973))); ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1567 n.32 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("[lIt seems highly unlikely that a responsible Congress would implicitly delegate to an agency
the power to define the scope of its own power."); Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 186, at 1011.
378. See Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) ("[An] agency may not finally decide
the limits of its statutory power. That is a judicial function."); Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc.,
322 U.S. 607, 616 (1944) ("Determination of the extent of authority given to a delegated agency by
Congress is not left for the decision of him in whom authority is vested."); SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLurnON, supra note 191, at 224 ("A cardinal principle of American constitutionalism is that those
who are limited by law should not be empowered to decide on the meaning of the limitation: foxes
should not guard henhouses.").
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to an agency before the court can be charged with deferring to the agency's
exercise of that power.3 79

If Justice Brennan was right in principle, Justice Scalia's critique based on the
practical difficulties of defining agency action in excess of authority has been
sufficiently persuasive that it has discouraged the Court from developing any
scope-of-jurisdiction exception. The Court appears to be aware of the need to
police against agency aggrandizement (and abrogation). But it has done so
primarily by exercising especially vigorous statutory interpretation at Chevron's
step one when agencies press the limits of their authority, not by creating an
exception to Chevron deference.38 ° Unfortunately, there are serious drawbacks
with using step-one analysis as the means for policing agency deviations from
their assigned mandates.
One problem with using step one in this fashion is that it distorts the inquiry
ordinarily mandated at step one. The Court has never disavowed the understanding that the inquiry at step one is whether the statute has only one possible
meaning.3 8 1 Yet, in its jurisdiction-policing mode, the Court has insisted on
interpretations that, while arguably correct as reconstructions of the best understanding of congressional intent, are by no means the only possible interpretation of the relevant language. In order to preserve the general structure of the

379. It may be argued that the scope-of-jurisdiction question does not concern whether Congress has
given the agency the power to act with the force of law, but rather how far that power extends, in the
sense of what subject matter is covered. This is more closely analogous to the question of whether a
delegation of power has been cabined by an "intelligible principle," something the Court has found
notoriously hard to enforce. However, even in its most lenient interpretations of the intelligible
principle, the Court has exercised independent judgment. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 425-26 (1944); Nat'l. Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943). The intelligible
principle standard may not be very constraining, but there is no doubt that the question whether this
standard is satisfied is one the court must decide independently, rather than by deferring to the agency.
For example, prior to the Court's recent decision in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct.
903 (2001), it had been suggested occasionally that the agency can help solve the intelligible principle
problem by articulating standards that constrain its own exercise of discretion. See Amalgamated Meat
Cutters v. Connally, 337 F Supp. 737, 758-59 (1971) (three-judge court); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Schechter Poultry at the Millenium: A Delegation Doctrinefor the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J.
1399, 1415-31 (2000). Although the Court in American Trucking rejected this suggestion, see 121 S. Ct.
at 912, it is noteworthy that even those that endorsed agency-developed standards as a partial substitute
for congressional standards nevertheless always admitted that the ultimate judgment as to whether the
standards are constitutionally sufficient is for the court to make.
380. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (striking down FCC's
regulation that would eliminate tariff filings for most interexchange telephones as going beyond
statutory authority allowing the agency to "modify" tariff filing requirements); Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26 (1990) (invalidating the Office of Management and Budget's assertion of
jurisdiction over agency information disclosure policies as contrary to the structure and general
purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act).
381. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) ("Under Chevron, a
reviewing court must first ask 'whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.' "); Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 487 (1998) (same); Nationsbank v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 (1995) ("Under the formulation now familiar, when we confront an
expert administrator's statutory exposition, we inquire first whether 'the intent of Congress is clear' as
to 'the precise question at issue.' ").
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Chevron framework, however, the Court has been forced to dissemble, characterizing these readings as resting on the "clear," "plain," or "unambiguous"
meaning of the statute.3 82 This dissembling threatens to contaminate the stepone inquiry in other cases in which the agency is concededly acting within the
scope of its authority, sending confusing signals to the lower courts.
Using step one to police agency jurisdiction also eliminates any requirement
that the Court confront the agency's reasons for expanding (or contracting) its
mandate. Often agencies will want to add to or subtract from their portfolio of
responsibilities based on unforeseen changes in technology or market conditions.3 83 These new developments may or may not justify the agency's proposed
departure from past regulatory practices, but it would be desirable for courts at
least to confront the agency's stated motivations. Instead, the inquiry at step one
proceeds only in terms of the original text, history, and judicial understanding of
the relevant statutory language, as if the practical problem and the agency's
reasoning for reformulating the scope of its authority in light of this problem did
not exist.
Rather than seeking to identify the precise boundaries of agency authority at
step one, a better solution would be to ask at "step zero" whether Congress
would want the particular question about the scope of agency authority to be
resolved as a matter of mandatory deference (Chevron) or common-law deference (Skidmore). As the Court recognized in Brown & Williamson, whether an
agency is entitled to Chevron deference turns ultimately on congressional intent.
With respect to "ordinary" gaps in a statutory scheme, Chevron represents a
presumption that Congress intends the agency to be primary interpreter. 3 84 It
does not follow, however, that Congress harbors the same intent with respect to
"extraordinary" gaps that implicate the scope of an agency's authority.385 As to
what constitutes an extraordinary gap, the Brown & Williamson Court did not
suggest any fixed criteria. At least implicitly, however, Justice O'Connor's
opinion recognizes that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary is a
function of history and context. To put it another way, extraordinary questions
are those as to which one can say, based on the totality of the statutory

382. See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp., 512 U.S. at 225-29 (finding agency interpretation contracting
its jurisdiction to be foreclosed by old dictionary definitions and the purposes of the statute); Dole v.
United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. at 42-43 & n. 10 (finding agency interpretation expanding its jurisdiction
to be foreclosed by "clear congressional intent" as revealed by examination of general purposes and the
overall structure of the Paperwork Reduction Act).
383. See, e.g., Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990) (refusing to
allow ICC to relax filed rate doctrine notwithstanding widespread disregard of filing requirements and
surge in bankruptcies among trucking companies); United States v. S.W. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968) (permitting FCC to regulate cable television-a new technology unknown when the Communications Act of 1934 was enacted).
384. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.
385. Id.
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circumstances, that Congress clearly would not want the courts to give mandatory deference to agency interpretations of law.
Note that treating the problem of agency jurisdiction at step zero in this
fashion does not require that the court identify a clear congressional intent
regarding whether the agency has jurisdiction. It requires only that the court
identify a clear congressional intent about the identity of the primary interpreter
of the agency's jurisdiction. Thus, if the court concludes that Congress would
not want the agency to be the primary interpreter, the court need not insist that
the statute has only one right answer in order to reject the agency's interpretation.
Treating the scope of jurisdiction problem at step zero also significantly
blunts Justice Scalia's criticism based on the practical difficulty of defining
when an agency is proposing an interpretation "in excess" of its authority. The
step zero approach does not modify the presumption that Chevron deference is
the rule whenever Congress delegates power to act with the force of law. This
presumption can only be overcome by a finding, based on all relevant evidence,
that Congress clearly would not want a court to give mandatory deference to the
agency's interpretation. The need to overcome the presumption should prevent
the scope-of-jurisdiction exception from swallowing the rule.
Note too that the inquiry at step zero would not turn on an exercise in abstract
characterization-asking whether the question is "jurisdictional" or not. Instead,
it would turn on an effort to uncover Congress's intent regarding the most
appropriate interpreter. As Brown & Williamson illustrates, this inquiry necessarily encompasses not just the statute under review, but also related statutes that
bear on the division of authority as between different agencies and different
levels of government. Thus, resolution of the step-zero question will require,
among other things, a consideration of the historical evolution of the agency's
mandate and the implications to be drawn from related post-enactment legislation. This type of inquiry is far removed from the exercise in abstract characterization Justice Scalia assumed would prevail.3 86
Finally, if the court concludes that Skidmore deference is more appropriate,
the court will necessarily confront a wide range of considerations bearing on the
evolution of agency authority and the congressional response, and this likely
will require the court to engage in a more pragmatic assessment of the issue
than is required under Chevron's step one. Specifically, the court must expressly
confront such factors as the cogency and thoroughness of the agency's reasoning, the extent to which the agency is departing from past practice, and whether

386. Also, when we recognize that the default rule in the absence of Chevron deference is Skidmore
deference, the stakes in making the step-zero determination go down. The question at step zero is
whether Congress would want Chevron or Skidmore to apply in deciding whether the agency is acting
in excess of statutory authority. Posing the question this way reduces the payoff to manipulation of
abstract concepts, and hence makes it somewhat less likely that it will occur.
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the issue implicates the agency's unique expertise.387 In other words, the court
must engage the agency's reasoning for departing from its historical mandate.
The agency may not convince the court that its departure is justified, but at least
the court will grapple with the underlying problems that have impelled the
agency in a different direction.
13. Does Chevron Apply to Interpretations That Raise Constitutional
Questions?
Another difficult issue involves the interaction of Chevron and questions of
constitutional law, a point at which two policymaking regimes clash. The
agency is supposed to be responsible for making policy under the statute,
consistent with the terms and conditions laid down by Congress, but the Court
has anointed itself the chief policymaker under the Constitution. Because the
Constitution is a form of law superior to a mere statute, it is clear that in any
direct clash between the Court's policy derived from its status as constitutional
interpreter and the agency's policy derived from its authority under a statute, the
Court's policy must win. 388 Thus, there can be no doubt that Chevron deference
must give way when the agency's policy, although consistent with the statute
and otherwise permissible in light of the statutory language and purpose,
impinges upon principles that the Court has discerned in the Constitution.
Two separate canons of avoidance can be invoked in mediating the conflict
between agency policy and constitutional policy: avoidance of unconstitutional
questions and avoidance of unconstitutionality. 389 The avoidance of unconstitutionality canon says that when faced with a choice between two interpretations
of a statute, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the court should
chose the interpretation that is constitutional. The avoidance of questions canon
says that when faced with a choice between two interpretations of a statute, one
that does not raise a serious constitutional question and one that does, the court
should chose the interpretation that does not raise any serious constitutional
question. On some occasions (including one just this Term), the Court has
squarely endorsed the avoidance of questions canon, and held that this canon
displaces the Chevron doctrine.3 9 ° Under this version of the canon, an agency
interpretation that would otherwise be sustained under Chevron will be rejected
if it raises a serious constitutional question. On at least one occasion, however,
the Court has adopted a position more consistent with the avoidance of unconsti-

387. See Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
388. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2332 (2000) (stating that
"Congress may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution").
389. See Adrian Vermeule, Savings Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948-49 (1997) (collecting
authorities recognizing two versions of the canon).
390. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 121 S. Ct.
675, 683 (2001); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 574-75 (1988).

2001]

CHEVRON'S DOMAIN

tutionality canon. 39 ' Under this version of the canon, an agency interpretation
that would otherwise be sustained under Chevron will be rejected in favor of
another interpretation only if it would actually be unconstitutional. The Court's
decisions thus send conflicting signals on this question.
We think the avoidance of unconstitutionality canon comports better with the
underlying rationale of the Chevron doctrine than does the avoidance of questions canon. Chevron rests in part on the understanding that Congress prefers
discretionary policy choices to be made, to the extent possible, by Congress
itself and by accountable agencies rather than by the courts. The avoidance of
questions canon has the opposite effect of enlarging the scope of policymaking
by courts at the expense of Congress and the agencies. As Judge Posner has
written, the effect of this version of the canon is
to enlarge the already vast reach of constitutional prohibition beyond even the
most extravagant modem interpretations of the Constitution-to create a
judge-made "penumbra" that has much the same prohibitory effect as the
judge-made (or at least judge-amplified) Constitution itself-and in doing so
to sharpen the tensions between the legislative and judicial branches.39 2
When an agency's interpretation poses an actual conflict with the Constitution, the court should displace the Chevron doctrine and adopt the interpretation
that avoids this result. However, short of an actual conflict with the Constitution, Chevron instructs that courts should seek to preserve the discretion of
agencies to resolve questions of policy. Thus, whatever the fate of the avoidance
of questions canon in other contexts,39 3 it should be abandoned in cases that
arise under the Chevron doctrine.
14. Does Chevron Apply to Interpretations That Are Inconsistent with Judicial
Precedent?
The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that agency interpretations of
statutes that deviate from the Court's own precedents are not entitled to Chevron
deference.3 94 According to the Court, "Once we have determined a statute's
clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare
decisis, and we judge an agency's later interpretation of the statute against our
prior determination of the statute's meaning., 395 Such blanket statements have
the appearance of creating an exception to the Chevron doctrine-that is, a
391. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991).
392. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 285 (1985).
393. Commentators have suggested that the canon should be abolished altogether. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 71.
394. See Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992);
Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 (1990); see also Pierce, supra note 28, at
2251 (synthesizing cases).
395. Maislin Indus., 497 U.S. at 131.
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circumstance in which courts should find that the presumption of delegated
interpretational authority has been overcome. Indeed, the Court's understanding
appears at first blush to violate the logic of delegated lawmaking that underlies
Chevron. If Congress has indeed delegated the primary power of interpretation
to the agency rather than the courts, then it cannot be true that every judicial
interpretation takes precedence over contrary agency interpretations. At least if
the issue is one as to which the statute admits of more than one meaning, then
the agency interpretation logically should take precedence over the judicial
interpretation. 39 6
More accurately considered, however, the question of what to do about
judicial precedent does not present an exception to Chevron, but illustrates the
need for a transitional rule-a special rule of adjustment that mediates between
the pre-Chevron and the post-Chevron worlds. This can be seen by considering,
first, what role judicial precedent should play in a world in which all relevant
decisions have been made in full awareness of Chevron and its two-step
procedure. In such a world, all judicial precedent should be self-consciously
rendered as either a "step-one precedent" or a "step-two precedent." If step one,
then the previous court will have determined that the statute had an unambiguous meaning that forecloses the exercise of any interpretational discretion on the
part of the agency; the statute either compelled or forbade the previous agency
view. Such a precedent would obviously be entitled to full stare decisis effect in
a later case presenting the same interpretational issue. Such a decision, in effect,
tells us that the statute has only one possible meaning, which precludes any
exercise of agency discretion.3 97
In contrast, if the previous judicial decision was a step-two precedent, then
the court found that the statute admits of the exercise of agency discretion in its
interpretation. If the court upheld the agency interpretation at step two, then we
know that the previous agency interpretation was reasonable. This does not,
however, foreclose the possibility that a different, agency interpretation would
also be reasonable. If the court struck down the previous agency interpretation
at step two, then we know the previous interpretation was unreasonable. But
this too does not mean that a different agency interpretation would not be
reasonable. In either event, the previous judicial decision should not be given
full stare decisis effect in fixing the meaning of the statute. Instead, it should be
given stare decisis effect only for the proposition that the statute admits of
multiple interpretations-in other words, for the proposition that the case should
be resolved at step two-and that at least one interpretation (the agency's
previous interpretation) was either reasonable or unreasonable. The fact that the
court upheld (or invalidated) the agency's prior construction of the statute

396. One of the authors of this Article has previously commented on this issue in a manner that
reflects this perspective. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 989-90.
397. See White, supra note 28, at 745-46, 759.
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would not, however, be determinative in deciding whether the current interpretation is permissible. 398 Thus, in a post-Chevron world in which all relevant
decisions are taken in full awareness of Chevron's two-step procedure, judicial
precedent should be categorized as being either step-one precedent or step-two
precedent, and should be given the stare decisis effect appropriate to its status.
The analysis becomes more complicated, however, when we introduce the
possibility that one or more of the relevant judicial decisions were not rendered
in full awareness of the Chevron framework. The most obvious circumstance is
where the judicial precedent predates 1984. We also know, however, that for
many years after Chevron, courts irregularly, but often, ignored or disregarded
the Chevron doctrine. 399 The difficult question is how to treat such pre-Chevron
precedent.
There are really only two options for such decisions. One is to examine each
pre-Chevron precedent on a case-by-case basis, in an attempt to determine as
best as is possible whether the precedent would have been a step-one precedent
or a step-two precedent if, counterfactually, the court had applied the Chevron
doctrine. 40 0 The other is to adopt a blanket presumption that all pre-Chevron
precedent is step-one precedent. 40 ' Neither option can be fairly described as an
exception to the Chevron doctrine. Rather, courts must elect one option or the
other as a transition rule in order to make sense of pre-Chevron precedent in a
post-Chevron world. Competing arguments can be advanced in support of either
rule, and the logic of Chevron does not clearly demand one approach rather than
the other. The Supreme Court's treatment of its own precedent is best understood as adopting the second option-the blanket presumption that all past
Supreme Court precedents are step-one precedents. This choice is a justifiable
one, for several reasons.

398. Professor Pierce appears to advocate a more grudging approach to step-two precedent. He
would relax the strong presumption against overruling statutory interpretation precedent in this context,
but apparently would continue to treat the judicial precedent as presumptively correct, in deference to
reliance interests associated with judicial precedent. See Pierce, supra note 28, at 2259-62. At least in
the context of judicial precedent rendered with full awareness of Chevron, we think this gives
insufficient credence to the notion that Congress has impliedly delegated interpretational authority to
the agency, not the court. Once the Chevron message is fully assimilated, parties affected by judicial
decisions affirming agency interpretations at step two should understand that the decision they are
relying upon is the agency's, not the court's.
399. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 982-84.
400. This appears to be the approach advocated both by Pierce, supra note 28, at 2260-61, and by
White, supra note 28, at 761.
401. Logically, of course, one could also adopt the presumption that all pre-Chevron precedent is
step-two precedent. This would make little sense, however, given that courts prior to Chevron
frequently paid little heed to agency interpretations. There is no empirical basis for presuming that all
pre-Chevron statutory interpretation precedent involved ambiguous statutes or that they involved
agency interpretations that were either reasonable (if upheld) or unreasonable (if struck down).
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First, in the era before Chevron, courts commonly took the view that they
should engage in independent judgment in matters of statutory interpretation.4 °2
This was not always the case; there has always been a significant strand of
deference.4 °3 But independent judgment was the rule often enough that, as an
empirical matter, a substantial percentage of pre-Chevron decisions would on a
fair re-examination be found to be step-one precedents. Adopting the blanket
presumption is thus not a large distortion of reality.
Second, there was no understanding before Chevron that agencies were free
to change judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes. Thus, once the meaning
of a statute was fixed by a Supreme Court decision, it almost always became a
fixed point of reference in understanding the regulatory scheme. Any methodology that would require the systematic reevaluation of pre-Chevron precedent
would "unsettle a vast cluster of public and private expectations" 40 4 and would
thus be destabilizing. 4°5 The truism that it is often more important that rules be
settled than that they be settled correctly 40 6 would appear to be fully applicable
here.
Third, the process of case-by-case reclassification would be fraught with
difficulties. An example is provided by the confident assertion of commentators
that the Supreme Court precedent enforced in Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v.
PrimarySteel, Inc. "merely upheld a prior agency construction of the [Interstate
Commerce Act],""0 7 in other words, held that the precedent was what we would

now call step-two precedent. Although one might gain this impression by
reading Maislin, the precedent followed by the Court came from original
judicial actions seeking to enforce rates different from the ones contained in the
filed tariffs. 40 8 The doctrine was initially articulated by courts, not by the

agency, based on the courts' own understanding of the requirements of the
policies underlying the Interstate Commerce Act.40 9 The precedent reaffirmed in
Maislin thus does not correspond to either step one or step two of Chevron.
402. See Russell L. Weaver, Chevron: Martin, Anthony, and Format Requirements, 40 KAN. L. REV.
587, 587-88 (1992) (stating that before Chevron, courts usually exercised independent judgment in
determining statutory meaning).
403. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 975; see also Diver, supra note 3, at 551-52.
404. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents,76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1367 (1988).
405. See generally Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) ("Stare decisis is the preferred
course because it promotes evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process."); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The doctrine [of stare
decisis] exists for the purpose of introducing certainty and stability into the law and protecting the
expectations of individuals and institutions that have acted in reliance on existing rules."). 406. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
407. Pierce, supra note 28, at 2260; see White, supra note 28, at 744.
408. See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U.S. 242 (1906) (filed rate supersedes rate stated in
bill of lading); Gulf, Colo.& Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98 (1895) (filed rate supersedes state
statute making rate in bill of lading controlling).
409. It appears that the relevant agency (the Interstate Commerce Commission) was mildly supportive of the filed rate doctrine, but purely after-the-fact. See INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM'N, NIrTH
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As this example suggests, the Supreme Court does not have the institutional
capacity to engage in wholesale reexamination of. each of its pre-Chevron
interpretations of regulatory statutes, and classify them as step one or step two.
The task of case-by-case reexamination would have to be undertaken largely by
the lower courts. This would magnify the uncertainty of the reexamination
process, and would increase the likelihood of conflict among the circuits. In
addition, even if the Court did have the capacity to undertake these inquiries,
there is something misplaced about committing significant judicial resources to
"litigation over litigation."4 1 ° Requiring that all statutory interpretation precedents be reexamined and re-categorized in order to calibrate their stare decisis
effect probably represents a poor return on investment in both private and
public litigation resources.
Finally, the affirmative case for the alternative option, individualized reexamination of past precedents to categorize them as step one or step two, largely
rests upon the desirability of giving maximal effect to the allocation of interpretational authority adopted in Chevron. As we have seen, however, allocation of
authority established in Chevron is a revisionist one, and rests on a questionable
assumption about presumed congressional intent. 4 1' Thus, not much is lost by
limiting its effect to future controversies. Decisions that change the ground rules
are usually given prospective application, and it is fitting that Chevron be given
prospective application, at least as regards the treatment of judicial precedent.
Some of these considerations, most prominently the limited institutional
capacity to engage in case-by-case reexamination, apply most forcefully to
the Supreme Court, and less so to the lower courts. However, the general
thrust of the analysis points toward a similar conclusion throughout the
judicial hierarchy. Pre-Chevron precedent at all levels is highly likely to
reflect independent judicial judgment; past judicial interpretations at all
levels have undoubtedly elicited significant reliance; and case-by-case reconsideration at all levels would be fraught with uncertainty and draining of
resources. Thus, there is little basis for adopting a different approach to
Supreme Court and lower court precedent in determining the relative claims
of Chevron and stare decisis.
In sum, judicial precedent should be factored into the Chevron framework
by first asking whether the precedent was rendered before or after Chevron
came to be recognized as a universal standard for determining when courts
must defer to agency interpretations of law. Post-Chevron precedent should

76-77 (1896) (commenting on the Hefley decision, and indicating no prior ICC position
on the question); supra note 402 and accompanying text.
410. Cf Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560-61 (1988) (cautioning against overuse of litigationover-litigation because this "investment of appellate energy will either fail to produce the normal
norm-clarifying benefits that come from an appellate decision on a question of law, or else will
strangely distort the appellate process").
411. See notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
ANNUAL REPORT
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be given whatever stare decisis effect is appropriate to either a step-one
decision or a step-two decision. Pre-Chevron precedent should be conclusively presumed to be step-one precedent, and should be given the full stare
decisis effect appropriate to such status.
CONCLUSION

For a doctrine that enunciates a simple two-step inquiry, Chevron has generated an extraordinary amount of confusion about when it does and does not
apply. The root of the problem is not the idea of implied delegation-that
interpretational authority should be allocated between agencies and courts in
accordance with the intentions of Congress. Rather, the root of the problem
would appear to be Chevron's suggestion that the critical act of delegation
occurs when Congress enacts a statute that contains a gap or ambiguity. 4 12 This
cannot be correct. Any statute that entails executive branch functions can (and
almost inevitably does) contain gaps and ambiguities. The presence of a gap or
ambiguity therefore does not differentiate agencies entitled to exercise primary
interpretational authority from any unit of the executive branch. 13
Gaps and ambiguities are relevant to the scope of Chevron only because
every delegation of authority to an agency is subject to the constraint that it
must be exercised in accordance with law. Thus, whether an agency is acting
pursuant to a delegation to spend money, prosecute crimes, or develop
standards for controlling air pollution, its action must conform to law. The
existence of a silence or ambiguity in the statute that delegates such power
widens the potential discretion of the agency to act, but does not confer
authority to act in the first place. We must look elsewhere to identify the
critical congressional action that impliedly delegates interpretational authority to an agency.
The critical source of delegated authority that gives rise to mandatory
deference is not found in Chevron's language about silences and ambiguities, but rather in its offhand reference to the fact that certain agencies are
charged with administration of a statute. Although Chevron and most of its
many progeny have left this phrase undefined, the Court's recent decision in
Christensen v. HarrisCount) points toward a more precise understanding of
what it takes to charge an agency, which comports with the logic of implied
delegation: The relevant source of delegation is a statute that charges an
agency with taking action that binds persons outside the agency with the
force of law.
Armed with this insight, understood in light of background principles that tell
us Chevron is but one of two deference doctrines and that congressional intent
is always paramount in discerning when Chevron should apply, most of the
412. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
413. Accord Anthony, supranote 10, at 34-35.
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issues about Chevron's domain that have bedeviled the courts turn out to have
fairly easy answers. Agencies are entitled to mandatory deference when they act
with the force of law in promulgating rules or adjudicating a dispute that falls
within their legislative mandate, and not otherwise. Chevron's domain is not as
large as some, most notably Justice Scalia, may have imagined, but it is by no
means insignificant. Within its proper domain, Chevron serves as a powerful
command to which all courts owe a duty of obedience.

